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not 2d783448b7 fix(e2e): assert the register record where a real approval happens (refs #149)
CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 1m6s
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CI / verify-stack (pull_request) Successful in 7m49s
CI / frontend (pull_request) Successful in 2m57s
CI / mutation (pull_request) Successful in 6m7s
verify-domain was the wrong home for the assertion, and CI was right to fail it.
That check completes the Beoordelen task straight through Flowable REST — on
purpose, it exists to exercise the Workflow Client's REST contract — which
bypasses the domain `decide` path that calls the ACL. No approval reached the
ACL there, so no record was ever written.

The Playwright happy path is the only check that drives a real approval
(behandel portal → BFF → domain → ACL), and it already knows its own reference.
Assert there instead: exactly one RegisterRecord for that reference,
INGESCHREVEN, carrying nothing outside the public-safe schema. Drops
register-record-check.py and the verify-domain block.

The helper was run under real Playwright against a live Objecten before
committing — one record found, none for an unknown reference.
2026-08-14 10:43:34 +02:00
not 10b784cc05 fix(infra): reach Objecten by service name in the register-record check (refs #149)
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CI / verify-stack (pull_request) Failing after 7m24s
CI caught my own check falling into the constraint ADR-0028 documents: it looked
Objecttypen up by container IP, so the objecttype URL came back IP-addressed and
Objecten rejected it as "not one of the available choices". Reach both by
service name — compose DNS resolves them, and neither request has OpenZaak's
URL-validity constraint that made IPs necessary elsewhere in this script.

The 400 also spent the full 60s timeout disguised as "transport:" because
HTTPError is a URLError subclass. Handle it separately: a 4xx now fails
immediately with the response body, which is where the real reason was.

Verified both ways against a live Objecten: absent record → exit 1 with the
reason, present record → exit 0.
2026-08-14 10:20:26 +02:00
not 2bb7d9c165 test(acl): ObjectenGateway integration test against live Objecten (refs #149)
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CI / verify-stack (pull_request) Failing after 18m4s
Drives the real gateway against a running Objecten + Objecttypen pair: two
writes for the same id leave exactly one object carrying the second write's
status, and nothing outside the public-safe schema. Runs under verify-acl,
inside the compose network — which it must, because Objecttypen echoes the
request Host into the objecttype `url` and Objecten only accepts the one
matching its configured api_root. ADR-0028 records that constraint.
2026-08-14 09:44:15 +02:00
not 4a047c618c fix(infra): let Objecten actually accept the register record (refs #149)
Replaying the gateway's calls against a live Objecten + Objecttypen pair turned
up two blockers CI would only have found after the fact:

- Objecten rejects an objecttype it has not been configured with, and it
  identifies one by uuid — assigned at seed time by a one-shot that runs after
  Objecten's static setup_configuration. Pin the uuid on both sides instead.
- Objecten notifies on every write and notifications_api_common *raises* when
  that config is absent, so every POST 500'd after rolling the object back.
  Objecten → NRC has no broker, worker, kanaal or abonnement yet, so disable
  notifications rather than wire a client that drops every message; S-19b turns
  them on for real.

With both in place the full exchange verifies end to end: lookup → version →
search → create → update (still one object), and a record carrying a bsn is
rejected by the schema. ADR-0028 records both.
2026-08-14 09:41:00 +02:00
not 43b45ad756 fix(acl): read each objecttype version instead of the versions collection (refs #149)
The version resolve assumed `GET {objecttype}/versions` returns a bare list.
Every other collection in the Objecttypen API returns a paginated envelope, and
nothing in the repo exercises that endpoint, so the shape was a guess. Follow
the path infra/registerrecord-check.py already proves against the real API
instead: read the `versions` URLs off the objecttype and fetch each for its
status. Costs a request per version, once per gateway instance.

ACL mutation score 92.23% (baseline 91.37%).
2026-08-14 09:33:15 +02:00
not 5502e4c099 test(acl): raise the Objecten gateway above the mutation ratchet (refs #149)
The new gateway landed at 77.6%, dragging the ACL score under its 90 break
threshold. The gaps were all real behaviour nobody was asserting: a failed or
empty read being mistaken for "nothing there yet" and followed by a blind
write, a `results`-less response taking down the resolve with an
ArgumentNullException, the CRS headers going to Objecttypen (which is not a geo
API), and the write body being sent chunked. ACL score 86.63% → 92.08%.
2026-08-14 09:29:03 +02:00
not 3705a18e18 docs: ADR-0028 + demo note — Objecten holds the register (refs #149)
ADR-0028 records why the register record lives in Objecten rather than as zaak
eigenschappen, why the ACL owns the hop, and how two non-atomic writes are made
to converge instead. Also retires the PRD §15 out-of-scope line the slice
supersedes.
2026-08-14 09:23:41 +02:00
not 400bdcafc4 test(infra): assert the approval wrote the register record to Objecten (refs #149)
verify-domain already drives a full approval; it now also asserts Objecten holds
exactly one RegisterRecord for that registration — matched on its own reference,
because the shared verify stack carries records from earlier runs. The check
covers the three things that can silently go wrong: the record is missing (the
ACL's Objecten hop never ran), duplicated (the upsert is not idempotent), or
carries a field outside the public-safe schema.
2026-08-14 09:22:09 +02:00
not c67ee7d3f5 refactor(acl): resolve the objecttype's highest published version (refs #149)
Counting the `versions` URLs assumed a contiguous, all-published list. Read the
objecttype's versions collection instead and take the highest one whose status
is `published`, so a draft version — whose schema is still being shaped — is
never written against.
2026-08-14 09:19:50 +02:00
not d14f379358 feat(acl): write the RegisterRecord to Objecten on approval (refs #149)
ApproveZaakAsync now does two writes: the ZGW eindstatus (the process) and the
register record in Objecten (the register). The record is keyed on the zaak
UUID — the same key the read projection rows carry — and its reference is the
zaak's identificatie, so nothing personal crosses into the world-readable
register (ADR-0027).

ObjectenGateway resolves the objecttype by name (its URL and version are
assigned at seed time, as with ADR-0021), searches for an existing object by
data attribute, then POSTs or PATCHes. Resolution is lazy, so the ACL needs no
depends_on on Objecten and does not crash-loop when it boots first.
2026-08-14 09:18:34 +02:00
not 66f8322580 test(acl): approval writes the RegisterRecord to Objecten (refs #149)
Ports and failing tests for the Objecten hop, ahead of the implementation:

- IRegisterRecordGateway + RegisterRecord — the Application-side port; the
  record mirrors the objecttype schema registered in S-18c (ADR-0027).
- AclService takes the port but does not yet call it, so the approval test
  fails on an empty upsert list.
- ObjectenGateway is a shell throwing NotImplementedException; its tests pin
  the contract: resolve the objecttype by name, search by data attribute,
  POST when absent / PATCH when present, static Token auth per API, the CRS
  headers the geo API requires, and a surfaced error body.

Also splits S-19 (#20) into #149/#150 in BACKLOG.md — the approval-side write
and the projection re-sourcing are independently deployable (CLAUDE.md §13).
2026-08-14 09:16:23 +02:00
103 changed files with 500 additions and 4442 deletions
+1 -6
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@@ -219,9 +219,6 @@ jobs:
- name: OpenZaak → NRC → Event Subscriber → projection-api
id: projection
run: make verify-projection
- name: Objecten → NRC notification delivery
id: objecten_nrc
run: make verify-objecten-notifications
- name: Domain → Flowable → ACL → OpenZaak
id: domain
run: make verify-domain
@@ -248,7 +245,6 @@ jobs:
OBJECTTYPEN: ${{ steps.objecttypen.outcome }}
OBJECTEN: ${{ steps.objecten.outcome }}
REGISTERRECORD: ${{ steps.registerrecord.outcome }}
OBJECTEN_NOTIFICATIONS: ${{ steps.objecten_nrc.outcome }}
ACL: ${{ steps.acl.outcome }}
NRC: ${{ steps.nrc.outcome }}
PROJECTION: ${{ steps.projection.outcome }}
@@ -270,7 +266,6 @@ jobs:
echo "| Objecttypen API + token | $(icon "$OBJECTTYPEN") |"
echo "| Objecten API + token | $(icon "$OBJECTEN") |"
echo "| RegisterRecord objecttype | $(icon "$REGISTERRECORD") |"
echo "| Objecten → NRC | $(icon "$OBJECTEN_NOTIFICATIONS") |"
echo "| ACL ↔ OpenZaak | $(icon "$ACL") |"
echo "| OpenZaak → NRC | $(icon "$NRC") |"
echo "| NRC → Event Subscriber → projection | $(icon "$PROJECTION") |"
@@ -290,7 +285,7 @@ jobs:
# Log dump must precede teardown (which removes the containers).
- name: Dump container logs on failure
if: failure()
run: docker compose -f infra/docker-compose.yml logs --no-color --tail=100 oz-init openzaak nrc-init nrc-web nrc-celery nrc-beat flowable-db flowable-rest flowable-init keycloak acl bff domain projection-db event-subscriber projection-api self-service openbaar behandel beheer objecttypen-db objecttypen-redis objecttypen-init objecttypen objecten-db objecten-redis objecten-init objecten objecten-celery registerrecord-init tempo prometheus grafana 2>&1 || true
run: docker compose -f infra/docker-compose.yml logs --no-color --tail=100 oz-init openzaak nrc-init nrc-web nrc-celery nrc-beat flowable-db flowable-rest flowable-init keycloak acl bff domain projection-db event-subscriber projection-api self-service openbaar behandel beheer objecttypen-db objecttypen-redis objecttypen-init objecttypen objecten-db objecten-redis objecten-init objecten registerrecord-init tempo prometheus grafana 2>&1 || true
- name: Tear down
if: always()
run: make down
+1 -3
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@@ -296,9 +296,7 @@ Split into independently deployable sub-slices (CLAUDE.md §13):
Split into independently deployable sub-slices (CLAUDE.md §13):
- **S-19a** (#149, ✅) · ACL writes the `RegisterRecord` to Objecten on approval, idempotently, alongside the ZGW eindstatus. Carries the ADR (ADR-0028).
- **S-19b** (#150, ✅) · Read projection sourced from Objecten instead of NRC zaak events. *(split — #150 closed)*
- **S-19b-1** (#152, ✅) · Objecten publishes to NRC — broker, celery worker, `objecten` kanaal, notifications config. Turns back on what ADR-0028 deliberately disabled.
- **S-19b-2** (#153, ✅) · Projection derived from `RegisterRecord` objects, rebuildable from the Objecten-derived log. The ACL also writes an INGEDIEND record on submit, so the register holds the whole lifecycle. Carries ADR-0030.
- **S-19b** (#150) · Read projection sourced from Objecten instead of NRC zaak events. Depends on S-19a.
---
+1 -93
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@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ export DOCKER_HOST := unix://$(PODMAN_SOCK)
endif
endif
.PHONY: ci lint build unit mutation frontend integration verify verify-up verify-acl verify-nrc verify-projection verify-bff verify-domain verify-observability verify-tracing verify-metrics verify-objecttypen verify-objecten verify-registerrecord verify-objecten-notifications verify-notifications smoke up down local verify-local local-down changelog openzaak-up openzaak-smoke openzaak-seed openzaak-down stack-up stack-smoke stack-down keycloak-up keycloak-smoke keycloak-down flowable-up flowable-smoke flowable-down k8s-lint k8s-registry k8s-images k8s-seed k8s-up k8s-reseed k8s-portals k8s-down k8s-purge help
.PHONY: ci lint build unit mutation frontend integration verify verify-up verify-acl verify-nrc verify-projection verify-bff verify-domain verify-observability verify-tracing verify-metrics verify-objecttypen verify-objecten verify-registerrecord verify-notifications smoke up down local verify-local local-down changelog openzaak-up openzaak-smoke openzaak-seed openzaak-down stack-up stack-smoke stack-down keycloak-up keycloak-smoke keycloak-down flowable-up flowable-smoke flowable-down help
## ci: run the full pipeline — lint, build, unit, mutation, frontend, verify (mirrors Gitea Actions)
## `verify` is the live-stack stage (full stack up once → ACL + notification checks).
@@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ build:
# TRX per test project (→ TestResults/) feeds the CI per-service summary (#136); harmless locally.
unit:
dotnet test $(SLN) -c Release --filter "Category!=Integration" --logger trx --results-directory TestResults
python3 infra/test_portal_caddyfiles.py
## mutation: run the Stryker.NET ratchet on each service with branching logic (fails below baseline)
# Stryker is pinned as a local dotnet tool (.config/dotnet-tools.json); `tool restore`
@@ -202,11 +201,6 @@ verify-objecten:
verify-registerrecord:
bash infra/run-registerrecord-check.sh
## verify-objecten-notifications: assert a RegisterRecord write in Objecten is DELIVERED as an
## `objecten` notification via NRC (S-19b-1), against the already-running stack.
verify-objecten-notifications:
bash infra/run-objecten-notifications-check.sh
## verify: local mirror of the CI verify-stack job — full stack up once, all checks,
## tear down (always). For fast single-concern local iteration use `integration`
## (oz-only) or `verify-notifications` (oz+nrc) instead.
@@ -218,7 +212,6 @@ verify:
&& bash infra/run-acl-integration.sh \
&& bash infra/run-notification-check.sh \
&& bash infra/run-projection-check.sh \
&& bash infra/run-objecten-notifications-check.sh \
&& bash infra/run-domain-check.sh \
&& bash infra/run-bff-check.sh \
&& bash infra/run-e2e-check.sh || rc=$$?; \
@@ -327,91 +320,6 @@ flowable-down:
docker compose -f $(FL_COMPOSE) down --volumes
-docker volume rm -f rr-fl-bpmn
# ── Kubernetes (single-node Talos) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
# The Helm chart in infra/helm/big-reference is a port of infra/docker-compose.yml
# (ADR-0033). Full walkthrough: docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md.
# TALOS_HOST the address the BROWSER uses — pins Keycloak's issuer and the portals'
# OIDC authority. Use `localhost` with `make k8s-portals`: the OIDC
# library needs crypto.subtle, which browsers only expose on a secure
# context (https, or localhost) — see docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md §5
# K8S_REGISTRY the registry both sides use for this repo's images (see k8s-registry)
K8S_NS ?= big
K8S_CHART := infra/helm/big-reference
K8S_REGISTRY ?=
TALOS_HOST ?=
# The images built from this repo — compose service name == image name == chart workload.
K8S_IMAGES := acl domain bff event-subscriber projection-api self-service openbaar behandel beheer
## k8s-lint: render + schema-check the Helm chart (no cluster needed)
k8s-lint:
helm lint $(K8S_CHART)
helm template big $(K8S_CHART) -n $(K8S_NS) --set images.registry=registry.invalid:5000 >/dev/null
## k8s-registry: deploy the in-cluster image registry (NodePort 30500)
k8s-registry:
kubectl apply -f infra/helm/registry.yaml
kubectl -n registry rollout status deploy/registry --timeout=180s
## k8s-images: build this repo's images (via compose) and push them to $(K8S_REGISTRY)
# `docker save | crane push` rather than `docker push`: the registry speaks plain
# HTTP, which the Docker daemon refuses without a root-level insecure-registries
# entry, while crane just takes --insecure. Install: see docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md.
k8s-images:
@command -v crane >/dev/null || { echo "crane not found — see docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md §0" >&2; exit 2; }
@test -n "$(K8S_REGISTRY)" || { echo "set K8S_REGISTRY=<registry host:port>" >&2; exit 2; }
docker compose -f $(COMPOSE) build $(K8S_IMAGES)
@tar=$$(mktemp -t rr-img-XXXX.tar); \
for i in $(K8S_IMAGES); do \
docker save register-referentie/$$i:dev -o $$tar; \
crane push --insecure $$tar $(K8S_REGISTRY)/register-referentie/$$i:dev; \
done; rm -f $$tar
## k8s-seed: create the ConfigMaps the chart mounts (upstream config + bootstrap scripts)
k8s-seed:
bash infra/helm/seed-configmaps.sh $(K8S_NS)
## k8s-up: seed the config and install/upgrade the release
k8s-up: k8s-seed
@test -n "$(TALOS_HOST)" || { echo "set TALOS_HOST=<node ip>" >&2; exit 2; }
@test -n "$(K8S_REGISTRY)" || { echo "set K8S_REGISTRY=<registry the node can pull from>" >&2; exit 2; }
helm upgrade --install big $(K8S_CHART) -n $(K8S_NS) --create-namespace \
--set host=$(TALOS_HOST) --set images.registry=$(K8S_REGISTRY) $(K8S_SET)
kubectl -n $(K8S_NS) get pods
## k8s-reseed: re-run the bootstrap jobs (after a database was wiped, or after
## changing a Job in the chart — Job pod templates are immutable, so a plain
## `helm upgrade` is rejected)
k8s-reseed:
kubectl -n $(K8S_NS) delete job -l app.kubernetes.io/component=init --ignore-not-found
$(MAKE) k8s-up
# The projection's schema is created on service start (Projection.ReadModel migrates in a
# hosted service), so a wiped database also needs these two restarted — otherwise they keep
# writing to a schema-less DB and fail with `relation "processed_notifications" does not exist`.
kubectl -n $(K8S_NS) rollout restart deploy/event-subscriber deploy/projection-api
kubectl -n $(K8S_NS) rollout status deploy/event-subscriber deploy/projection-api --timeout=180s
## k8s-portals: forward the browser-facing services to localhost (Ctrl-C stops them all)
# The portals' OIDC flow needs a *secure context* for crypto.subtle (PKCE), and browsers
# only grant that to https or localhost — a NodePort on the VM's IP is neither. Forwarding
# to localhost on the same port numbers keeps Keycloak's pinned issuer valid. Deploy with
# TALOS_HOST=localhost for this to line up.
k8s-portals:
@echo "self-service http://localhost:30140 · openbaar :30141 · behandel :30142 · beheer :30143 · keycloak :30180"
@trap 'kill 0' INT TERM; \
for f in self-service:30140:80 openbaar:30141:80 behandel:30142:80 beheer:30143:80 keycloak:30180:8080; do \
svc=$${f%%:*}; rest=$${f#*:}; lport=$${rest%%:*}; rport=$${rest#*:}; \
kubectl -n $(K8S_NS) port-forward --address 127.0.0.1 svc/$$svc $$lport:$$rport >/dev/null & \
done; wait
## k8s-down: uninstall the release (database PVCs are kept)
k8s-down:
helm uninstall big -n $(K8S_NS)
## k8s-purge: uninstall AND drop the namespace, including the database volumes
k8s-purge:
-helm uninstall big -n $(K8S_NS)
kubectl delete namespace $(K8S_NS) --ignore-not-found
## help: list available targets
help:
@grep -E '^## ' $(MAKEFILE_LIST) | sed 's/^## //'
-22
View File
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
:80 {
# Same-origin API: behandelaars authenticate against the medewerker realm; the BFF validates it
# for /behandel/* (S-12c).
# `handle` blocks are mutually exclusive and matched most-specific-first, so the
# SPA fallback below can never swallow an API call — unlike a bare `try_files`,
# which Caddy sorts *before* reverse_proxy and would rewrite it to /index.html.
#
# No `resolver` stanza is needed: Caddy dials the upstream per
# request through the system resolver, so it starts before the BFF is up, picks up
# its restarts, and honours the DNS search domains in /etc/resolv.conf — which is
# what lets the bare `bff` name resolve on Kubernetes as well as under compose.
handle /behandel/* {
reverse_proxy bff:8080
}
# The Angular app. Client-side routing: an unknown path serves index.html.
handle {
root * /usr/share/caddy
try_files {path} /index.html
file_server
}
}
+9 -6
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# Multi-stage build for the behandel portal (Angular → Caddy).
# Multi-stage build for the behandel portal (Angular → nginx).
# Build context is the repo root (the app needs the pnpm workspace + libs). See infra/docker-compose.yml.
FROM node:24-slim AS build
WORKDIR /src
@@ -13,12 +13,15 @@ COPY apps/behandel apps/behandel
COPY libs libs
RUN pnpm nx build behandel
FROM caddy:2-alpine AS runtime
COPY apps/behandel/Caddyfile /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/behandel/browser /usr/share/caddy
FROM nginx:1.27-alpine AS runtime
COPY apps/behandel/nginx.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/behandel/browser /usr/share/nginx/html
# Compose-time OIDC config: the browser (Playwright, on the compose network) reaches Keycloak by
# service name, so the token issuer matches the BFF's medewerker authority (host-consistent, ADR-0013).
# Kubernetes mounts a ConfigMap over this file with the node address instead (ADR-0033).
RUN printf '{ "authority": "http://keycloak:8080/realms/medewerker" }\n' > /usr/share/caddy/config.json
RUN printf '{ "authority": "http://keycloak:8080/realms/medewerker" }\n' > /usr/share/nginx/html/config.json
# Make the reverse-proxy resolver engine-portable (Docker 127.0.0.11 vs podman aardvark); runs from
# the nginx image's /docker-entrypoint.d before nginx starts.
COPY apps/portal-nginx-resolver.sh /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
RUN chmod +x /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
EXPOSE 80
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
server {
listen 80;
server_name _;
root /usr/share/nginx/html;
index index.html;
# Resolve the BFF via Docker's embedded DNS at request time (variable proxy_pass), so nginx starts
# even before the BFF is up and picks up restarts — instead of failing to load the config.
resolver 127.0.0.11 ipv6=off valid=30s;
# Same-origin API: proxy the behandel endpoint group to the bff service. The api-client uses
# relative URLs, so the browser calls this origin and nginx forwards to the BFF — no CORS, and the
# medewerker token (same-origin) is attached by the app's interceptor (ADR-0013).
location /behandel/ {
set $bff http://bff:8080;
proxy_pass $bff;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
}
# SPA fallback — Angular client-side routing.
location / {
try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html;
}
}
+1 -1
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@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ export interface RuntimeConfig {
/**
* Route prefixes whose requests carry the medewerker token. These MUST match the **relative** URLs
* the api-client actually calls (same-origin via the Caddy proxy) — the interceptor matches on
* the api-client actually calls (same-origin via the nginx proxy) — the interceptor matches on
* `req.url`, which stays relative, so an absolute origin would never match and the token would go
* unattached. Only `/behandel/` is secured; the app calls no other endpoint group.
*/
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { of, throwError } from 'rxjs';
import { BffApiV1Service, type WerkbakItem } from 'api-client';
import { AuthService } from 'auth';
import { axe } from 'vitest-axe';
import { WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS, WerkbakPage } from './werkbak-page';
import { WerkbakPage } from './werkbak-page';
const sample: WerkbakItem[] = [
{ registrationId: 'reg-1', bsn: '123456782', status: 'InBehandeling' },
@@ -81,94 +81,6 @@ describe('WerkbakPage', () => {
});
});
it('picks up a newly submitted registration without a reload', async () => {
// S-26 (#162): a registration reaches Beoordelen asynchronously, after the citizen supplies
// documents — so the werkbak must refresh itself rather than wait for the behandelaar to reload.
vi.useFakeTimers();
try {
const getBehandelWerkbak = vi
.fn()
.mockReturnValueOnce(of([sample[0]]))
.mockReturnValue(of(sample));
const { providers } = setup({ getBehandelWerkbak });
const { detectChanges } = await render(WerkbakPage, { providers });
expect(screen.getByText('reg-1')).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.queryByText('reg-2')).toBeNull();
vi.advanceTimersByTime(WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS);
detectChanges();
expect(getBehandelWerkbak).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
expect(screen.getByText('reg-2')).toBeTruthy();
// A background refresh must not flash the loading state over the rows the behandelaar is reading.
expect(screen.queryByText(/bezig met laden/i)).toBeNull();
} finally {
vi.useRealTimers();
}
});
it('keeps the rows on screen when a background refresh fails', async () => {
// A blip on a background poll must not replace the list with the load-failure alert; the next
// tick recovers. Only the first load speaks for whether the werkbak is readable at all.
vi.useFakeTimers();
try {
const getBehandelWerkbak = vi
.fn()
.mockReturnValueOnce(of(sample))
.mockReturnValue(throwError(() => new Error('503')));
const { providers } = setup({ getBehandelWerkbak });
const { detectChanges } = await render(WerkbakPage, { providers });
vi.advanceTimersByTime(WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS);
detectChanges();
expect(screen.getByText('reg-1')).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.queryByText(/kon de werkbak niet laden/i)).toBeNull();
} finally {
vi.useRealTimers();
}
});
it('stops refreshing once the page is destroyed', async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
try {
const { getBehandelWerkbak, providers } = setup();
const { fixture } = await render(WerkbakPage, { providers });
fixture.destroy();
vi.advanceTimersByTime(WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS * 3);
expect(getBehandelWerkbak).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
} finally {
vi.useRealTimers();
}
});
it('clears a load failure once a refresh succeeds', async () => {
// Without this the werkbak stays stuck on the error until the behandelaar reloads — the very
// thing this slice removes. A recovered read must put the rows back.
vi.useFakeTimers();
try {
const getBehandelWerkbak = vi
.fn()
.mockReturnValueOnce(throwError(() => new Error('503')))
.mockReturnValue(of(sample));
const { providers } = setup({ getBehandelWerkbak });
const { detectChanges } = await render(WerkbakPage, { providers });
expect(screen.getByText(/kon de werkbak niet laden/i)).toBeTruthy();
vi.advanceTimersByTime(WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS);
detectChanges();
expect(screen.queryByText(/kon de werkbak niet laden/i)).toBeNull();
expect(screen.getByText('reg-1')).toBeTruthy();
} finally {
vi.useRealTimers();
}
});
it('shows an empty state when the werkbak has no items', async () => {
const { providers } = setup({ getBehandelWerkbak: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(of([])) });
await render(WerkbakPage, { providers });
+3 -34
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,7 @@
import { Component, inject, signal } from '@angular/core';
import { takeUntilDestroyed } from '@angular/core/rxjs-interop';
import { interval } from 'rxjs';
import { BffApiV1Service, type WerkbakItem } from 'api-client';
import { UtrechtComponentsModule } from 'ui';
/**
* How often an open werkbak re-reads itself (S-26/#162, ADR-0032). Exported so the spec advances the
* clock by exactly one interval instead of hard-coding the number.
*/
export const WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS = 5_000;
/** The two decisions a behandelaar can make; the BFF validates these exact values (ADR-0013). */
type Besluit = 'goedkeuren' | 'afwijzen';
@@ -18,11 +10,6 @@ type Besluit = 'goedkeuren' | 'afwijzen';
* Flowable `Beoordelen` tasks, read through the domain) and decides each — goedkeuren or afwijzen. A
* decision posts to the BFF, which applies the domain transition and completes the workflow task
* (ADR-0013; S-12). After a decision the werkbak refreshes so the handled item drops off the list.
*
* The page also re-reads itself every {@link WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS} while it is open, so a registration
* that reaches beoordeling after the behandelaar opened the werkbak shows up on its own — no reload
* (S-26/#162). Polling rather than a pushed stream: nothing notifies the BFF either, so a stream
* would poll the domain in the BFF instead and add connection state for the same freshness (ADR-0032).
*/
@Component({
selector: 'app-werkbak-page',
@@ -40,37 +27,19 @@ export class WerkbakPage {
constructor() {
this.load();
// ponytail: a fixed interval, polled while the page lives — it keeps refreshing in a background
// tab. Gate on `document.visibilityState` if the request volume ever matters.
interval(WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS)
.pipe(takeUntilDestroyed())
.subscribe(() => this.load({ background: true }));
}
/**
* Read the werkbak. A `background` read is the interval refresh: it leaves the rows and the states
* the behandelaar is looking at alone until it has an answer — no loading flash on every tick, and
* a blip does not swap the list for the failure alert (the next tick recovers). Only a foreground
* read — on open, or after a decision — speaks for whether the werkbak is readable at all.
*/
load(options: { background?: boolean } = {}): void {
const background = options.background ?? false;
if (!background) {
this.loading.set(true);
this.failed.set(false);
}
load(): void {
this.loading.set(true);
this.failed.set(false);
this.bff.getBehandelWerkbak().subscribe({
next: (rows: WerkbakItem[]) => {
this.items.set(rows);
this.loading.set(false);
this.loaded.set(true);
// A read that came back is the answer, so a refresh also clears an earlier failure — the
// werkbak recovers on its own instead of showing the error until someone reloads.
this.failed.set(false);
},
// Surface the failure (e.g. 403 for a non-behandelaar) instead of swallowing it.
error: () => {
if (background) return;
this.items.set([]);
this.loading.set(false);
this.loaded.set(true);
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
:80 {
# Same-origin API: beheerders use the same medewerker realm as behandel (S-15a).
# `handle` blocks are mutually exclusive and matched most-specific-first, so the
# SPA fallback below can never swallow an API call — unlike a bare `try_files`,
# which Caddy sorts *before* reverse_proxy and would rewrite it to /index.html.
#
# No `resolver` stanza is needed: Caddy dials the upstream per
# request through the system resolver, so it starts before the BFF is up, picks up
# its restarts, and honours the DNS search domains in /etc/resolv.conf — which is
# what lets the bare `bff` name resolve on Kubernetes as well as under compose.
handle /beheer/* {
reverse_proxy bff:8080
}
# The Angular app. Client-side routing: an unknown path serves index.html.
handle {
root * /usr/share/caddy
try_files {path} /index.html
file_server
}
}
+9 -6
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# Multi-stage build for the beheer portal (Angular → Caddy).
# Multi-stage build for the beheer portal (Angular → nginx).
# Build context is the repo root (the app needs the pnpm workspace + libs). See infra/docker-compose.yml.
FROM node:24-slim AS build
WORKDIR /src
@@ -13,12 +13,15 @@ COPY apps/beheer apps/beheer
COPY libs libs
RUN pnpm nx build beheer
FROM caddy:2-alpine AS runtime
COPY apps/beheer/Caddyfile /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/beheer/browser /usr/share/caddy
FROM nginx:1.27-alpine AS runtime
COPY apps/beheer/nginx.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/beheer/browser /usr/share/nginx/html
# Compose-time OIDC config: the browser (Playwright, on the compose network) reaches Keycloak by
# service name, so the token issuer matches the BFF's medewerker authority (host-consistent, ADR-0013).
# Kubernetes mounts a ConfigMap over this file with the node address instead (ADR-0033).
RUN printf '{ "authority": "http://keycloak:8080/realms/medewerker" }\n' > /usr/share/caddy/config.json
RUN printf '{ "authority": "http://keycloak:8080/realms/medewerker" }\n' > /usr/share/nginx/html/config.json
# Make the reverse-proxy resolver engine-portable (Docker 127.0.0.11 vs podman aardvark); runs from
# the nginx image's /docker-entrypoint.d before nginx starts.
COPY apps/portal-nginx-resolver.sh /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
RUN chmod +x /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
EXPOSE 80
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
server {
listen 80;
server_name _;
root /usr/share/nginx/html;
index index.html;
# Resolve the BFF via Docker's embedded DNS at request time (variable proxy_pass), so nginx starts
# even before the BFF is up and picks up restarts — instead of failing to load the config.
resolver 127.0.0.11 ipv6=off valid=30s;
# Same-origin API: proxy the beheer endpoint group to the bff service. The api-client uses
# relative URLs, so the browser calls this origin and nginx forwards to the BFF — no CORS, and the
# medewerker token (same-origin) is attached by the app's interceptor (ADR-0013).
location /beheer/ {
set $bff http://bff:8080;
proxy_pass $bff;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
}
# SPA fallback — Angular client-side routing.
location / {
try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html;
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ export interface RuntimeConfig {
/**
* Route prefixes whose requests carry the medewerker token. These MUST match the **relative** URLs
* the api-client actually calls (same-origin via the Caddy proxy) — the interceptor matches on
* the api-client actually calls (same-origin via the nginx proxy) — the interceptor matches on
* `req.url`, which stays relative, so an absolute origin would never match and the token would go
* unattached. Only `/beheer/` is secured; the app calls no other endpoint group.
*/
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
:80 {
# Same-origin API: the public register is anonymous, but still reads through the BFF (S-09).
# `handle` blocks are mutually exclusive and matched most-specific-first, so the
# SPA fallback below can never swallow an API call — unlike a bare `try_files`,
# which Caddy sorts *before* reverse_proxy and would rewrite it to /index.html.
#
# No `resolver` stanza is needed: Caddy dials the upstream per
# request through the system resolver, so it starts before the BFF is up, picks up
# its restarts, and honours the DNS search domains in /etc/resolv.conf — which is
# what lets the bare `bff` name resolve on Kubernetes as well as under compose.
handle /openbaar/* {
reverse_proxy bff:8080
}
# The Angular app. Client-side routing: an unknown path serves index.html.
handle {
root * /usr/share/caddy
try_files {path} /index.html
file_server
}
}
+8 -4
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# Multi-stage build for the openbaar portal (Angular → Caddy).
# Multi-stage build for the openbaar portal (Angular → nginx).
# Build context is the repo root (the app needs the pnpm workspace + libs). See infra/docker-compose.yml.
FROM node:24-slim AS build
WORKDIR /src
@@ -13,9 +13,13 @@ COPY apps/openbaar apps/openbaar
COPY libs libs
RUN pnpm nx build openbaar
FROM caddy:2-alpine AS runtime
COPY apps/openbaar/Caddyfile /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/openbaar/browser /usr/share/caddy
FROM nginx:1.27-alpine AS runtime
COPY apps/openbaar/nginx.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/openbaar/browser /usr/share/nginx/html
# No runtime config: the openbaar register is anonymous (no OIDC authority to inject).
# Make the reverse-proxy resolver engine-portable (Docker 127.0.0.11 vs podman aardvark); runs from
# the nginx image's /docker-entrypoint.d before nginx starts.
COPY apps/portal-nginx-resolver.sh /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
RUN chmod +x /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
EXPOSE 80
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
server {
listen 80;
server_name _;
root /usr/share/nginx/html;
index index.html;
# Resolve the BFF via Docker's embedded DNS at request time (variable proxy_pass), so nginx starts
# even before the BFF is up and picks up restarts — instead of failing to load the config.
resolver 127.0.0.11 ipv6=off valid=30s;
# Same-origin API: proxy the anonymous openbaar endpoint group to the bff service. The api-client
# uses relative URLs, so the browser calls this origin and nginx forwards to the BFF — no CORS.
location /openbaar/ {
set $bff http://bff:8080;
proxy_pass $bff;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
}
# SPA fallback — Angular client-side routing.
location / {
try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html;
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { appRoutes } from './app.routes';
/**
* The openbaar register is a public, anonymous read: no DigiD, no auth interceptor. The app is served
* same-origin as the BFF (Caddy proxies /openbaar), so the api-client's relative calls stay same-origin.
* same-origin as the BFF (nginx proxies /openbaar), so the api-client's relative calls stay same-origin.
*/
export const appConfig: ApplicationConfig = {
providers: [
+17
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Point nginx's reverse-proxy `resolver` at THIS container's real DNS server.
#
# The portal nginx configs use a variable proxy_pass, which needs a `resolver` so the BFF hostname is
# resolved at request time (nginx can start before the BFF is up). The config hardcodes Docker's
# embedded DNS (127.0.0.11) — correct on Docker/Docker Desktop, but rootless podman uses a
# network-specific address (aardvark, e.g. 10.89.0.1), so proxied calls 502 there. Read the actual
# nameserver from /etc/resolv.conf and substitute it, so the reverse proxy works on any engine.
#
# Runs from the nginx image's /docker-entrypoint.d/ before nginx starts. On Docker the nameserver IS
# 127.0.0.11, so the substitution is a no-op. Guarded (no `set -e`) so it's safe whether the nginx
# entrypoint executes or sources it.
ns="$(awk '/^nameserver/{print $2; exit}' /etc/resolv.conf 2>/dev/null)"
if [ -n "$ns" ] && [ "$ns" != "127.0.0.11" ]; then
sed -i "s/resolver 127\.0\.0\.11/resolver $ns/" /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf 2>/dev/null || true
echo "portal-nginx-resolver: set resolver to $ns"
fi
-26
View File
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
:80 {
# Same-origin API: the api-client uses relative URLs, so the browser calls this origin and Caddy
# forwards to the BFF — no CORS, and the DigiD token is attached by the app interceptor
# (S-08d/ADR-0010).
# `handle` blocks are mutually exclusive and matched most-specific-first, so the
# SPA fallback below can never swallow an API call — unlike a bare `try_files`,
# which Caddy sorts *before* reverse_proxy and would rewrite it to /index.html.
#
# No `resolver` stanza is needed: Caddy dials the upstream per
# request through the system resolver, so it starts before the BFF is up, picks up
# its restarts, and honours the DNS search domains in /etc/resolv.conf — which is
# what lets the bare `bff` name resolve on Kubernetes as well as under compose.
handle /self-service/* {
reverse_proxy bff:8080
}
handle /openbaar/* {
reverse_proxy bff:8080
}
# The Angular app. Client-side routing: an unknown path serves index.html.
handle {
root * /usr/share/caddy
try_files {path} /index.html
file_server
}
}
+9 -6
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# Multi-stage build for the self-service portal (Angular → Caddy).
# Multi-stage build for the self-service portal (Angular → nginx).
# Build context is the repo root (the app needs the pnpm workspace + libs). See infra/docker-compose.yml.
FROM node:24-slim AS build
WORKDIR /src
@@ -13,12 +13,15 @@ COPY apps/self-service apps/self-service
COPY libs libs
RUN pnpm nx build self-service
FROM caddy:2-alpine AS runtime
COPY apps/self-service/Caddyfile /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/self-service/browser /usr/share/caddy
FROM nginx:1.27-alpine AS runtime
COPY apps/self-service/nginx.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/self-service/browser /usr/share/nginx/html
# Compose-time OIDC config: the browser (Playwright, on the compose network) reaches Keycloak by
# service name, so the token issuer matches the BFF's authority (host-consistent, ADR-0010).
# Kubernetes mounts a ConfigMap over this file with the node address instead (ADR-0033).
RUN printf '{ "authority": "http://keycloak:8080/realms/digid" }\n' > /usr/share/caddy/config.json
RUN printf '{ "authority": "http://keycloak:8080/realms/digid" }\n' > /usr/share/nginx/html/config.json
# Make the reverse-proxy resolver engine-portable (Docker 127.0.0.11 vs podman aardvark); runs from
# the nginx image's /docker-entrypoint.d before nginx starts.
COPY apps/portal-nginx-resolver.sh /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
RUN chmod +x /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
EXPOSE 80
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
server {
listen 80;
server_name _;
root /usr/share/nginx/html;
index index.html;
# Resolve the BFF via Docker's embedded DNS at request time (variable proxy_pass), so nginx starts
# even before the BFF is up and picks up restarts — instead of failing to load the config.
resolver 127.0.0.11 ipv6=off valid=30s;
# Same-origin API: proxy the BFF endpoint groups to the bff service. The api-client uses relative
# URLs, so the browser calls this origin and nginx forwards to the BFF — no CORS, and the DigiD
# token (same-origin) is attached by the app's interceptor (S-08d/ADR-0010).
location /self-service/ {
set $bff http://bff:8080;
proxy_pass $bff;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
}
location /openbaar/ {
set $bff http://bff:8080;
proxy_pass $bff;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
}
# SPA fallback — Angular client-side routing.
location / {
try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html;
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ export interface RuntimeConfig {
/**
* Route prefixes whose requests carry the DigiD token. These MUST match the **relative** URLs the
* api-client actually calls (same-origin via the Caddy proxy) — the interceptor matches on `req.url`,
* api-client actually calls (same-origin via the nginx proxy) — the interceptor matches on `req.url`,
* which stays relative, so an absolute origin would never match and the token would go unattached.
* `/openbaar/` is deliberately excluded: it is the anonymous public register.
*/
@@ -67,14 +67,6 @@ itself, so no in-image healthcheck tool is required.
- Three more images built each CI run (kept small; not on the health-gate list).
- Storage is ephemeral container fs — a demo backplane, not a retention target.
Object storage for Tempo / remote-write for Prometheus is a later concern.
- Tempo runs **single-binary**, so its distributor and ingester are one process and
some of its distributed-mode machinery is not just redundant but harmful. Its
ingester-pool health check is disabled (`ingester_client.pool_config`) because with
a single in-process ingester the check can never route around a failure — a 1s
loopback-gRPC deadline missed under CI load only evicted the one ingester and made
Tempo drop spans, which is how `verify-tracing` flaked (#156). Expect the same
shape from other distributed-mode knobs if we tune them; the fix is to switch to
real multi-ingester Tempo, not to re-enable them here.
## Coupling rules touched (CLAUDE.md §8)
@@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ every message was dropped on the floor — a delivery path that looks wired and
- ponytail ceiling: Objecten emits no notifications, so nothing downstream can react to a
register write yet.
- **Lifted by ADR-0029** (S-19b-1, #152): broker, worker, `objecten` kanaal and
notifications config now exist, and `NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED` is `false`.
- Upgrade path: S-19b (#150) needs those notifications to source the projection from
Objecten, and turns them on together with the broker, worker, kanaal and abonnement.
## Consequences
@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ every message was dropped on the floor — a delivery path that looks wired and
independent of the case that produced it.
- The disclosure boundary is enforced by Objecten's schema validation (ADR-0027), not by
discipline in projection code.
- The read projection can become a cache of Objecten rather than a re-derivation of ZGW
done in S-19b-2 (#153), ADR-0030.
- The read projection can become a cache of Objecten rather than a re-derivation of ZGW
(S-19b, #150).
**Negative / costs**
@@ -142,9 +142,8 @@ every message was dropped on the floor — a delivery path that looks wired and
(`Acl__Objecten__Token`) in compose.
- Two new hand-kept constants: the pinned objecttype UUID (two files) and the objecttype
name (compose + `register.py`).
- ~~Until S-19b lands, the public register is still read from the NRC-derived projection, so
the register record is written but not yet read — the two must agree.~~ Closed by ADR-0030:
the projection is now derived from the register, so there is only one source to agree with.
- Until S-19b lands, the public register is still read from the NRC-derived projection, so
the register record is written but not yet read — the two must agree.
## Coupling rules touched (CLAUDE.md §8)
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
# ADR-0029: Objecten publishes register events to NRC
- **Status:** Accepted
- **Date:** 2026-08-14
- **Deciders:** Respellion engineering
- **Slice:** S-19b-1 (#152), first of the S-19b (#150) split
- **Supersedes in part:** ADR-0028's "Objecten's notifications are off for this slice"
## Context
ADR-0028 put the authoritative register record in the Objecten API and had the ACL write
it on approval. It also switched Objecten's notifications **off** — deliberately, with a
stated ceiling: there was no broker, no worker, no `objecten` kanaal and no abonnement, so
turning the client side on alone would have produced a delivery path that looks wired and
drops every message.
S-19b-2 (#153) wants the read projection sourced from register writes rather than
re-derived from ZGW zaak events. That needs the notifications to actually arrive. This ADR
builds the four missing pieces and lifts the ceiling.
## Decision
**Objecten publishes to the same NRC OpenZaak already publishes to, on the `objecten`
kanaal, delivered by its own Celery worker — provisioned declaratively on both sides,
exactly as ADR-0007 did for OpenZaak.**
- **Objecten** (`infra/objecten/setup_configuration/data.yaml`): a `zgw_consumers` service
`nrc` (api_type `nrc`) plus a `notifications_config` step naming it, and
`NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: "false"` in both compose files.
- **NRC** (`infra/opennotificaties/setup_configuration/data.yaml`): an `objecten` kanaal
alongside `zaken`.
- **`objecten-celery`**: a worker container on the Objecten image (`/celery_worker.sh`),
mirroring `oz-celery`, with `CELERY_BROKER_URL`/`CELERY_RESULT_BACKEND` on
`objecten-redis` db 1 (db 0 is already the cache).
### One NRC, one credential, one kanaal per publisher
Objecten reuses the `big-reference-seed` client OpenZaak publishes with. NRC verifies its
JWT and authorizes it against OpenZaak's Autorisaties API (ADR-0007), which grants that
client `heeft_alle_autorisaties` — so no second credential and no publisher-specific
authorization is needed. A second NRC, or a second credential, would buy isolation this
reference application has no use for.
The kanaal name is **not ours to choose**: the Objects API sends
`NOTIFICATIONS_KANAAL = "objecten"`. NRC rejects a publish to an unregistered kanaal
(`"Kanaal met deze naam bestaat niet"`), which is precisely what the failing check for this
slice reported first. Its filter set (`object_type`) matches the kenmerken the Objects API
sends, so an abonnement can narrow to one objecttype instead of receiving every write.
### Writers address Objecten as `objecten.local` — NRC rejects single-label hosts
NRC types a notification's `hoofdObject` and `resourceUrl` as DRF `URLField`s, so Django's
`URLValidator` runs on them — and it refuses a **single-label** host. Objecten fills both
from the object `url` that DRF built with `request.build_absolute_uri`, i.e. **the Host the
caller used**. Write to `http://objecten:8000` and NRC answers every publish with
```
{"hoofdObject":["Voer een geldige URL in."],"resourceUrl":["Voer een geldige URL in."]}
```
which `objecten-celery` then retries with exponential backoff, forever, in the background —
the write itself having returned 201.
`SITE_DOMAIN` does **not** fix this; it is not what builds those URLs. The fix is on the
caller side: the `objecten` service carries an `objecten.local` network alias, and every
component whose writes must be notified — the ACL (`Acl__Objecten__BaseUrl`), the gateway
integration tests, this slice's verify check — addresses it there. An alias rather than a
plain dotted `SITE_DOMAIN` so the host still **resolves in-network**: a subscriber that
follows `resourceUrl` reaches the record it points at, which S-19b-2 will do. Readers are
unaffected and keep using the plain service name.
This is the same class of constraint as ADR-0028's "the ACL's Objecttypen base URL must
match Objecten's configured `api_root`": these modules put request-derived hosts into data
another module then validates or dereferences.
- ponytail ceiling: nothing *enforces* that a new writer uses the alias — it would get a 201
and silently no notification.
- Upgrade path: if a second writer ever appears, rename the compose service to `objecten.local`
so the plain name stops working, rather than adding a lint.
### A worker, not a synchronous send
`notifications_api_common` only schedules the send on transaction commit. Without a worker
the task sits in redis forever and every register write is silently undelivered — the exact
half-wired state ADR-0028 refused to ship. No `beat` for Objecten: it is a publisher, not a
subscriber, and `nrc-beat` already drains NRC's delivery queue.
## Verification
`make verify-objecten-notifications` (`infra/run-objecten-notifications-check.sh`, in the
CI `verify-stack` job) registers an abonnement on the `objecten` kanaal pointing at a
throwaway webhook sink, writes a `RegisterRecord` exactly as the ACL does on approval, and
asserts the notification reaches the sink. That is the whole chain in one assertion:
Objecten → `objecten-celery` → NRC → `nrc-beat` → the callback. Any missing piece — broker,
worker, kanaal, notifications config — shows up as a non-delivery rather than as a green
config.
## Consequences
**Positive**
- A register write is now observable by anything that subscribes, which is what S-19b-2
(#153) needs to make the projection a cache of Objecten rather than a re-derivation of ZGW.
- ADR-0028's ceiling is lifted: the delivery path is proven end to end, not merely configured.
**Negative / costs**
- One more long-running container (`objecten-celery`) on an already memory-tight CI runner.
- A second publisher on the shared `big-reference-seed` credential — a credential rotation
now touches two modules.
- Objecten now has two in-network names, and which one a caller uses silently decides
whether its writes are notified (ceiling above).
- ponytail ceiling: notification delivery has no dead-letter or alerting — a failed publish
is visible only in the worker log.
- Upgrade path: if undelivered register events start mattering, subscribe an audit sink or
read NRC's own delivery admin rather than building a retry layer here.
## Coupling rules touched (CLAUDE.md §8)
None bent. This is infrastructure between two upstream modules, over their documented
APIs; no service reaches another's database. §8.6 (idempotency at every event boundary)
applies to whatever consumes the new kanaal — S-19b-2's problem, not this slice's.
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
# ADR-0030: The read projection is sourced from the register, not from ZGW
- **Status:** Accepted
- **Date:** 2026-08-28
- **Deciders:** Respellion engineering
- **Slice:** S-19b-2 (#153), second of the S-19b (#150) split
- **Builds on:** ADR-0008 (read projection store), ADR-0028 (Objecten holds the register), ADR-0029 (Objecten publishes to NRC)
## Context
ADR-0028 moved the authoritative register record into the Objecten API, and said what should
follow: "the read projection can become a cache of Objecten rather than a re-derivation of
ZGW." Until this slice it was still the latter — the Event Subscriber listened on the `zaken`
kanaal and inferred register state from case events:
- a `zaak`/`create` meant INGEDIEND;
- any `status`/`create` was taken to be the approval, so meant INGESCHREVEN — the subscriber
may not read OpenZaak (§8.1), so it could not tell one statustype from another;
- the citizen-facing reference was not in the notification at all, so every projection had a
second hop: ask the ACL for the zaak's identificatie (#78).
So the register — a fact about a person — was reconstructed by guessing at the lifecycle of the
case that happened to produce it. ADR-0029 made the register itself publish. This ADR switches
the projection over to it.
## Decision
**The Event Subscriber listens on the `objecten` kanaal and projects the `RegisterRecord` the
notification points at. The projection is a cache of the register; ZGW is no longer a source.**
- The subscriber's abonnement moves from `zaken` to `objecten` (`register-abonnement.py`, and
the CI projection check).
- An Objecten notification carries **no record data** — only the object URL and the objecttype
as a kenmerk — so the record is read back through the ACL (`POST /register-records/read`).
§8.1 applies to Objecten exactly as ADR-0028 established: the ACL is the only code that talks
to it.
- The accepted acties are `create`, `update` and `partial_update`. The last one is not
defensive breadth: the ACL upserts with PATCH, and DRF routes a PATCH through the notifying
`update()` while naming the action `partial_update` — which is what Objecten publishes. So
every approval arrives as `partial_update`, and accepting only `create`/`update` drops the
one state change this slice exists to project. `destroy` is deliberately not accepted:
removing a registration from the public register is its own decision.
- The record already carries `id`, `status` and `reference`, so the row is the record. The
zaak-shaped surface goes: `IsZaakCreated`, `IsZaakStatusSet`, `ZaakUrl`, `ZaakId`, and
`ToEntry`'s `Resource == "status"` inference are replaced by `IsRegisterRecordWritten` +
`ObjectUrl`, and the ACL enrichment hop disappears.
### The ACL writes an INGEDIEND record on submit
Before this slice only approval wrote a record, so re-sourcing alone would have silently
dropped every INGEDIEND row from the public register. `OpenZaakAsync` therefore upserts a
record with status INGEDIEND after opening the zaak, keyed on the same zaak id that approval
later upserts to INGESCHREVEN.
This is the same two-writes-converging posture ADR-0028 already accepted for approval, now on
the submit path too: both writes are idempotent, so a retried submit updates the record rather
than adding a second one (§8.6). The reference comes from the registration itself, so unlike
approval this path needs no ZGW read-back.
The alternative — a register holding only INGESCHREVEN — is arguably the more correct reading
of "public register", but it narrows what the openbaar portal shows and reads against PRD §68
("~50 register entries with diverse statuses"). Rejected as a behaviour change this slice was
not asked to make.
### The dedup key is the projected row, not the notification
NRC carries no notification id and may redeliver, so the idempotency key is derived from
content (as before). The obvious candidates both break here:
- **the object URL alone** — the ACL upserts *one object per registration*, so submit and
approval notify about the same URL, and the approval would be swallowed as a duplicate;
- **object URL + actie** — a retried approval is a second `update`, so it would be dropped
while genuinely being the same state (harmless), but a *third* distinct state would collide
with it (not harmless).
The key is therefore the object plus the state that write puts in the projection —
`objecten:object:{url}:{status}:{reference}`. A redelivery collapses; a genuine state change
does not. That is exactly the property §8.6 asks for, and it needs no version field from
Objecten's internals.
### The notification log holds the row, not the event
`processed_notifications` stops describing ZGW events (`actie`, `zaak_id`, `resource`) and
holds the projected row itself (`register_id`, `status`, `reference`). A rebuild becomes a
replay with no mapping rules and no upstream reads at all — §8.4 held before via the ACL hop;
now it holds outright.
The migration **drops** the old columns rather than renaming them. EF scaffolded renames
(`resource``register_id`, `zaak_id``status`) that would have carried ZGW values into
columns meaning something else entirely, and a rebuild would then have projected that garbage.
- ponytail ceiling: the migration empties both tables. A pre-slice row describes a zaak event
the new projector cannot reproject, and the registrations behind those rows have no
RegisterRecord in Objecten (only approvals wrote one), so they are not re-derivable from the
new source either.
- Upgrade path: fine while stacks are ephemeral. If a long-lived environment ever needs to keep
them, backfill by walking Objecten's objects rather than replaying the log.
## Consequences
**Positive**
- The register is read from the register. The projection is a derived cache of a first-class
record, not an inference over someone else's lifecycle.
- The "any status-create is the approval" guess is gone — a real source of wrongness the moment
the zaaktype grows a second statustype.
- One hop fewer per notification: the record carries its own reference, so the ACL enrichment
call disappears.
- A rebuild needs nothing but its own log (§8.4).
**Negative / costs**
- Submission is now two writes across two modules and eventually consistent. A failure between
them leaves a zaak with no register record until the submit is retried; nothing repairs that
automatically yet — the same gap ADR-0028 recorded for approval, now on a second path.
- The projection lags the register by a notification round trip, where it used to lag the zaak
by one. In practice the same order of magnitude.
- Projecting now depends on the ACL being reachable, where the reference enrichment used to be
the only ACL dependency. A failed read means the notification is not logged and not
projected — NRC retries, so it converges, but the failure mode is now on the main path.
- OpenZaak still publishes to `zaken` and nothing in the product listens. Kept because the
`verify-nrc` check asserts that path, and turning off a working publisher to save nothing
would be its own risk.
## Coupling rules touched (CLAUDE.md §8)
None bent. §8.1 holds — the subscriber reaches Objecten only through the ACL. §8.4 is
strengthened: the projection is rebuildable from its own log, with no upstream reads at all.
§8.6 is what the dedup-key discussion above is about.
## Verification
`make verify-projection` (`infra/run-projection-check.sh`, in CI's `verify-stack`) opens a zaak
**through the ACL** and asserts projection-api serves a row for it with status INGEDIEND — the
whole new chain in one assertion: ACL → Objecten → `objecten-celery` → NRC → `nrc-beat`
Event Subscriber → projection → projection-api. A zaak created behind the ACL's back produces
no row, which is the re-source working rather than a gap.
`RegisterProjectieBijwerken.feature` covers the use case in business language, including the
approval case — the same row moving INGEDIEND → INGESCHREVEN, which is now one registration's
record being updated rather than two unrelated ZGW events.
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
# ADR-0031 — MFA on the medewerker realm, with a fixture TOTP secret
- **Status:** Accepted
- **Date:** 2026-09-03
- **Slice:** S-15c (Gitea #132)
## Context
Staff (behandelaar, teamlead, beheerder) act on citizens' registrations and on the ACL's
default-fill: the highest-privilege logins in the platform. The medewerker realm protected
them with a password alone, while the citizen realms (digid, eherkenning, eidas) mock
brokers that carry their own assurance levels. A reference application that demonstrates a
government architecture should show MFA on the staff realm.
Two things had to be decided: **how** to enforce OTP in a realm export, and **how the
automated checks and a human demo obtain a code** — the e2e drives a real browser login and
`make keycloak-smoke` drives a real password grant, so neither can scan a QR.
## Decision
**Enforce OTP by giving every seeded medewerker a TOTP credential**, rather than replacing
Keycloak's browser flow with a copy whose OTP execution is `REQUIRED`.
Keycloak's stock `browser` and `direct grant` flows both contain a *conditional OTP*
subflow that fires when the user has an OTP credential. Seeding the credential therefore
turns the challenge on for every seeded user, in both flows, without duplicating ~40 lines
of flow JSON into the export. `CONFIGURE_TOTP` is additionally set as a **default required
action**, so a medewerker created later must enrol before their first login.
**The seeded secret is a fixed, committed fixture** (`BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED`) shared by all
medewerkers. Codes are then computable: `infra/keycloak/check_realms.py` (Python, stdlib
`hmac`) and `tests/e2e/medewerker-login.ts` (Node `crypto`) each implement RFC 6238 in
about six lines — no OTP dependency on either side, and no enrolment step in the tests.
## Consequences
- A password alone no longer yields a token on the medewerker realm; `check_realms.py`
asserts that refusal, so the enforcement cannot silently regress.
- Every medewerker login in the e2e goes through `loginMedewerker()`, which submits the OTP
form. New staff specs must use it.
- **The secret is public.** It is a demo fixture and worthless outside this synthetic
stack, in the same class as the committed `test123` passwords and the mock DigiD broker.
A real deployment enrols per-user authenticators (or federates to DigiD Machtigen /
eHerkenning at the required assurance level) and seeds no credentials at all.
- Enforcement is *effectively* realm-wide but *technically* per-user: the conditional
subflow is what fires. A medewerker whose OTP credential were removed would fall back to
the required action at next login (enrol, then challenge) rather than skipping MFA — an
acceptable equivalence for this purpose, and the reason the required action is set.
- Reversal is a one-file edit: drop the `otp` credentials and the `requiredActions` block.
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
# ADR-0032: The werkbak refreshes itself by polling, not by a pushed stream
- **Status:** Accepted
- **Date:** 2026-09-04
- **Deciders:** Respellion engineering
- **Slice:** #162 (proposal #163). The issue titles it S-26; that id already belongs to
the self-service resume slice (#111), so #162 is the identifier that counts.
## Context
The werkbak (S-12) is a read of the open Flowable `Beoordelen` tasks: portal → BFF
`GET /behandel/werkbak` → domain `Werkbak` query → workflow engine, each task enriched
from its aggregate. A registration reaches `Beoordelen` **asynchronously**, only once the
citizen supplies its documents and the DMN routes it (S-10a) — so it appears in a werkbak
that is already open, and until now a behandelaar had to reload the page to see it.
Three forces shape the mechanism:
- **Nothing notifies anyone.** The trigger lives in Flowable. The domain does not publish
task events, and there is no bus between the domain and the BFF.
- **The BFF is stateless** and sits behind each portal's reverse proxy.
- **This is the repo's first live-updating view**, so the choice sets a precedent.
## Decision
**The werkbak page re-reads the existing BFF endpoint on a fixed interval
(`WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS`, 5 s) while it is open. No new endpoint, dependency or server-side
state.**
The refresh is a *background* read: it leaves the rows and the loading/failure states
untouched until it has an answer, so a tick never flashes a spinner over rows a
behandelaar is reading and a single failed poll never swaps the list for the error alert.
A read that comes back also clears an earlier failure, so the view recovers on its own —
the same reload this slice set out to remove would otherwise be needed to escape a
transient error. Only a foreground read (on open, after a decision) speaks for whether the
werkbak is readable at all.
### Why not SSE or WebSockets
Neither buys freshness here, because **nothing notifies the BFF either**:
- **SSE** (`text/event-stream`) would mean a new streaming endpoint whose handler polls the
domain and forwards diffs — the same latency, plus connection lifecycle, proxy
buffering, and auth on a long-lived connection.
- **WebSocket/SignalR** adds a dependency (CLAUDE.md §13) and makes the BFF stateful and
sticky-session-bound. A genuine push path would *also* need the domain to publish task
events. Warranted by high-frequency, bidirectional or fan-out-heavy traffic; the werkbak
is none of those.
Polling meets the acceptance ("a registration can be seen in the werkbak once it is ready
for review") in a handful of lines inside one component.
- ponytail ceiling: a fixed 5 s interval, per open page, that keeps polling in a
background tab. Each tick costs one Flowable task query plus a store read per open task.
- Upgrade path: publish task events from the domain, then swap the component's `interval`
for a stream. The endpoint contract and the component's rendering stay as they are;
gate on `document.visibilityState` first if request volume is the concern.
## Consequences
**Positive**
- The outcome is delivered with no new endpoint, dependency, or server-side state, and no
service boundary moves.
- Self-healing: a transient read failure no longer strands the view until a manual reload.
- The e2e got *simpler* — the happy path waits for the werkbak row without reloading the
page, which is itself the live-refresh assertion.
**Negative / costs**
- Staleness is bounded by one interval (≤5 s) rather than instant.
- One `GET /behandel/werkbak` per open werkbak per interval, including in hidden tabs.
- The precedent is polling; a future view with genuinely high-frequency updates will have
to revisit this (see the upgrade path above).
## Coupling rules touched (CLAUDE.md §8)
None. The poll reuses the existing portal → BFF → domain read path: §8.3 (portals talk
only to the BFF) and §8.2 (only the Workflow Client talks to Flowable) are unchanged.
@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
# ADR-0033: Kubernetes deployment is one values-driven Helm chart, not a chart per service
- **Status:** Accepted
- **Date:** 2026-09-04
- **Deciders:** Respellion engineering
- **Slice:** _(none yet — raised directly as a deployment-target request; see
"Process note" at the end)_
## Context
The stack is defined once, in `infra/docker-compose.yml`: 30-odd containers made of six
upstream Common Ground modules (OpenZaak, Open Notificaties, Objecten, Objecttypen,
Keycloak, Flowable), their databases and workers, five .NET services, four portals, six
one-shot bootstrap containers, and an observability backplane (off by default here). Compose is the
CI-canonical stack: `make verify` and every `verify-*` script drive it.
We now also want the stack on Kubernetes — first target a **single-node Talos VM on a
laptop**. Four properties of this particular stack shape the answer:
- **The upstream images are used verbatim** and read their configuration from a mounted
directory (`setup_configuration/data.yaml`, Keycloak realm exports, BPMN/DMN). Compose
streams those files into external volumes (`infra/seed-config.sh`) because bind mounts
don't reach sibling containers on the CI runner. Kubernetes needs the same files as
ConfigMaps — from *somewhere*.
- **Django's `URLValidator` rejects single-label hosts.** Compose works around it by
handing the ACL and the seeds a container *IP* (ADR-0009, ADR-0020, ADR-0029, and the
`objecten.local` network alias). In Kubernetes a Service FQDN is already multi-label, so
the workaround has a natural replacement — but the hosts have to line up exactly, since
Objecten reflects the request Host into the URLs it publishes to NRC.
- **The OIDC issuer must be one string** for both the browser and the BFF (ADR-0010).
`infra/host-browser.yml` already solved this for a host browser: pin `KC_HOSTNAME`, keep
backchannel discovery in-cluster, and mount a `config.json` per portal.
- **Nothing here is highly available.** One replica of everything, on one node.
## Decision
**One chart — `infra/helm/big-reference` — whose `values.yaml` is a near-literal
transcription of the compose file, rendered by three generic templates (Deployment, Job,
Service) over a `workloads` map.** Adding a service is a values edit.
Consequences of that shape, each chosen deliberately:
- **Config files are not copied into the chart.** `infra/helm/seed-configmaps.sh` creates
the ConfigMaps from the files that already live in the repo — the Kubernetes sibling of
`infra/seed-config.sh`. The chart therefore needs `make k8s-seed` before `helm install`,
which is the same two-step dance compose already has.
- **Bootstrap one-shots become Jobs, with no ordering mechanism.** Every one is idempotent
(ADR-0020); each waits for the TCP ports it needs via a busybox init container and
Kubernetes retries the rest. `make k8s-reseed` re-runs them.
- **The four Django services apply their own `setup_configuration`** —
`args: [sh, -c, "/setup_configuration.sh && exec /start.sh"]` — instead of getting a
separate `*-init` Job like compose. Both of those image scripts run
`manage.py migrate`, and compose serialises them with
`depends_on: service_completed_successfully`; Kubernetes has no such edge, so a Job and
its web pod migrate the same database concurrently and Django dies with
*"relation zgw_consumers_service already exists"*. Running the two steps in order inside
the one container leaves exactly one migrator per database, and deletes four workloads.
- **`args`, never `command`.** Compose's `command:` replaces the image's CMD; Kubernetes'
`command:` replaces its ENTRYPOINT. Transcribing one to the other silently broke every
upstream image that relies on its entrypoint — postgres ran as root and refused to
start, Keycloak tried to exec `start-dev` as a binary. The chart now `fail`s at render
time if a workload sets `command`, because the symptom (a crashloop three layers down)
is nothing like the cause.
- **Published ports are NodePorts.** No ingress controller, no LoadBalancer, no TLS. The
four portals are the exception in *use*, not in wiring: PKCE needs `crypto.subtle`, which
browsers expose only in a secure context, so a portal has to be reached over `localhost`
(`make k8s-portals` forwards them) or eventually over HTTPS. `.Values.host` is therefore
"the address the browser uses", not "the node's address" — it pins Keycloak's issuer and
each portal's `config.json`, and both must agree with the URL bar (ADR-0010).
- **Databases are `emptyDir` by default**, so the stack comes up on a cluster with no CSI
driver; setting `persistence.storageClass` switches every database to a PVC.
- **Only two hosts become FQDNs** — OpenZaak (for the ACL and the zaaktype seed) and
Objecten (for the ACL's register writes), the two that Django validates as URLs.
Everything else keeps the short compose service name, because the upstream
`setup_configuration` files name those and Objecten matches an objecttype URL against the
one it was configured with. The portals used to be a third case — nginx's `resolver` never
appends search domains, so the bare `bff` upstream could not resolve on Kubernetes — which
ADR-0034 removed by serving them with Caddy, whose resolver honours `/etc/resolv.conf`.
- **Compose stays CI-canonical.** The chart is a second deployment target, not a
replacement; the acceptance, verify and e2e lanes are unchanged.
### Alternatives considered
- **A chart per service, or an umbrella of 30 subcharts.** The conventional layout, and
roughly 1,500 lines of near-identical YAML for a stack where 28 of 30 workloads are
"one pod, one image, some env". It buys independent versioning we don't want (the stack
is demoed as a whole) and costs the eye-diffability against the compose file that keeps
the two stacks honest.
- **`kompose convert`.** One-shot generation, no ongoing artefact to maintain — but it
drops exactly the parts that carry the design (init ordering, the config volumes, the
issuer pinning) and produces output nobody owns.
- **Bitnami PostgreSQL/Redis subcharts.** Six more dependencies (CLAUDE.md §13) and a
second way of expressing the same three-line database.
- **ingress-nginx with hostname routing.** Needs a controller, `/etc/hosts` entries and a
matching issuer host; NodePorts need none of it and reuse the mechanism
`infra/host-browser.yml` already proves.
- **A registry on the laptop** (the obvious home for images built there). Talos cannot
side-load an image, so a registry is required either way — but reaching one on the host
means opening an inbound port on firewalld's `libvirt` zone, which needs root, and
pushing to it over plain HTTP means an `insecure-registries` entry in the Docker daemon,
which needs root again. `infra/helm/registry.yaml` runs the registry *in* the cluster on
a NodePort instead: pushing laptop → node is outbound and unfiltered, the node pulls from
its own NodePort, and `docker save | crane push --insecure` needs no daemon
configuration. Cost: one more (throwaway, `emptyDir`) workload, and a re-push if its pod
is replaced.
- **Helm hooks (`pre-install`/`post-install`) for bootstrap ordering.** Hooks run after
`--wait`, which would deadlock: OpenZaak's readiness needs the migrations that the hook
is supposed to run. Idempotent Jobs plus retries need no such sequencing.
- ponytail ceiling: single-node assumptions are baked in — one replica per workload,
`Recreate` rollouts, ReadWriteOnce volumes, no PodDisruptionBudgets, no resource
requests or limits (a laptop VM schedules everything or nothing), plain HTTP.
Upgrade path for a real cluster: add requests/limits per workload (the field is already
passed through), swap NodePorts for an Ingress with TLS, and give the databases a real
StorageClass — none of which changes the workload graph.
## Consequences
**Positive**
- One file to read to see what the cluster runs, and it lines up with the compose file
line for line.
- The compose IP workarounds disappear: cluster DNS supplies multi-label hosts.
- `make k8s-lint` renders and schema-checks the whole stack without a cluster.
- The config inputs have exactly one home (the repo) for both stacks — no fork to drift.
**Negative / costs**
- A second deployment description to keep in step with compose. Nothing enforces that
today; a drift check belongs in CI (follow-up).
- `helm install` alone is not enough — the ConfigMaps must be seeded first, and a missing
one surfaces as `ContainerCreating`, not as a clear error.
- Generic templates mean a values typo can render valid-but-wrong YAML; `k8s-lint` catches
schema errors, not intent.
- The verify/e2e lanes do not run against the chart, so the Kubernetes path is verified by
hand (docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md §5) rather than by CI.
- The chart deviates from compose in four places now (args, self-configuring Django pods,
FQDN hosts, NodePorts). Each is forced by the platform and commented where it appears,
but it is four more things that can drift.
## Coupling rules touched (CLAUDE.md §8)
None. The chart deploys the same graph: portals reach only the BFF (§8.3), only the ACL
holds ZGW credentials (§8.1), only the Workflow Client talks to Flowable (§8.2), each
service keeps its own database (§8.5). No workload gained a peer it didn't have in compose.
## Verified
Brought up from scratch on a single-node Talos v1.14.0 VM (6 vCPU / 10 GB, virtio disk)
under virt-manager: 29 pods ready and four bootstrap Jobs complete in under three minutes,
with zero restarts, using ~4.4 GB of the VM's 10 GB. The smoke test in the runbook's §5
walks the whole path — portal proxy → BFF → domain → Flowable → ACL → OpenZaak + Objecten →
NRC → event-subscriber → projection → public register — plus a werkbak read with an
MFA'd medewerker token. The browser flow itself was driven with Playwright against
`http://localhost:30140`: secure context, PKCE, Keycloak form, login, no console errors.
## Process note
CLAUDE.md §14 wants the ADR proposal issue opened before the code, and §7 wants a slice
issue behind the work. This landed the other way round — chart first, on request. The
issue and the CI drift check are the outstanding follow-ups.
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
# ADR-0034: The portals are served by Caddy, not nginx
- **Status:** Accepted
- **Date:** 2026-09-04
- **Deciders:** Respellion engineering
- **Slice:** _(none yet — raised directly alongside the Kubernetes deployment, ADR-0033)_
## Context
Each portal ships as one image that does two jobs: serve the built Angular app, and
reverse-proxy *its own* BFF endpoint group so the browser calls a single origin (no CORS,
and the DigiD/medewerker token rides along — ADR-0010, ADR-0013). Until now that was nginx
with a hand-written `nginx.conf` per app.
Two workarounds had accumulated around nginx's resolver, both for the same root cause:
**nginx resolves a variable `proxy_pass` upstream itself**, using only the `resolver`
directive, and never the search domains in `/etc/resolv.conf`.
1. `resolver 127.0.0.11` (Docker's embedded DNS) is wrong on rootless podman, which uses a
network-specific aardvark address — so `apps/portal-nginx-resolver.sh` rewrote the
directive at container start by reading the pod's actual nameserver.
2. On Kubernetes the bare `bff` name cannot resolve at all without the `svc.cluster.local`
search domain, so the same script gained a `BFF_HOST` override that the Helm chart set
per portal (ADR-0033).
Both existed only to tell the proxy how to resolve one hostname.
## Decision
**Serve the portals with `caddy:2-alpine` and a small `Caddyfile` per app, replacing the
nginx runtime stage, the four `nginx.conf` files, and the resolver workaround.**
Caddy dials its upstream per request through Go's resolver, which reads
`/etc/resolv.conf` — nameserver *and* search domains. So `reverse_proxy bff:8080` resolves
correctly under Docker, rootless podman and Kubernetes with no per-engine configuration,
and it still starts before the BFF exists and picks up its restarts (the property the
variable `proxy_pass` was there to buy). `apps/portal-nginx-resolver.sh`, its unit test and
the chart's `BFF_HOST` env are deleted.
The Caddyfile uses `handle` blocks rather than a bare `try_files`:
```
handle /behandel/* { reverse_proxy bff:8080 }
handle { root * /usr/share/caddy; try_files {path} /index.html; file_server }
```
`handle` blocks are mutually exclusive and matched most-specific-first. This matters:
Caddy's default directive order puts rewrites (`try_files`) *before* `reverse_proxy`, so a
top-level `try_files {path} /index.html` would rewrite every API path to `/index.html`
before the proxy ever saw it — the SPA fallback would silently eat the API. The `handle`
form makes the routing explicit instead of relying on directive-order trivia.
`infra/test_portal_caddyfiles.py` (in `make unit`) asserts each portal proxies exactly its
own endpoint groups and keeps the SPA fallback. The four files are near-identical, so a
copy-paste slip is cheap to make and expensive to find: proxying another portal's group
hands a browser an endpoint its token isn't for, and the failure surfaces as a 401 three
services away.
### Alternatives considered
- **Keep nginx.** Zero migration, and it works — but the resolver workaround stays, and it
had already grown a second head for Kubernetes. Both heads are nginx-specific.
- **Keep nginx, hard-code the FQDN.** Would need a different config per deployment target
(compose vs Kubernetes), which is exactly the fork the chart was written to avoid.
- **Drop the proxy and use CORS.** Turns the same-origin design (ADR-0010) inside out:
CORS preflights, an explicit origin allowlist in the BFF, and a token attached
cross-origin. Not a serving decision — an architectural regression.
- **Kubernetes Ingress in front of the portals.** Solves nothing about compose, adds a
controller, and the portals would still need something to serve static files.
- ponytail ceiling: plain HTTP on `:80`, no compression, no cache headers beyond Caddy's
defaults, and Caddy's automatic HTTPS deliberately unused (there is no hostname to get a
certificate for). Upgrade path: `encode zstd gzip` and a cache policy for immutable
Angular bundles; a real hostname makes TLS a one-line `Caddyfile` change, which is the
main reason this is worth having in place.
## Consequences
**Positive**
- One resolver behaviour across compose, podman and Kubernetes; a script, a unit test and a
chart env var are deleted rather than maintained.
- The images gain `curl` for free (the alpine nginx image had only busybox `wget`), which
the compose healthchecks can use.
- Routing intent is readable: one `handle` block per endpoint group, one for the app.
- TLS later is a one-line change instead of a new component.
**Negative / costs**
- A new runtime dependency in four images (CLAUDE.md §13): Caddy replaces nginx rather than
joining it, so the count is unchanged, but it is a less familiar config language for
anyone who has only read nginx configs.
- The images grew: 90.6 MB against nginx's 75.7 MB, because `caddy:2-alpine` carries a
bigger static binary than nginx's. Measured, not estimated.
- Caddy's directive-order rule is a genuine footgun (see above); the `handle` form and the
Caddyfile comments exist to keep the next person out of it.
- Any operational note that says "the portal's nginx" is now wrong; the ones in `docs/` were
updated with this ADR.
## Coupling rules touched (CLAUDE.md §8)
None. §8.3 is unchanged and unchanged in kind: the portals still talk only to the BFF, and
the proxy is still the thing that makes that same-origin.
-50
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@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
# FDS-architectuur — Open Register
Deze map bevat de architectuurbesluiten en de engineer-documentatie voor de FDS-kant van deze
referentie-applicatie: deelnemen aan het Federatief Datastelsel als **afnemer**.
De strategische inzet, de slices en de portfoliostatus staan in het Innovation Lab-repo,
`Respellion/innovation-lab`, onder `projects/open-register-fd/`. Daar staan ook de
architectuurblauwdruk, de FDS gap-analyse en de privacy-views.
## Documenten
| Document | Waarvoor |
|---|---|
| [`c4-component-view.md`](c4-component-view.md) | Componentview op niveau 3: ports en adapters, en welke views nog waarde toevoegen |
| [`slice-1-proposal.md`](slice-1-proposal.md) | Het bouwbare eerste increment; plak dit in een `poc-voorstel`-issue |
| `adr/` | De geaccepteerde architectuurbesluiten, ADR-0001 tot en met ADR-0006. Zie de tabel hieronder. |
## Architecture Decision Records
Een ADR legt een besluit vast dat **vaststaat**, met de context en de gevolgen, zodat het niet stil
opnieuw wordt uitgevochten. Statuswaarden: `proposed``accepted` → (`vervangen door ADR-NNNN` |
`deprecated`).
Een geaccepteerde ADR wijzigen betekent een nieuwe ADR schrijven die de oude vervangt. Wij
herschrijven de historie nooit.
ADRs liggen naast governance. Acceptatie volgt de asynchrone bezwaarronde uit
`Respellion/innovation-lab`, `operating-model/operating-model.md`, sectie *Besluitvorming*.
| ADR | Besluit | Status |
|---|---|---|
| [0001](adr/0001-acl-at-every-register-boundary.md) | Anti-Corruption Layer op elke registergrens | accepted |
| [0002](adr/0002-fsc-for-connectivity.md) | FSC voor connectiviteit tussen organisaties, geen ruwe REST | accepted |
| [0003](adr/0003-pbac-via-opa.md) | Policy-based access control via OPA, FTV-klaar | accepted |
| [0004](adr/0004-bounded-cache.md) | Begrensde cache; registers blijven systeem van registratie | accepted |
| [0005](adr/0005-ldv-verwerkingenlog.md) | Verwerkingenlog via event-emissie, in lijn met LDV | accepted |
| [0006](adr/0006-module-boundary-and-reuse.md) | Modulegrens en hergebruikstrategie: in-process → .NET-module → OpenMetadata-feed → gateway op verzoek | accepted |
## Nummering
Deze reeks staat los van de ADR-reeks over de referentie-applicatie zelf, die in
[`../`](../adr-0001-loose-coupling.md) loopt van `adr-0001-loose-coupling` tot en met
`adr-0010-bff-oidc`. Vandaar de eigen map `fds/`: beide reeksen beginnen bij 0001, en de nummers
zouden anders over de volle breedte botsen.
In de MkDocs-navigatie staan deze zes daarom als **FDS ADR-000N**, zodat de zijbalk ze niet met de
reeks van de applicatie verwart.
Nieuwe FDS-ADR: kopieer [`adr/template.md`](adr/template.md), neem het volgende nummer, en open een
pull request.
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
# ADR-0001: Anti-Corruption Layer op elke registergrens
- **Status:** accepted
- **Datum:** 2026-06-13
- **Deciders:** Lab Circle (Build, Lead Link)
- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
## Context
De applicatie bevraagt meerdere registers: BRP, NHR/KVK, en ZGW via OpenZaak. Hun vocabulaires en
schema's verschillen van elkaar en van ons domein. Zij veranderen ook zelf mee met de FDS-standaarden.
Lekt registervocabulaire het domeinmodel in, dan werkt elke wijziging aan de registerzijde door in de
bedrijfslogica. Het domein wordt dan een lappendeken van vreemde begrippen in plaats van ubiquitous
language.
## Besluit
Elk register is bereikbaar via een Anti-Corruption Layer: **één adapter per register**, die een
**port** vervult die het domein definieert.
Adapters doen alleen vertalen en velden versmallen. Zij bevatten geen bedrijfslogica. Het domein
spreekt `Persoon` en `Organisatie`, en nooit veldnamen uit BRP of NHR.
## Gevolgen
**Positief:** verloop in registers en FDS-standaarden blijft bij de adapter. Het domein blijft stabiel
en testbaar. Adapters zijn onafhankelijk vervangbaar, en dat is precies wat de FSC-wissel uit
ADR-0002 goedkoop maakt. Het patroon generaliseert naar een herbruikbare ACL-template per register,
een Foundations-kandidaat.
**Negatief en kosten:** één vertaalmap per register om te schrijven en te onderhouden, plus een extra
indirectie die engineers moeten respecteren in plaats van omzeilen.
**Vervolgwerk:** extraheer de ACL-template zodra de tweede adapter bestaat (slice 3).
## Overwogen alternatieven
- **Registers direct aanroepen uit de applicatieservices** — afgewezen: dit koppelt bedrijfscode aan
registerschema's en aan versies van FDS-standaarden.
- **Eén generieke registeradapter** — afgewezen: registers verschillen genoeg dat een generieke
abstractie zou gaan lekken of opzwellen. Adapters per register zijn duidelijker.
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
# ADR-0002: FSC voor connectiviteit tussen organisaties, geen ruwe REST
- **Status:** accepted
- **Datum:** 2026-06-13
- **Deciders:** Lab Circle, Upstream Liaison
- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
## Context
Registerbevragingen kruisen een organisatiegrens naar systemen van bronhouders met
persoonsgegevens. Het FDS noemt Federatieve Service Connectiviteit (FSC, de opvolger van NLX) als de
richting voor connectiviteit: wederzijdse authenticatie op organisatieniveau, autorisatie
gecontroleerd tegen een contract en gehandhaafd bij de bron, en symmetrische transactielogging.
Een ruwe REST-client met mTLS geeft ons geen van de contractadministratie, delegatie of onafhankelijke
tweezijdige verantwoording die een FG of auditor nodig heeft.
## Besluit
Het FSC Client-component stuurt alle registerbevragingen via een **FSC outway**, de
EUPL-referentie-implementatie. De ACL-adapter hangt af van de FSC Client, en niet van een HTTP-client.
FSC-zaken — contracten, identiteiten, delegatie — leven in dit component, achter de Register Port.
## Gevolgen
**Positief:** de autorisatie wordt bij de bron gehandhaafd, en niet op gezag van de aanroeper
vertrouwd. Onweerlegbaar loggen aan beide uiteinden maakt onafhankelijke afstemming tegen ons LDV-log
mogelijk. Delegatie wordt expliciet meegedragen. Wij lopen in lijn met de FDS-richting, vóór er een
verplichting is.
**Negatief en kosten:** FSC is operationeel zwaarder dan een REST-aanroep — beheer van certificaten en
identiteiten, plus een outway die op De Werf moet draaien. De vergelijking FSC tegenover DSP loopt
binnen het FDS nog, dus sommige details kunnen schuiven.
**Vervolgwerk:** valideer het contract- en logginggedrag van de huidige fsc-nlx-implementatie
(slice 2). Herzie dit als het FDS voor DSP kiest; ADR-0001 houdt die wissel beperkt tot één component.
## Overwogen alternatieven
- **Ruwe REST met mTLS** — afgewezen: geen contractlaag, geen tweezijdig log, en het wijkt af van het
FDS.
- **Wachten tot het FDS FSC tegenover DSP heeft beslist** — afgewezen: de naad uit ADR-0001 laat ons nu
adopteren en later aanpassen. Wachten geeft het voordeel van vroege expertise weg.
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
# ADR-0003: Policy-based access control via OPA, FTV-klaar
- **Status:** accepted
- **Datum:** 2026-06-13
- **Deciders:** Lab Circle, FG (geconsulteerd)
- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
## Context
Elke bevraging van persoonsgegevens uit BRP of NHR is een verwerking die een grondslag en een
begrensde doelbinding nodig heeft. Toegangsregels moeten handhaafbaar en auditeerbaar zijn, en
wijzigbaar zonder de bedrijfscode opnieuw uit te rollen.
De Federatieve Toegangsverlening (FTV) van het FDS beweegt naar policy-based access control, maar is
nog geen afgeronde standaard.
## Besluit
Introduceer een Policy Decision Point met Open Policy Agent (OPA). De applicatieservices roepen de
PDP aan — via een Authorisation Port en een PDP Client — **vóór elke registerbevraging**, en geven
rol, doel en grondslag mee.
Policies schrijven wij als code, **geversioneerd in Gitea**, en zij gaan via review naar productie. De
PDP staat zo gepositioneerd dat wij bij de komst van FTV alleen het policy-dialect opnieuw uitdrukken,
zonder de architectuurgrens te verplaatsen.
## Gevolgen
**Positief:** doelbinding en grondslag worden gehandhaafd, en niet alleen gedocumenteerd. De FG kan de
werkelijke regels in versiebeheer lezen, waardoor het verwerkingenregister en de gehandhaafde policy
naar elkaar toe groeien. Toegangswijzigingen zijn reviewbaar en gedateerd.
**Negatief en kosten:** BRP-autorisatiebesluiten correct modelleren is juridisch werk, geen
engineering. De PDP maakt de handhaving betrouwbaar, niet de policy juist. Daarnaast komt er een
component bij om te exploiteren.
**Vervolgwerk:** een promotiepijplijn voor policies in Gitea Actions. Policies opnieuw uitdrukken zodra
FTV stabiliseert. Een FG-review van de policy-set vóórdat er echte persoonsgegevens in komen.
## Overwogen alternatieven
- **Rolcontroles in de applicatiecode** — afgewezen: niet auditeerbaar, niet wijzigbaar zonder deploy,
en het verspreidt toegangslogica over de codebase.
- **Wachten op FTV** — afgewezen: de PBAC-vorm is al duidelijk. Nu OPA, later het FTV-dialect.
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
# ADR-0004: Begrensde cache; registers blijven systeem van registratie
- **Status:** accepted
- **Datum:** 2026-06-13
- **Deciders:** Lab Circle, FG (geconsulteerd)
- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
## Context
*Data bij de bron* verbiedt het behandelen van registerdata als lokale bron van waarheid. Maar BRP of
NHR bij elke interactie bevragen is onpraktisch en vergroot de blootstelling.
Persoonsgegevens zijn de data die wij het minst willen opbouwen. Een onbegrensde cache wordt stil een
schaduwregister, met een onbeheerde bewaarverplichting als gevolg.
## Besluit
Een **begrensde cache** staat achter een Cache Port, beheerd door een Cache Manager. Vier grenzen
gelden.
| Grens | Wat die betekent |
|---|---|
| **Tijd** | Een TTL die aan het doel hangt |
| **Omvang** | Alleen de werkset van een actieve zaak |
| **Gezag** | Antwoordt nooit wat de bron niet zou antwoorden; geen systeem van registratie |
| **Adresseerbaarheid** | Gesleuteld op subject, zodat verwijderen op verzoek kan |
Purge-triggers: het verstrijken van de TTL, het sluiten van de zaak, en een verwijderingsverzoek.
## Gevolgen
**Positief:** de prestaties van een lokale kopie, zonder een onbevoegd register te worden. Bewaartermijn
en het recht op verwijdering zijn echte operaties, geen hoop. Dit is consistent met zowel
AVG-dataminimalisatie als FDS-data-bij-de-bron.
**Negatief en kosten:** de mapping van doel naar TTL is een beleidsbesluit, samen met de FG en de
autorisatievoorwaarden, en geen engineeringconstante. Die is dus makkelijk fout te krijgen. Daarnaast
komt de complexiteit van cache-invalidatie erbij.
**Vervolgwerk:** definieer het beleid voor doel naar TTL met de FG. Maak een toestandsdiagram voor de
levensloop van een cache-entry. Documenteer de aanvaardbare veroudering per register.
## Overwogen alternatieven
- **Geen cache; altijd de bron bevragen** — afgewezen: onpraktische latency en belasting, en meer
blootstelling per aanroep.
- **Een onbegrensde of algemene cache** — afgewezen: die wordt een schaduwregister, precies de
faalvorm waar de AVG en het FDS beide tegen duwen.
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
# ADR-0005: Verwerkingenlog via event-emissie, in lijn met LDV
- **Status:** accepted
- **Datum:** 2026-06-13
- **Deciders:** Lab Circle, FG (geconsulteerd)
- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
## Context
AVG art. 30 vereist een register van verwerkingsactiviteiten. De FDS-bouwsteen Logboek
Dataverwerkingen (LDV) wijst naar een gestandaardiseerd verwerkingslog dat de burger kan bevragen.
Database-CDC met Debezium legt *datawijzigingen* vast, en niet *verwerkingsgebeurtenissen met
doelbinding*. Het is dus geen verwerkingenlog.
## Besluit
Elke registeradapter stuurt een **verwerkingsactiviteit-event** naar een eigen Redpanda-topic, via een
Verwerking Port en een LDV Emitter. Het event bevat: subjectcategorie, register, velden, doel en
doelbinding, grondslag, bevragende rol, en tijdstempel. **Nooit de opgehaalde waarden.**
Een projectie maakt het log bevraagbaar. De emissie is asynchroon, maar niet over te slaan: de adapter
die de Register Port vervult, is dezelfde code die het event uitstuurt.
## Gevolgen
**Positief:** het spoor voor art. 30 en LDV ontstaat als neveneffect van de bevraging, dus het kan niet
uit de pas lopen met de werkelijkheid. Het is af te stemmen tegen de tweezijdige logs van FSC
(ADR-0002). Het is onderscheidend in een tender.
**Negatief en kosten:** een topic en een projectie om te exploiteren. Het ontsluiten van het log naar
de burger valt buiten de huidige scope; wij produceren het log. Het eventschema vraagt governance.
**Vervolgwerk:** definieer het schema van het verwerkingsevent. Bouw de bevraagbare projectie. Sluit
aan op de LDV-standaard zodra die volwassen wordt; dit is een upstream-kandidaat.
## Overwogen alternatieven
- **Debezium-CDC hergebruiken als log** — afgewezen: dat legt datawijzigingen vast, en geen verwerking
met doelbinding. Verkeerde semantiek.
- **Synchroon loggen in het aanroeppad** — afgewezen: dat koppelt de latency van de bevraging aan het
log. Asynchroon maar niet over te slaan geeft zowel snelheid als garantie.
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
# ADR-0006: Modulegrens en hergebruikstrategie voor de governed-access spine
- **Status:** accepted
- **Datum:** 2026-06-13
- **Deciders:** Lab Circle (Lead Link, Build, Upstream Liaison)
- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
## Context
De compliance-spine uit slice 1 bestaat uit de PDP-controle (ADR-0003), gegoverneerd uitgaand verkeer
via FSC (ADR-0002), emissie van het verwerkingenlog (ADR-0005), en de begrensde cache (ADR-0004),
allemaal achter ports (ADR-0001). Die spine is mogelijk breder herbruikbaar dan alleen in de
referentie-applicatie.
Er spelen twee hergebruikvragen: welke verpakkingsvorm kiezen wij, en hoe verhoudt de spine zich tot
andere omgevingen zoals het OpenMetadata-datagovernanceproject?
Twee verduidelijkingen bepalen het besluit.
1. **OpenMetadata is geen afnemer.** In het datagovernanceproject is het de catalogus- en
lineage-laag over (synthetische) data. Het bevraagt geen BRP of NHR. FSC of de begrensde cache
daarin inbouwen zou zinloos zijn. De juiste aansluiting is **integratie van de output van de
spine**, en niet het inbouwen van de spine.
2. **FSC en de begrensde cache zijn zaken die alleen een afnemer aangaan.** "Maak het herbruikbaar"
mag deze niet uitsmeren over componenten die geen registerdata bevragen.
Nu al een taalonafhankelijke gateway bouwen — vóórdat er een tweede, niet-.NET afnemer bestaat — zou
de valkuil van speculatieve architectuur herhalen, die wij voor de capability-laag al hebben
afgewezen.
## Besluit
Wij nemen een **vraaggestuurde reeks van vier stappen** aan. Elke stap hangt af van echte behoefte, en
niet van verwachte behoefte.
| Stap | Wat | Wanneer |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | **In-process bewijzen.** Bouw de spine als gewone componenten achter ports, binnen de .NET register-applicatie. Nog geen extractie. Doel: de compliance-invarianten één keer echt valideren. | Slice 1 |
| 2 | **Extraheren als .NET-module.** Zodra een tweede .NET-afnemer in zicht is, haal de spine eruit als een geversioneerde .NET-library of SDK. Dit is de ACL-template-extractie die het charter al plant. Herbruikbaar voor .NET-afnemers, en dat is genoeg voor register-reference en zijn broertjes. | Slice 3 |
| 3 | **De feed LDV naar OpenMetadata aansluiten.** Route verwerkingsevents uit de LDV-emitter naar OpenMetadata als access- en usage-metadata bij het geclassificeerde asset: wie las welk persoonsgegevensveld, met welk doel, hoe vaak. Optioneel laten classificatietags uit OpenMetadata terugstromen om veldminimalisatie in de ACL aan te sturen. Dit is de concrete brug tussen beide anchor-projecten: integratie, geen inbouw. | Na stap 2 |
| 4 | **Alleen op verzoek een taalonafhankelijke gateway bouwen.** Heeft een echte niet-.NET afnemer gegoverneerde registertoegang nodig, verpak de spine dan als zelfstandige sidecar of proxy met een dunne lokale API, met PDP, FSC-egress en LDV erachter. Niet eerder. | Op verzoek |
## Gevolgen
**Positief:** eigen software blijft minimaal. Hergebruik volgt op validatie in plaats van eraan vooraf
te gaan. Beide anchor-projecten krijgen een concreet, benoemd integratiepunt (stap 3). Zaken die
alleen een afnemer aangaan, blijven ingesloten.
**Negatief en kosten:** de .NET-module uit stap 2 dient geen niet-.NET afnemers. Dat aanvaarden wij,
omdat stap 4 dat geval dekt zodra het echt is. Stap 3 vraagt een afgesproken schema voor het
verwerkingsevent, stabiel genoeg voor OpenMetadata om te consumeren.
**Vervolgwerk:**
1. Neem stap 3 als expliciet integratiepunt op in beide projectpagina's in het Innovation Lab-repo:
`projects/open-register-fd/README.md` en `projects/openmetadata/README.md`.
2. Herzie de trigger van stap 4 bij elke portfolio-review. Bouw niet vooruit.
3. Regel governance op het schema van het verwerkingsevent; dat is een gedeelde afhankelijkheid van
stap 1 en stap 3.
## Overwogen alternatieven
- **De taalonafhankelijke gateway vooraf bouwen** — afgewezen: speculatieve architectuur voordat er een
tweede afnemer bestaat. De latency en de operationele kosten zijn niet te rechtvaardigen.
- **De spine in OpenMetadata inbouwen** — afgewezen: OpenMetadata is geen afnemer. Dit is een
categoriefout.
- **De spine permanent in-process houden, zonder extractie** — afgewezen: dat geeft het hergebruik
tussen projecten en applicaties weg, en dat is een kerndoel van de Open Register-inzet.
-27
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@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
# ADR-NNNN: <titel>
- **Status:** proposed
- **Datum:** JJJJ-MM-DD
- **Deciders:** <rollen>
- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
## Context
<De krachten die spelen: het probleem, de beperkingen, de FDS- en AVG-drijfveren. Waarom er nu een
besluit nodig is.>
## Besluit
<De keuze, eenvoudig gesteld.>
## Gevolgen
**Positief:** <wat dit oplevert>
**Negatief en kosten:** <wat het kost, en wat wij aanvaarden>
**Vervolgwerk:** <welk werk dit oproept>
## Overwogen alternatieven
<De afgewezen opties, en waarom.>
-127
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@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
# C4-componentview — register-applicatie en capability-laag
> Niveau 3, de componentview. Deze view zoomt in op de container van de .NET register-applicatie uit
> het L2-containerdiagram. Zij verbindt het geheel op componentniveau — domein, ports, adapters en de
> FDS-capability-componenten — en toont waar elk onderdeel externe tooling raakt.
>
> De hexagonale structuur is expliciet: het domein hangt alleen af van **ports** (interfaces). Elke
> concrete capability is een **adapter** die aan een port is gebonden.
>
> De containerview (L2), de blauwdruk en de privacy-datastroomviews staan in het Innovation Lab-repo,
> `Respellion/innovation-lab`, onder `projects/open-register-fd/`.
```mermaid
C4Component
title Componentview — register-applicatie (.NET) en de FDS-capability-laag
Person(user, "Behandelaar", "Behandelt zaken")
Container(spa, "Frontend", "Angular + NL Design System", "Zaakinterface")
Container_Boundary(app, "Register-applicatie (.NET, hexagonaal)") {
Component(api, "API / application services", ".NET", "Orkestreert use cases; verklaart doelbinding per vraag")
Component(domain, "Domeinmodel", ".NET / DDD", "Ubiquitous language; geen registervocabulaire")
Component(portReg, "Register Port", "interface", "De vraag van het domein: Personen / Organisaties")
Component(portPol, "Authorisation Port", "interface", "mag-deze-verwerking-doorgaan?")
Component(portLog, "Verwerking Port", "interface", "leg de verwerkingsgebeurtenis vast")
Component(portTm, "Terugmelding Port", "interface", "meld een vermoedelijke fout")
Component(portCache, "Cache Port", "interface", "doelgebonden lezen, schrijven en verwijderen")
Component(aclBrp, "BRP-adapter", ".NET", "Vertaalt domein<->BRP; minimale velden")
Component(aclKvk, "NHR/KVK-adapter", ".NET", "Vertaalt domein<->NHR; UBO-bewust")
Component(pdpClient, "PDP Client", ".NET -> OPA", "Roept de policy engine; geeft doel en grondslag mee")
Component(ldvEmit, "LDV Emitter", ".NET", "Bouwt het verwerkingsevent; publiceert naar Redpanda")
Component(fscClient, "FSC Client", ".NET", "Stuurt contractuele aanroepen via de outway")
Component(cacheMgr, "Cache Manager", ".NET", "TTL en verwijderen op subjectsleutel")
Component(tmHandler, "Terugmelding Handler", ".NET -> Flowable", "Start het terugmeldproces")
Component(procClient, "Process Client", ".NET -> Flowable", "Uitvoering van BPMN en DMN")
}
System_Ext(opa, "OPA (PDP)", "Policies geversioneerd in Gitea")
System_Ext(fsc, "FSC Outway", "EUPL-referentie-implementatie")
System_Ext(flowable, "Flowable", "BPMN + DMN")
ContainerDb_Ext(cache, "Begrensde cache", "PostgreSQL")
System_Ext(redpanda, "Redpanda", "LDV-topic + CDC")
System_Ext(brp, "BRP", "via FSC inway")
System_Ext(kvk, "NHR / KVK", "via FSC inway")
System_Ext(kanidm, "Kanidm", "OIDC")
Rel(user, spa, "Gebruikt")
Rel(spa, api, "REST/JSON")
Rel(kanidm, api, "OIDC", "authenticatie")
Rel(api, domain, "Roept aan")
Rel(api, portPol, "Controleert vóór de bevraging")
Rel(api, portReg, "Vraagt data")
Rel(api, portTm, "Dient melding in")
Rel(api, procClient, "Voert proces uit")
Rel(portPol, pdpClient, "gebonden aan")
Rel(pdpClient, opa, "besluitverzoek")
Rel(portReg, aclBrp, "gebonden aan")
Rel(portReg, aclKvk, "gebonden aan")
Rel(aclBrp, fscClient, "via")
Rel(aclKvk, fscClient, "via")
Rel(aclBrp, portLog, "stuurt event")
Rel(aclKvk, portLog, "stuurt event")
Rel(aclBrp, portCache, "leest en schrijft")
Rel(aclKvk, portCache, "leest en schrijft")
Rel(fscClient, fsc, "contractuele aanroep")
Rel(fsc, brp, "mTLS + contract")
Rel(fsc, kvk, "mTLS + contract")
Rel(portLog, ldvEmit, "gebonden aan")
Rel(ldvEmit, redpanda, "publiceert")
Rel(portCache, cacheMgr, "gebonden aan")
Rel(cacheMgr, cache, "slaat op")
Rel(portTm, tmHandler, "gebonden aan")
Rel(tmHandler, flowable, "start proces")
Rel(procClient, flowable, "voert uit")
```
## Hoe je dit leest
1. **De ports zijn de naad.** Het domein en de application services hangen af van de vijf interfaces,
en nooit van adapters. FSC wisselen voor DSP, of OPA voor de latere FTV-client, verandert een
adapter — geen port, en niet het domein. Dit is de clock-speed boundary, concreet gemaakt.
2. **De compliance-componenten zijn adapters, geen domeinlogica.** De PDP-client, de LDV-emitter, de
FSC-client en de cache manager staan allemaal aan de adapterzijde. Een bevraging kan er fysiek niet
langs, omdat de adapter die de Register Port vervult dezelfde code is die het LDV-event uitstuurt
en via FSC routeert.
3. **Slechts twee componenten raken de registers**: de BRP-adapter en de NHR/KVK-adapter. Beide
bereiken ze uitsluitend via de FSC-client. Er is geen vierde pad.
## Componenten tegenover verplichtingen
| Component | Omvang eigen bouw | Verplichting die het afdekt |
|---|---|---|
| Domeinmodel | het product | correctheid van de bedrijfsregels |
| BRP- en NHR-adapters | dun | dataminimalisatie: vertalen en velden versmallen |
| PDP Client | klein | handhaven van grondslag en doelbinding |
| LDV Emitter | klein | verwerkingenlog (AVG art. 30 en LDV) |
| FSC Client | klein | geautoriseerde, gelogde connectiviteit |
| Cache Manager | klein | grenzen aan bewaring, en verwijdering |
| Terugmelding Handler | klein | de terugmeldplicht van de afnemer |
---
## Aanvullende views die voor engineers waarde hebben
De diagrammen tot hier verklaren *structuur* en *compliance-intentie*. Engineers die dit bouwen,
hebben er nog een aantal nodig. Wij tekenen geen view voordat er iets echt is om te beschrijven, dus
elke regel noemt de trigger.
| # | View | Wat het toevoegt | Trigger |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | **Deploymentview** (C4 deployment, topologie) | Waar elke container op De Werf draait: k3s-namespaces, welke services sidecar zijn en welke een eigen pod (is OPA een sidecar of centraal? waar eindigt de FSC outway?), netwerkpolicies tussen de vlakken van de vertrouwensgrens, en beheer van secrets en mTLS-certificaten voor FSC. Hier worden de privacy*grenzen* echte firewall- en netwerkregels. | Vóór de eerste deploy met meerdere services. **Hoogste waarde als volgende.** |
| 2 | **Sequences voor de niet-gelukkige paden** | Wij hebben het gelukkige pad. Engineers hebben de lastige nodig: PDP-*deny* midden in een transactie, een verlopen of ingetrokken FSC-contract, een register-timeout terwijl er een verouderde cache-entry ligt, en een gedeeltelijk NHR-antwoord waarbij een UBO-veld is achtergehouden. Dit bepaalt de foutafhandeling, en hier verstoppen de compliance-randgevallen zich. | Direct na slice 1. |
| 3 | **Domeinmodel en ERD** | De bounded contexts en aggregates in het domein, plus het cacheschema: welke persoonsgegevens blijven staan, op welke sleutel, en met welke purge-kolom. Dit is tegelijk het artefact dat de FG beoordeelt voor bewaartermijnen. | Zodra het domein in slice 1 stabiliseert. |
| 4 | **Dataclassificatie- en catalogusview** | Elk veld dat een grens kruist, getagd — persoonsgegeven? bijzondere categorie? UBO-beperkt? — en gemapt op zijn classificatie in OpenMetadata. Dit stuurt de GDPR-scrubbingregels en de lineage-tags. | Beter *uit* OpenMetadata gegenereerd zodra die gevuld is, dan met de hand getekend. |
| 5 | **Toestandsdiagram: levensloop van een cache-entry** | `fetched``valid` (binnen TTL) → `stale``purged` (TTL verstreken \| zaak gesloten \| verwijderingsverzoek). Klein, maar het pint de bewaarsemantiek vast die "begrensde cache" nu alleen in prose beschrijft. | Samen met ADR-0004-vervolgwerk. |
| 6 | **BPMN-view: de terugmelding-workflow** | Het Flowable-proces zelf: ingediend → verstuurd naar bronhouder → bevestigd → opgelost of afgewezen. Dit is uitvoerbaar BPMN, dus het diagram en de implementatie zijn hetzelfde artefact. | Wanneer de terugmelding-slice start. |
| 7 | **Threat model en vertrouwensgrensview** (STRIDE-stijl) | Dreigingen over de vertrouwensgrens leggen: tokendiefstal, cache poisoning, replay tegen FSC, policy bypass, en manipulatie van logs. Past natuurlijk bij de FSC-zoom, en is het anker van het securitygesprek. | Vóór het verwerken van echte persoonsgegevens. |
| 8 | **CI/CD- en policy-promotieview** | Hoe OPA-policies en BPMN/DMN-modellen van een pull request naar draaiende configuratie gaan. "Toegangsbeheer is configuratie in Gitea" geldt alleen als er een pijplijn is die review en promotie handhaaft. | Samen met het vervolgwerk uit ADR-0003. |
**Voorstel voor de volgende twee.** De **deploymentview**, omdat die de privacygrenzen omzet in
handhaafbare netwerkpolicy. En de **sequences voor de niet-gelukkige paden**, omdat compliance daar
werkelijk breekt.
-103
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@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
# POC-voorstel — slice 1: walking skeleton (één register, gegoverneerde bevraging)
> Klaar om in een `poc-voorstel`-issue te plakken, met de labels `build` en `poc`. Dit is het bouwbare
> eerste increment dat de architectuurdocumenten beschrijven. Het bewijst met opzet de
> *compliance-spine* end-to-end op de dunst mogelijke functionaliteit.
## Probleem en strategische vraag
Kunnen wij een registerbevraging demonstreren die *structureel* gegoverneerd is — onmogelijk uit te
voeren zonder gehandhaafde grondslag en een automatische regel in het verwerkingenlog — op onze
soevereine stack?
Dit is de geloofwaardigheidstoets achter de hele Open Register-inzet (slice 1 van het charter) en
achter de FDS gap-analyse.
## Hypothese
Wij verwachten dat het doorverbinden van één registerbevraging door de volledige capability-spine —
Register Port → ACL-adapter → PDP-controle → FSC-aanroep → LDV-emissie → begrensde cache — de claim
"compliance is structureel" bewijst.
Wij weten dat wij het goed hebben als een geautomatiseerde test aantoont dat een bevraging **niet** kan
voltooien als de PDP weigert, en **altijd** een LDV-event oplevert als de PDP toestaat.
## Scope ter grootte van één blok
**Wel in scope**
| Onderdeel | Wat |
|---|---|
| Register | **NHR/KVK**, basisgegevens over onderneming en bestuurder. Gekozen boven BRP; zie de slotnotitie. |
| Use case | Geef bij een KVK-nummer de geregistreerde organisatie terug aan het domein, voor één verklaard doel. |
| Ports | De vijf ports als interface. Concrete adapters: NHR-ACL, PDP-client (OPA), FSC-client met sandbox- of test-outway, LDV-emitter (Redpanda-topic), en cache manager (PostgreSQL met TTL). |
| Policy | OPA draait met één handgeschreven voorbeeldpolicy in Gitea: één allow-regel en één deny-geval. |
| Log | Verwerkingsevent-schema v0 plus een minimale bevraagbare projectie; een tabelweergave is genoeg. |
| Tests | Tests die de twee compliance-invarianten vastleggen: deny blokkeert, allow logt. |
**Niet in scope** — even belangrijk om op te schrijven.
1. Afgewerkte interface of NL Design System-schermen, verder dan een dev-harness.
2. BRP en paden met veel persoonsgegevens. Die gaan naar slice 2, met een door de FG beoordeelde
policy.
3. UBO-data. Het regime van beperkte toegankelijkheid valt buiten deze slice.
4. De terugmelding-workflow (latere slice), DCAT-export, en Superset-dashboards.
5. Echte register-endpoints. Alleen sandbox en stubs.
## Definition of Done
- [ ] Een bevraging op KVK-nummer geeft een domein-`Organisatie` terug via de NHR-ACL-adapter, zonder
registervocabulaire in het domein (ADR-0001).
- [ ] De aanroep loopt via de FSC-client naar een sandbox-outway, en niet via een ruwe HTTP-client
(ADR-0002).
- [ ] Er vindt geen bevraging plaats tenzij de PDP allow teruggeeft voor de combinatie rol, doel en
grondslag (ADR-0003).
- [ ] Elke toegestane bevraging stuurt precies één verwerkingsevent naar Redpanda, bevraagbaar in de
projectie, zonder opgehaalde waarden (ADR-0005).
- [ ] Cache-entries dragen een TTL en een subjectsleutel; een purge-aanroep verwijdert ze (ADR-0004).
- [ ] **De tests op de compliance-invarianten slagen in CI:** (a) PDP-deny betekent geen FSC-aanroep;
(b) PDP-allow betekent precies één LDV-event; (c) te ruim gevraagde velden bereiken het domein
nooit.
- [ ] Het geheel draait lokaal uit een gedocumenteerd `compose`- of k3s-manifest met stubs, zonder
echte registertoegang.
- [ ] ADR-0001 tot en met ADR-0005 zijn vanuit de code gelinkt. Eén nieuwe ADR als er in slice 1 een
besluit ontstaat.
## Acceptatiedemo (bewijs voor de week-3-toets)
Live: een geslaagde bevraging plus de bijbehorende LDV-regel. Zet daarna de policy op deny en toon
dezelfde bevraging geweigerd, zonder registeraanroep en zonder data.
Dat contrast *is* de demo.
## Ontvangende Delivery Circle (voorlopig)
De register-reference Delivery Circle. De Handoff-ontvanger krijgt bij de kickoff een naam.
Waarschijnlijke adoptie: de capability-spine wordt het herbruikbare substraat voor de
register-reference-applicatie.
## Upstream-kandidaten
| Project | Wat wij kunnen bijdragen |
|---|---|
| fsc-nlx | Ergonomie van de sandbox en testomgeving, plus documentatie |
| OPA | Policy-patronen voor het modelleren van Nederlandse grondslagen |
| OpenMetadata | Later een DCAT-AP-NL exporter; dit verbindt het OpenMetadata-project |
## AVG- en soevereiniteitsoverwegingen
Alleen NHR-basisgegevens, over onderneming en bestuurder, en in slice 1 **gestubd**. Er worden geen
echte persoonsgegevens verwerkt.
Een FG-review is een voorwaarde voor slice 2, met echte data en BRP. Alle componenten draaien
zelfgehost op De Werf; OPA-policies en BPMN staan in Gitea.
## Slotnotitie: waarom NHR vóór BRP voor het skeleton
Beide registers bevatten persoonsgegevens, dus geen van beide is "gratis". NHR-basisgegevens over
onderneming en bestuurder zijn echter minder gevoelig dan BRP-gegevens over inwoners, en er is een
duidelijker verhaal rond een publieke sandbox.
Zo bewijst slice 1 het *mechanisme*, voordat slice 2 BRP oppakt onder een door de FG beoordeelde
policy. UBO-data blijft buiten scope tot het toegangsregime is gemodelleerd.
+5 -71
View File
@@ -5,40 +5,6 @@ copy-pasteable walkthrough against a local `make up` stack.
---
## S-26/#162 — the werkbak refreshes itself (ADR-0032)
**Outcome:** a registration that reaches beoordeling while a behandelaar already has the werkbak open
**appears on its own** — no reload. The page re-reads `GET /behandel/werkbak` every 5 seconds; a
background refresh swaps the rows in without flashing the loading state, and a transient failure no
longer strands the view on its error message until someone reloads.
```bash
# 1. Two windows. Left: the behandel werkbak, already open and idle.
python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp # a code, valid right now
open http://localhost:8142 # merel-behandelaar / test123 + that code
#
# 2. Right: submit a registration and supply its documents (this is what routes it to Beoordelen).
open http://localhost:8140 # jan-burger / test123 → indienen → upload a PDF
#
# 3. Watch the left window. Within ~5 seconds the new reference appears in the werkbak — the page was
# never reloaded and never left the werkbak.
#
# 4. Automated, end to end: the happy path now waits for the werkbak row WITHOUT reloading, so the
# absence of the reload IS the assertion.
make verify-e2e # → registration.spec: "… → behandelaar goedkeurt → public INGESCHREVEN"
#
# 5. Component level (background refresh, failure recovery, teardown):
pnpm nx test behandel # → "picks up a newly submitted registration without a reload" (+3 guards)
```
**The path:** unchanged — portal → BFF `GET /behandel/werkbak` → domain `Werkbak` → Flowable. Only the
page's cadence is new: `interval(WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS)` scoped to the page with `takeUntilDestroyed()`.
**Not push:** nothing notifies the BFF either, so SSE/WebSockets would poll the domain inside the BFF
for the same freshness plus connection state — see ADR-0032 for the trade-off and the upgrade path.
---
## S-19a — approval writes the register record to Objecten (#149, ADR-0028)
**Outcome:** approving a registration no longer only moves the ZGW zaak to its eindstatus — it also
@@ -174,8 +140,7 @@ zaaktype cache). Store is in-memory: an edit reverts to the configured env on re
```bash
make up
# 1. Log in as bram-beheerder / test123 + OTP (`python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp`)
# → "Default-fill" tab → change a value → Opslaan.
# 1. Log in as bram-beheerder / test123 → "Default-fill" tab → change a value → Opslaan.
open http://localhost:8143/default-fill
#
# 2. Automated: the ACL uses the current default-fill per zaak (unit) and the endpoints are behind the
@@ -196,8 +161,7 @@ directly (ADR-0025); managing the default-fill config (S-15b) and MFA (S-15c) co
```bash
make up
# 1. Log in as bram-beheerder / test123 + OTP (`python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp`)
# → the catalogus lists the published zaaktypen.
# 1. Log in as bram-beheerder / test123 → the catalogus lists the published zaaktypen.
open http://localhost:8143
#
# 2. Automated (a CI verify-stack e2e): a beheerder logs in and sees BIG-REGISTRATIE.
@@ -340,8 +304,7 @@ make verify-local # → "OK — a fresh local stack completed the flow with
# 3. Or by hand in the browser: log in at http://localhost:8140 (jan-burger / test123), submit +
# upload a PDF, then approve it in the werkbak at http://localhost:8142 (merel-behandelaar /
# test123 + OTP, see S-15c); it shows as INGESCHREVEN in the openbaar register at
# http://localhost:8141.
# test123); it shows as INGESCHREVEN in the openbaar register at http://localhost:8141.
```
> The zaaktype is discovered by the ACL itself since S-27 (below); `local-seed`'s `acl.env` now
@@ -389,7 +352,7 @@ make verify-e2e # → login as jan-burger → submit → "ontvangen" co
open http://localhost:8140
```
> The portal is served same-origin with the BFF (Caddy proxies `/self-service` + `/openbaar`), so no
> The portal is served same-origin with the BFF (nginx proxies `/self-service` + `/openbaar`), so no
> CORS; the OIDC authority comes from `/config.json` at runtime. See `docs/frontend-decisions.md`.
---
@@ -626,7 +589,7 @@ or **afwijzen** — which also completes the Beoordelen task so the process adva
```text
# 1. Open the behandel portal and log in as a behandelaar (medewerker realm):
# http://localhost:8142/ → merel-behandelaar / test123 + OTP
# http://localhost:8142/ → merel-behandelaar / test123
#
# 2. The werkbak lists the registrations awaiting beoordeling (referentie / bsn / status).
# Find the reference from the submit confirmation and click "Goedkeuren" on that row.
@@ -849,32 +812,3 @@ make verify-domain # → "the timed-out registration's zaak was cancelled to
`POST /annuleringen` → ZGW `resultaten` + `statussen` (Geannuleerd); the aggregate then moves to
`Verlopen`. The ACL cancels the zaak **before** the aggregate is expired, so a failed ZGW call leaves the
job for redelivery rather than diverging the two (ADR-0019).
---
## S-15c — MFA on the medewerker realm (#132, ADR-0031)
**Outcome:** staff logins (behandel + beheer portals) need a **second factor**. The medewerker realm
seeds every medewerker with a TOTP credential, so Keycloak's conditional-OTP step challenges them in
both the browser flow and the direct grant; a password alone no longer yields a token. `CONFIGURE_TOTP`
is a default required action, so a medewerker added later must enrol first. Citizen realms (digid,
eherkenning, eidas) are unchanged — they mock brokers that carry their own assurance.
```bash
# 1. Manual: log in to the behandel portal. After username + password Keycloak asks for a code.
python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp # a valid code, right now
open http://localhost:8142 # merel-behandelaar / test123 + that code
#
# 2. Automated: the realm smoke check asserts the password alone is REFUSED, then that
# password + TOTP succeeds and still carries the behandelaar role:
make keycloak-smoke # → "medewerker merel-behandelaar password-only login refused [OK]"
#
# 3. End-to-end: every staff login in the e2e goes through the OTP prompt (loginMedewerker):
make verify-e2e # → registration.spec (behandelaar approves), catalogus.spec, default-fill.spec
```
**The path:** the seeded `otp` credential in `infra/keycloak/realms/medewerker-realm.json` activates
Keycloak's stock conditional-OTP subflow — no custom browser flow. The fixture secret is shared and
committed on purpose so the checks can compute codes; a real deployment enrols per-user authenticators
(ADR-0031).
+6 -8
View File
@@ -77,13 +77,11 @@ with the submit form (S-08c, #67); any deviation from NL DS will be recorded her
## Serving + e2e (S-08d, #68)
- **Served by Caddy, same-origin as the BFF.** The compose `self-service` image serves the built app
- **Served by nginx, same-origin as the BFF.** The compose `self-service` image serves the built app
and **reverse-proxies** `/self-service/*` + `/openbaar/*` to the `bff` service. Because the
api-client uses **relative URLs**, the browser calls the app's own origin → Caddy forwards to the
BFF: **no CORS**, and the DigiD token (same-origin) is attached by the interceptor. Caddy dials
the BFF per request through the system resolver, so it starts before the BFF is up, picks up its
restarts, and resolves the bare `bff` name on every engine — compose, podman and Kubernetes
(ADR-0034; the `Caddyfile` sits next to each app's `Dockerfile`).
api-client uses **relative URLs**, the browser calls the app's own origin → nginx forwards to the
BFF: **no CORS**, and the DigiD token (same-origin) is attached by the interceptor. nginx resolves
the BFF at request time (a `resolver` + variable `proxy_pass`) so it starts before the BFF is up.
- **Runtime config.** The app fetches `/config.json` before bootstrap (`main.ts`); `appConfig` is a
factory. The dev default (`public/config.json`) points at `localhost:8180`; the Docker image bakes
the compose value (`keycloak:8080`). One build, per-environment OIDC authority.
@@ -112,7 +110,7 @@ with the submit form (S-08c, #67); any deviation from NL DS will be recorded her
`angular-auth-oidc-client`, no interceptor, and no `config.json` — `main.ts` bootstraps `appConfig`
directly with just `provideHttpClient` + `provideRouter`. This is the deliberate contrast to
self-service and keeps the app trivially cacheable/CDN-able.
- **Same-origin via Caddy, like self-service.** The compose `openbaar` image serves the built app and
- **Same-origin via nginx, like self-service.** The compose `openbaar` image serves the built app and
reverse-proxies `/openbaar` to the BFF; the api-client's relative calls stay same-origin (no CORS).
Served on `:8141`, health-checked over IPv4 (`127.0.0.1`), no Keycloak dependency.
- **Public-safe by construction.** The portal only ever sees the BFF's `OpenbaarProjection.PublicView`
@@ -140,7 +138,7 @@ frontend work is the medewerker realm auth and the werkbak/decide page. Wiring r
**BFF remains the security boundary** (`behandelaar` policy, 401/403 on `/behandel/*`, ADR-0013);
the frontend role signal is for display/UX, and the werkbak page surfaces a load failure (e.g. a
403 for a non-behandelaar) rather than swallowing it.
- **Same-origin via Caddy, like the other portals.** The compose `behandel` image serves the built
- **Same-origin via nginx, like the other portals.** The compose `behandel` image serves the built
app and reverse-proxies `/behandel` to the BFF (relative calls, no CORS). Served on `:8142`,
health-checked over IPv4 (`127.0.0.1`), depends on Keycloak for the medewerker realm.
- **Werkbak = decide-and-refresh.** `WerkbakPage` loads `GET /behandel/werkbak` on open and renders a
-3
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@@ -9,9 +9,6 @@ should teach.
- **[Product Requirements](PRD.md)** — what we're building and why.
- **[ADR-0001: Loose coupling](architecture/adr-0001-loose-coupling.md)** — the
non-negotiable integration stance; the template for future ADRs.
- **[FDS architecture](architecture/fds/README.md)** — participating in the Federatief
Datastelsel as an afnemer: FDS ADR-0001…0006, the L3 component view, the slice-1 proposal.
In Dutch; the strategic framing lives in `Respellion/innovation-lab`.
- **[Working in Gitea](gitea-workflow.md)** — issues, milestones, branches, PRs.
- **[CI runbook](runbooks/ci.md)** — the pipeline and the `make ci` local gate.
-36
View File
@@ -23,9 +23,6 @@ login per realm and asserts the identifying claim:
| eidas | pierre-dupont | `eidas_id` |
| medewerker | merel-behandelaar | role `behandelaar` |
The medewerker row also asserts that the password **alone** is refused — that realm
enforces MFA (below).
All test users / credentials are in [../synthetic-data.md](../synthetic-data.md).
## Notes
@@ -38,36 +35,3 @@ All test users / credentials are in [../synthetic-data.md](../synthetic-data.md)
- **Image** pinned to `quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:26.1`.
- Claims are injected by OIDC protocol mappers on `big-portal` (user attribute → token
claim); `medewerker` roles come through `realm_access.roles`.
## MFA on the medewerker realm (S-15c)
Staff logins (behandel + beheer portals) need a second factor; citizen/company realms
(digid, eherkenning, eidas) do not. Two halves in `medewerker-realm.json`:
- Every seeded medewerker carries a **TOTP credential** with the fixture secret
`BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED`, so Keycloak's built-in *conditional OTP* step fires on every
login — browser flow (an `#otp` prompt after the password) and direct grant (a `totp`
form field) alike.
- `CONFIGURE_TOTP` is a **default required action**, so any medewerker added later must
enrol an authenticator before the first login.
See [../architecture/adr-0031-mfa-on-the-medewerker-realm.md](../architecture/adr-0031-mfa-on-the-medewerker-realm.md).
### Getting a code
```bash
python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp # prints a valid 6-digit code right now
```
Or enrol a phone once: the secret in base32 is `IJEUOTKFIRCVORKSJNCVET2UKBJUKRKE`
(`otpauth://totp/medewerker?secret=IJEUOTKFIRCVORKSJNCVET2UKBJUKRKE`). The e2e computes its
own code in `tests/e2e/medewerker-login.ts`.
**A code is single-use.** Keycloak's `otpPolicyCodeReusable` defaults to false, so it refuses a
code it has already accepted — a second login as the same medewerker inside the same 30-second
window fails with `invalid_grant` / *Invalid user credentials*, even though the code is current.
Nothing to fix in the realm: wait for the next window, or spend the following counter, which is
what `nextUnusedCounter` in `tests/e2e/medewerker-login.ts` does for back-to-back specs.
**Fixture only.** A shared, committed secret is a demo convenience, never a production
posture — see the ADR's consequences.
-370
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@@ -1,370 +0,0 @@
# Deploying the stack to a single-node Talos cluster
The Helm chart in `infra/helm/big-reference` is a port of `infra/docker-compose.yml`
(ADR-0033). This runbook is the walkthrough that was actually used to bring the stack up
on a Talos VM under virt-manager on a laptop, including the parts that bite.
Compose remains the CI-canonical stack — `make verify`, the acceptance lane and the
Playwright e2e all still drive it. Kubernetes is a second deployment target.
## 0. What you need
On the laptop, four static binaries, all installable to `~/.local/bin` without root:
```bash
curl -sSLo ~/.local/bin/talosctl https://github.com/siderolabs/talos/releases/download/v1.14.0/talosctl-linux-amd64
curl -sSLo ~/.local/bin/kubectl https://dl.k8s.io/release/v1.37.0/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl
curl -sSL https://get.helm.sh/helm-v3.16.4-linux-amd64.tar.gz | tar xz -O linux-amd64/helm > ~/.local/bin/helm
curl -sSL https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases/download/v0.20.2/go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz | tar xz -O crane > ~/.local/bin/crane
chmod +x ~/.local/bin/{talosctl,kubectl,helm,crane}
```
Match `talosctl` to the Talos ISO you booted (`talosctl version --insecure -n <ip>` reports
the server's tag). `crane` is what pushes images to a plain-HTTP registry without a
root-level Docker daemon change — see §2.
**VM sizing.** 6 vCPU / 10 GB RAM / 27 GB disk runs the whole stack with room to spare
(measured: ~4.4 GB used, 5.4 GB available with all 29 pods up). 4 GB is not enough. The
chart sets no resource requests or limits on purpose — on a single node the VM's RAM is the
only budget there is. Resize a stopped VM with:
```bash
virsh -c qemu:///system destroy talos # it's in maintenance mode; nothing is lost
virsh -c qemu:///system setmaxmem talos 10G --config
virsh -c qemu:///system setmem talos 10G --config
virsh -c qemu:///system setvcpus talos 6 --config --maximum
virsh -c qemu:///system setvcpus talos 6 --config
```
Two addresses matter throughout:
| Name | Meaning | Example |
|---|---|---|
| `TALOS_HOST` | the VM's IP — used by the browser, `talosctl` and `kubectl` | `192.168.122.33` |
| `K8S_REGISTRY` | `TALOS_HOST:30500` — the in-cluster registry (§2) | `192.168.122.33:30500` |
Find the VM's address with `virsh -c qemu:///system net-dhcp-leases default`.
## 1. Install Talos onto the VM
### The virt-manager trap
virt-manager treats the install ISO as one-shot: on the VM's **first shutdown** it ejects
the CD and rewrites the boot order to `hd`. A Talos VM booted from `metal-amd64.iso` runs
entirely in RAM, so the disk is still empty — the next start lands on
`Boot failed: not a bootable disk`. Put the ISO back before installing:
```bash
virsh -c qemu:///system change-media talos sda /path/to/metal-amd64.iso --config --insert
virt-xml -c qemu:///system talos --edit --boot cdrom,hd
virsh -c qemu:///system start talos
```
Wait for the maintenance-mode API, then confirm the install disk's device name — on virtio
it is `/dev/vda`, and Talos's default selector expects `/dev/sda`:
```bash
talosctl get disks --insecure -n <TALOS_HOST> -e <TALOS_HOST>
```
### Generate the machine config
Talos 1.14 moved several v1alpha1 fields into their own config documents. In particular
`machine.install` is now `UnattendedInstallConfig`, and patching the old field is rejected
with *"UnattendedInstallConfig config is incompatible with v1alpha1 config"*. Write
`patch.yaml` as a multi-document patch:
```yaml
machine:
certSANs:
- 192.168.122.33
registries:
mirrors:
# The in-cluster registry (§2) speaks plain HTTP.
"192.168.122.33:30500":
endpoints:
- http://192.168.122.33:30500
---
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: UnattendedInstallConfig
provisioning:
diskSelector:
match: disk.dev_path == "/dev/vda"
```
```bash
talosctl gen config big https://<TALOS_HOST>:6443 --output-dir ~/.talos/big --config-patch @patch.yaml
talosctl apply-config --insecure -n <TALOS_HOST> -e <TALOS_HOST> --file ~/.talos/big/controlplane.yaml
```
Talos installs to the disk and **kexecs straight into the installed system**, so the CD
boot order doesn't get in the way here. Then point the client at the node and bootstrap:
```bash
talosctl config merge ~/.talos/big/talosconfig
talosctl config endpoint <TALOS_HOST>
talosctl config node <TALOS_HOST>
talosctl bootstrap # wait for `talosctl version` to answer first
talosctl kubeconfig -f ~/.kube/config
```
A single-node cluster must run workloads on the control plane, or CoreDNS never schedules:
```bash
kubectl taint node --all node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane-
```
Finally, make a VM restart boot the installed system rather than the ISO (takes effect at
the next full power cycle):
```bash
virsh -c qemu:///system change-media talos sda --eject --config
virt-xml -c qemu:///system talos --edit --boot hd
```
## 2. A registry the node can pull from
Talos has no Docker daemon and no way to side-load an image, so this repo's images have to
come from a registry. The registry runs **inside the cluster**, published on NodePort
30500 (`infra/helm/registry.yaml`):
```bash
make k8s-registry
```
Why in-cluster rather than on the laptop: a laptop-side registry needs an inbound port
opened on firewalld's `libvirt` zone (`sudo firewall-cmd --zone=libvirt --add-port=5000/tcp`),
which needs root. Pushing from the laptop *to* the node is outbound and always allowed, and
the node pulls from its own NodePort. If you do open that port, put a registry on the
laptop instead and point `K8S_REGISTRY` at `<laptop-ip>:5000` — the mirror patch in §1 has
an entry ready for it.
Its storage is `emptyDir`, so if the registry pod is ever replaced, re-run `make k8s-images`.
## 3. Build and push the images
```bash
make k8s-images K8S_REGISTRY=<TALOS_HOST>:30500
```
This builds the nine images with `docker compose build` — same contexts and Dockerfiles as
compose, no second build definition — then `docker save | crane push --insecure` each one.
`docker push` is not used: the registry speaks plain HTTP, which the Docker daemon refuses
without a root-level `insecure-registries` entry, while crane just takes `--insecure`.
## 4. Deploy
```bash
make k8s-up TALOS_HOST=<TALOS_HOST> K8S_REGISTRY=<TALOS_HOST>:30500
```
That does two things:
1. `make k8s-seed` — creates the ConfigMaps the chart mounts, from the config files that
already live in this repo (`infra/helm/seed-configmaps.sh`): the four
`setup_configuration/data.yaml` files, the Keycloak realm exports, the BPMN + DMN, and
the two bootstrap scripts. Re-run it after editing any of them.
2. `helm upgrade --install` of the chart into namespace `big`.
First bring-up takes a few minutes: the four Django services migrate their databases and
apply their `setup_configuration`, Flowable creates its schema, and the bootstrap Jobs
deploy the BPMN/DMN, seed the zaaktype and register the NRC abonnement.
```bash
kubectl -n big get pods -w
kubectl -n big get jobs # all four must reach COMPLETIONS 1/1
```
The Jobs are the stack's wiring; if one is not complete, the flow is broken somewhere
specific:
| Job | What breaks without it |
|---|---|
| `flowable-init` | no `registratie` process, no diploma DMN |
| `registerrecord-init` | the register has no RegisterRecord objecttype, so writes are refused |
| `seed-zaaktype` | the ACL can't resolve `BIG-REGISTRATIE`, so no zaak is created |
| `nrc-subscribe` | register writes never reach the projection — the public register stays empty |
## 5. Use it
### The portals must be reached over `localhost`
The portals' OIDC flow uses PKCE, which needs `crypto.subtle` — and browsers only expose
that in a **secure context**: HTTPS, or an origin on `localhost`/`127.0.0.1`. A NodePort on
the VM's IP is neither, so `http://<TALOS_HOST>:30140` fails before it can even build the
authorize URL:
```
ERROR TypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'digest')
at t.calcHash → t.generateCodeChallenge → t.createUrlCodeFlowAuthorize
```
So deploy with `TALOS_HOST=localhost` — which pins Keycloak's issuer and the portals'
`config.json` authority to `http://localhost:30180` — and forward the browser-facing
services to those same ports:
```bash
make k8s-up TALOS_HOST=localhost K8S_REGISTRY=<TALOS_HOST>:30500
make k8s-portals # stays in the foreground; Ctrl-C stops all five forwards
```
| URL (needs `make k8s-portals`) | What |
|---|---|
| `http://localhost:30140` | self-service portal (DigiD) |
| `http://localhost:30141` | openbaar register (anonymous) |
| `http://localhost:30142` | behandel portal (medewerker) |
| `http://localhost:30143` | beheer portal (medewerker) |
| `http://localhost:30180` | Keycloak (admin/admin) |
The port numbers are deliberately the NodePort numbers: Keycloak's issuer is one fixed
string, so the port the browser uses has to match the one baked into `config.json`.
This is the same mechanism `infra/host-browser.yml` uses for the compose stack (which pins
`localhost:8180`); only the addresses differ.
### The admin UIs work straight off the NodePorts
These are server-rendered and need no secure context, so they are reachable at the VM's
address with no forwarding:
| URL | What |
|---|---|
| `http://<TALOS_HOST>:30000` | OpenZaak admin (admin/admin) |
| `http://<TALOS_HOST>:30001` | Open Notificaties admin (admin/admin) |
| `http://<TALOS_HOST>:30020` / `:30021` | Objecttypen / Objecten admin |
| `http://<TALOS_HOST>:30080` | BFF (`/health`) |
| `http://<TALOS_HOST>:30090` | Flowable REST (rest-admin/test) |
### Credentials
Log in with the test users from `docs/synthetic-data.md` (all password `test123`, e.g.
`jan-burger` for self-service, `merel-behandelaar` for behandel). The `medewerker` realm
enforces MFA (ADR-0031) — print a current code with
`python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp`. Walk the flow in `docs/demo-script.md`.
`TALOS_HOST` is not cosmetic: it pins Keycloak's issuer (`KC_HOSTNAME`) and the portals'
OIDC authority to the same string, which is what makes a browser token pass the BFF's
validation (ADR-0010). Change it and you must re-run `make k8s-up` — the chart rolls the
portals for you, because their `config.json` is a subPath mount and would otherwise keep
serving the old authority.
### Smoke-test the whole chain without a browser
With the forwards running:
```bash
TOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:30180/realms/digid/protocol/openid-connect/token \
-d grant_type=password -d client_id=big-portal \
-d username=jan-burger -d password=test123 -d scope=openid | jq -r .access_token)
# through the portal's Caddy, so this also proves the BFF reverse proxy
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:30140/self-service/registrations \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOK" -H 'Content-Length: 0'
# → {"registrationId":"…","status":"Ingediend"}
curl -s http://localhost:30141/openbaar/register
# → [{"id":"…","status":"INGEDIEND","reference":"<the registrationId>"}]
```
The second call proves the whole Common Ground path: portal → BFF → domain → Flowable →
ACL → OpenZaak + Objecten → NRC → event-subscriber → projection → openbaar register.
## 6. Keeping the databases (recommended if you iterate on the chart)
By default every database is an `emptyDir`: no CSI driver needed, and the data lives as
long as the pod. Note what that means in practice — **any** change to a database pod's
template (an image policy, an env value, a probe) recreates the pod and wipes it. The stack
then needs its bootstrap re-run:
```bash
make k8s-reseed TALOS_HOST=... K8S_REGISTRY=...
```
which re-runs the four Jobs *and* restarts `event-subscriber` + `projection-api`, because
those two create the projection schema on start and otherwise keep writing to a
schema-less database (`relation "processed_notifications" does not exist`). For persistence, install Rancher's local-path-provisioner — on Talos it
must write under `/var` and its namespace needs the privileged Pod Security label:
```yaml
# kustomization.yaml
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- github.com/rancher/local-path-provisioner/deploy?ref=v0.0.31
patches:
- patch: |-
kind: ConfigMap
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
name: local-path-config
namespace: local-path-storage
data:
config.json: |-
{ "nodePathMap":[ { "node":"DEFAULT_PATH_FOR_NON_LISTED_NODES", "paths":["/var/local-path-provisioner"] } ] }
- patch: |-
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: local-path-storage
labels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: privileged
```
```bash
kubectl apply -k .
make k8s-up TALOS_HOST=... K8S_REGISTRY=... K8S_SET='--set persistence.storageClass=local-path'
```
The PVCs carry `helm.sh/resource-policy: keep`, so `make k8s-down` leaves the data behind;
`make k8s-purge` drops the namespace and with it the volumes.
## 7. Day-to-day
```bash
make k8s-lint # render + schema-check the chart, no cluster needed
make k8s-portals # forward the portals + Keycloak to localhost (browser access)
make k8s-images K8S_REGISTRY=... # after changing a service or a portal
make k8s-up TALOS_HOST=... K8S_REGISTRY=...
make k8s-seed # after editing a data.yaml, a realm export, or the BPMN
make k8s-reseed TALOS_HOST=... K8S_REGISTRY=... # re-run the bootstrap Jobs + reset the projection schema
make k8s-down # uninstall, keep the database PVCs
make k8s-purge # uninstall and drop the namespace
```
This repo's images are pulled with `imagePullPolicy: Always` (the `dev` tag is mutable), so
`kubectl -n big rollout restart deploy/<name>` after `make k8s-images` picks up a rebuild.
Upstream images stay `IfNotPresent`: their tags are pinned, and keeping them out of the pod
template avoids needless churn — a changed template makes a Job unpatchable.
`k8s-reseed` is also the path for *changing* a Job in the chart: a Job's pod template is
immutable, so `helm upgrade` is rejected with `cannot patch "…" with kind Job`.
## 8. When it doesn't work
| Symptom | Cause |
|---|---|
| `Boot failed: not a bootable disk` | virt-manager ejected the install ISO on first shutdown — see §1 |
| The VM comes back in maintenance mode after a restart | the ISO is still attached and boots first; eject it and set `--boot hd` (§1) |
| `apply-config` rejects the patch with *"incompatible with v1alpha1"* | Talos ≥1.14 owns that field in its own config document — patch the document, not `machine.*` (§1) |
| CoreDNS `Pending` forever | the control-plane taint is still on the only node (§1) |
| `ImagePullBackOff``pull QPS exceeded` | transient: the kubelet rate-limits pulls when ~30 pods start at once. It recovers on retry |
| `ImagePullBackOff` on a `register-referentie/*` image | the registry mirror patch is missing: `talosctl get registriesconfig` |
| Pod stuck in `ContainerCreating`, event names a ConfigMap | `make k8s-seed` |
| `seed-zaaktype` retrying | publishing a zaaktype validates the resultaattype against `selectielijst.openzaak.nl`, so this one Job needs outbound internet from the VM (ADR-0006) |
| `TypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'digest')` on a portal | not a secure context: `crypto.subtle` is absent on `http://<ip>`. Use `localhost` + `make k8s-portals` (§5) |
| Login redirects but the portal stays logged out, or the BFF answers 401 | `TALOS_HOST` doesn't match the address in the browser's URL bar — issuer mismatch. Re-run `make k8s-up` with the right value |
| A portal returns 502 on `/self-service/…` | the BFF is unreachable from the portal pod: check `kubectl -n big get svc bff` and the BFF's own readiness |
| Public register empty after a submit | usually a wiped `emptyDir` database (§6): `make k8s-reseed`. Confirm with `kubectl -n big logs deploy/event-subscriber \| grep 42P01` |
| `helm upgrade` fails with `cannot patch … with kind Job` | see §7 — use `make k8s-reseed` |
| Pods `Evicted` / `OOMKilled` | the VM is too small (§0) |
| A Job shows `BackoffLimitExceeded` | read it: `kubectl -n big logs job/<name>` |
## What is not ported
- **Observability** (Tempo, Prometheus, Grafana) is defined but disabled — those are built
images too, so switching them on means pushing them as well:
`K8S_SET='--set workloads.tempo.enabled=true --set workloads.prometheus.enabled=true --set workloads.grafana.enabled=true'`.
The .NET services still export OTLP; the exporter fails harmlessly when Tempo is absent.
- **The verify/e2e lanes.** `make verify*` and the Playwright e2e drive compose, not the
chart. The Kubernetes path is verified with §5's smoke test.
- **Ingress, TLS, and resource requests.** See the ponytail ceiling in ADR-0033.
-8
View File
@@ -19,11 +19,6 @@ All test users share the password **`test123`**.
| `eidas` | eIDAS (EU) | `pierre-dupont` | `eidas_id` = `FR/NL/AB-1234-5678` |
| `medewerker` | Internal staff | `merel-behandelaar` | role `behandelaar` |
| `medewerker` | Internal staff | `tom-teamlead` | roles `behandelaar`, `teamlead` |
| `medewerker` | Internal staff | `bram-beheerder` | role `beheerder` |
`medewerker` users additionally need a **second factor**: that realm enforces MFA (S-15c,
ADR-0031). All three share the fixture TOTP secret `BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED`; print a current
code with `python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp`.
The identifying claims are injected via OIDC protocol mappers on `big-portal`
(user-attribute → token claim); `medewerker` roles appear in `realm_access.roles`.
@@ -37,8 +32,5 @@ curl -s -X POST \
-d username=jan-burger -d password=test123 -d scope=openid | jq -r .access_token
```
For a `medewerker` user, add `-d totp=$(python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp)`
without it the grant is refused with `invalid_grant`.
Decode the JWT payload to see the `bsn` claim. `make keycloak-smoke` checks every realm
automatically.
+10 -35
View File
@@ -341,8 +341,7 @@ services:
# Objecten holds the register, OpenZaak holds the process (S-19a, ADR-0028). Both APIs take a
# static token, not a ZGW JWT. The objecttype URL is assigned at seed time, so the ACL resolves
# it by name — lazily, on the first approval, so no depends_on is needed here.
# Dotted host on purpose — see the `objecten.local` alias below (ADR-0029).
Acl__Objecten__BaseUrl: http://objecten.local:8000/
Acl__Objecten__BaseUrl: http://objecten:8000/
Acl__Objecten__Token: ${OBJECTEN_TOKEN:-1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678}
Acl__Objecten__ObjecttypenBaseUrl: http://objecttypen:8000/
Acl__Objecten__ObjecttypenToken: ${OBJECTTYPEN_TOKEN:-0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567}
@@ -510,7 +509,7 @@ services:
networks: [cg]
# ── Portals (S-08/S-09/S-12) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
# Caddy serves each Angular app and reverse-proxies its endpoint group to the BFF (same-origin).
# nginx serves each Angular app and reverse-proxies its endpoint group to the BFF (same-origin).
# The images bake config.json with the compose authority (keycloak:8080), which a HOST browser
# can't resolve — so here we bind-mount a config.json pointing at the host-published localhost:8180
# (matching KC_HOSTNAME). openbaar is anonymous and needs no config.
@@ -522,7 +521,7 @@ services:
ports:
- "8140:80"
volumes:
- ./local-config/self-service.config.json:/usr/share/caddy/config.json:ro,z
- ./local-config/self-service.config.json:/usr/share/nginx/html/config.json:ro,z
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/ || exit 1"]
interval: 5s
@@ -562,7 +561,7 @@ services:
ports:
- "8142:80"
volumes:
- ./local-config/behandel.config.json:/usr/share/caddy/config.json:ro,z
- ./local-config/behandel.config.json:/usr/share/nginx/html/config.json:ro,z
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/ || exit 1"]
interval: 5s
@@ -692,14 +691,12 @@ services:
CACHE_AXES: objecten-redis:6379/0
DISABLE_2FA: "true"
OTEL_SDK_DISABLED: "true"
CELERY_BROKER_URL: redis://objecten-redis:6379/1
CELERY_RESULT_BACKEND: redis://objecten-redis:6379/1
# Publish register-record events to NRC on the `objecten` kanaal (S-19b-1, ADR-0029). The NRC
# service + notifications_config are provisioned by setup_configuration
# (infra/objecten/setup_configuration/data.yaml), and objecten-celery below actually sends
# them — notifications_api_common only queues the task. See ADR-0028 for why S-19a left this
# off until all four pieces existed.
NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: "false"
# S-19a: Objecten refuses every write while its Notificaties config is absent
# (notifications_api_common raises rather than skipping, so POST /objects 500s). Objecten →
# NRC is not wired yet — there is no broker, worker, kanaal or abonnement for it — so turn
# notifications off rather than fake a delivery path that silently drops every message.
# S-19b (#150) sources the projection from Objecten and turns this back on for real.
NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: "true"
RUN_SETUP_CONFIG: "true"
command: /setup_configuration.sh
volumes:
@@ -724,28 +721,6 @@ services:
start_period: 30s
ports:
- "8021:8000"
depends_on:
objecten-init:
condition: service_completed_successfully
networks:
cg:
# Objecten reflects the *request* Host into the `url` it returns, and
# notifications_api_common publishes that url as the notification's hoofdObject /
# resourceUrl — which NRC types as a URLField, and Django's URLValidator rejects a
# single-label host ("Voer een geldige URL in."). So every caller whose writes must be
# notified addresses Objecten by this dotted alias instead of `objecten` (ADR-0029).
# Reads are unaffected and still use the plain service name.
aliases:
- objecten.local
# The celery worker that actually delivers Objecten's notifications to NRC (S-19b-1, ADR-0029).
# notifications_api_common only schedules the send on transaction commit; without a worker the
# task sits in redis forever and every register write is silently undelivered. Mirrors oz-celery.
# No beat: Objecten is a publisher, not a subscriber — nrc-beat drains the delivery queue.
objecten-celery:
image: docker.io/maykinmedia/objects-api:${OBJECTS_TAG:-3.4.0}
environment: *objecten-env-local
command: /celery_worker.sh
depends_on:
objecten-init:
condition: service_completed_successfully
+15 -40
View File
@@ -326,8 +326,7 @@ services:
# Objecten holds the register, OpenZaak holds the process (S-19a, ADR-0028). Both APIs take a
# static token, not a ZGW JWT. The objecttype URL is assigned at seed time, so the ACL resolves
# it by name — lazily, on the first approval, so no depends_on is needed here.
# Dotted host on purpose — see the `objecten.local` alias below (ADR-0029).
Acl__Objecten__BaseUrl: http://objecten.local:8000/
Acl__Objecten__BaseUrl: http://objecten:8000/
Acl__Objecten__Token: ${OBJECTEN_TOKEN:-1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678}
Acl__Objecten__ObjecttypenBaseUrl: http://objecttypen:8000/
Acl__Objecten__ObjecttypenToken: ${OBJECTTYPEN_TOKEN:-0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567}
@@ -496,7 +495,7 @@ services:
networks: [cg]
# ── Self-Service portal (S-08d) ────────────────────────────────────────────
# Caddy serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies /self-service + /openbaar to the BFF
# nginx serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies /self-service + /openbaar to the BFF
# (same-origin, no CORS). The Playwright e2e drives it inside this network so the DigiD
# token issuer (keycloak:8080) matches the BFF's authority (ADR-0010).
self-service:
@@ -507,7 +506,7 @@ services:
ports:
- "8140:80"
healthcheck:
# 127.0.0.1, not localhost: keeps the check on the interface Caddy is published on.
# 127.0.0.1, not localhost: nginx listens on IPv4 only, but localhost resolves to ::1 first.
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/ || exit 1"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
@@ -520,7 +519,7 @@ services:
condition: service_started
networks: [cg]
# The openbaar (public) register portal: Caddy serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies
# The openbaar (public) register portal: nginx serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies
# /openbaar to the BFF. Anonymous — no DigiD, no Keycloak dependency (S-09).
openbaar:
build:
@@ -530,7 +529,7 @@ services:
ports:
- "8141:80"
healthcheck:
# 127.0.0.1, not localhost: keeps the check on the interface Caddy is published on.
# 127.0.0.1, not localhost: nginx listens on IPv4 only, but localhost resolves to ::1 first.
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/ || exit 1"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
@@ -541,7 +540,7 @@ services:
condition: service_healthy
networks: [cg]
# The behandel portal: Caddy serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies /behandel to the BFF.
# The behandel portal: nginx serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies /behandel to the BFF.
# Behandelaars log in against the Keycloak medewerker realm (ADR-0013; S-12).
behandel:
build:
@@ -551,7 +550,7 @@ services:
ports:
- "8142:80"
healthcheck:
# 127.0.0.1, not localhost: keeps the check on the interface Caddy is published on.
# 127.0.0.1, not localhost: nginx listens on IPv4 only, but localhost resolves to ::1 first.
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/ || exit 1"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
@@ -564,7 +563,7 @@ services:
condition: service_started
networks: [cg]
# The beheer portal: Caddy serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies /beheer to the BFF.
# The beheer portal: nginx serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies /beheer to the BFF.
# Beheerders log in against the Keycloak medewerker realm (same realm as behandel, S-15a).
beheer:
build:
@@ -574,7 +573,7 @@ services:
ports:
- "8143:80"
healthcheck:
# 127.0.0.1, not localhost: keeps the check on the interface Caddy is published on.
# 127.0.0.1, not localhost: nginx listens on IPv4 only, but localhost resolves to ::1 first.
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/ || exit 1"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
@@ -718,14 +717,12 @@ services:
CACHE_AXES: objecten-redis:6379/0
DISABLE_2FA: "true"
OTEL_SDK_DISABLED: "true"
CELERY_BROKER_URL: redis://objecten-redis:6379/1
CELERY_RESULT_BACKEND: redis://objecten-redis:6379/1
# Publish register-record events to NRC on the `objecten` kanaal (S-19b-1, ADR-0029). The NRC
# service + notifications_config are provisioned by setup_configuration
# (infra/objecten/setup_configuration/data.yaml), and objecten-celery below actually sends
# them — notifications_api_common only queues the task. See ADR-0028 for why S-19a left this
# off until all four pieces existed.
NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: "false"
# S-19a: Objecten refuses every write while its Notificaties config is absent
# (notifications_api_common raises rather than skipping, so POST /objects 500s). Objecten →
# NRC is not wired yet — there is no broker, worker, kanaal or abonnement for it — so turn
# notifications off rather than fake a delivery path that silently drops every message.
# S-19b (#150) sources the projection from Objecten and turns this back on for real.
NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: "true"
RUN_SETUP_CONFIG: "true"
command: /setup_configuration.sh
# data.yaml is streamed into this external volume by infra/seed-config.sh before start.
@@ -753,28 +750,6 @@ services:
start_period: 30s
ports:
- "8021:8000"
depends_on:
objecten-init:
condition: service_completed_successfully
networks:
cg:
# Objecten reflects the *request* Host into the `url` it returns, and
# notifications_api_common publishes that url as the notification's hoofdObject /
# resourceUrl — which NRC types as a URLField, and Django's URLValidator rejects a
# single-label host ("Voer een geldige URL in."). So every caller whose writes must be
# notified addresses Objecten by this dotted alias instead of `objecten` (ADR-0029).
# Reads are unaffected and still use the plain service name.
aliases:
- objecten.local
# The celery worker that actually delivers Objecten's notifications to NRC (S-19b-1, ADR-0029).
# notifications_api_common only schedules the send on transaction commit; without a worker the
# task sits in redis forever and every register write is silently undelivered. Mirrors oz-celery.
# No beat: Objecten is a publisher, not a subscriber — nrc-beat drains the delivery queue.
objecten-celery:
image: docker.io/maykinmedia/objects-api:${OBJECTS_TAG:-3.4.0}
environment: *objecten-env
command: /celery_worker.sh
depends_on:
objecten-init:
condition: service_completed_successfully
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: v2
name: big-reference
description: >-
The BIG reference stack (Common Ground) on Kubernetes — a port of
infra/docker-compose.yml, aimed at a single-node Talos cluster.
type: application
version: 0.1.0
appVersion: dev
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
{{ .Chart.Name }} {{ .Chart.Version }} deployed to namespace {{ .Release.Namespace }}.
Watch it converge (the upstream Django services migrate on first boot, so the
first bring-up takes a few minutes):
kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get pods -w
kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get jobs
Every bootstrap Job must reach Completions 1/1:
{{- range $name, $w := .Values.workloads }}
{{- if and (ne $w.enabled false) $w.job }}
- {{ $name }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
Open in a browser (add {{ .Values.host }} to /etc/hosts if you use a name):
{{- range $name, $port := .Values.nodePorts }}
{{- $w := index $.Values.workloads $name }}
{{- if ne $w.enabled false }}
{{ printf "%-16s http://%s:%v" $name $.Values.host $port }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
Test users are in docs/synthetic-data.md. If a pod is stuck in
ContainerCreating on a missing ConfigMap, run: make k8s-seed
@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
{{/*
One pod spec for every workload, Deployment and Job alike. The chart is
values-driven on purpose: `.Values.workloads` is a near-literal transcription of
infra/docker-compose.yml, so the two stacks can be diffed by eye instead of by
archaeology. Adding a service is a values edit, not a template edit.
Called as: include "big.podspec" (dict "root" $ "name" $name "w" $w)
*/}}
{{- define "big.podspec" -}}
{{- $root := .root -}}
{{- $name := .name -}}
{{- $w := .w -}}
{{- with $root.Values.imagePullSecrets }}
imagePullSecrets:
{{- toYaml . | nindent 2 }}
{{- end }}
{{- with $w.waitFor }}
initContainers:
- name: wait-for-deps
image: {{ $root.Values.images.busybox }}
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
for t in {{ join " " . }}; do
echo "waiting for $t"
until nc -z "${t%:*}" "${t#*:}"; do sleep 2; done
done
{{- end }}
containers:
- name: {{ $name }}
image: {{ include "big.image" (dict "root" $root "name" $name "w" $w) }}
# Only this repo's images get the configured policy: their `dev` tag is mutable.
# Upstream tags are pinned, so IfNotPresent keeps them out of pod-template diffs —
# which matters because a changed template makes a Job unpatchable (immutable).
imagePullPolicy: {{ if $w.own }}{{ $root.Values.images.pullPolicy }}{{ else }}IfNotPresent{{ end }}
{{- if $w.command }}
{{- fail (printf "workload %s: use `args`, not `command` — compose's `command:` replaces CMD, but Kubernetes' `command:` replaces the image ENTRYPOINT (postgres would run as root, keycloak would exec `start-dev`)" $name) }}
{{- end }}
{{- with $w.args }}
args:
{{- toYaml . | nindent 6 }}
{{- end }}
{{- with $w.envFrom }}
envFrom:
{{- range . }}
- configMapRef:
# optional: an env group whose feature is disabled (e.g. otel) simply
# isn't rendered, and the pod must still start.
name: {{ printf "%s-env" . }}
optional: true
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- with $w.env }}
env:
{{- include "big.env" (list $root .) | nindent 6 }}
{{- end }}
{{- with $w.ports }}
ports:
{{- range . }}
- name: {{ .name }}
containerPort: {{ .targetPort | default .port }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- with $w.probe }}
readinessProbe:
{{- toYaml . | nindent 6 }}
{{- end }}
{{- with $w.resources }}
resources:
{{- toYaml . | nindent 6 }}
{{- end }}
{{- if or $w.files $w.data }}
volumeMounts:
{{- range $w.files }}
- name: {{ .configMap }}
mountPath: {{ .mountPath }}
{{- with .subPath }}
subPath: {{ . }}
{{- end }}
readOnly: true
{{- end }}
{{- with $w.data }}
- name: data
mountPath: {{ .mountPath }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- if or $w.files $w.data }}
volumes:
{{- range $w.files }}
- name: {{ .configMap }}
configMap:
name: {{ .configMap }}
{{- with .defaultMode }}
defaultMode: {{ . }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- with $w.data }}
- name: data
{{- if $root.Values.persistence.storageClass }}
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: {{ $name }}-data
{{- else }}
# No StorageClass configured: the databases are emptyDir, so the stack needs
# no CSI driver to come up. Data then lives as long as the pod does — see
# docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md for switching on local-path.
emptyDir: {}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end -}}
{{/* Image ref: `own: true` workloads are built from this repo, everything else is upstream. */}}
{{- define "big.image" -}}
{{- $root := .root -}}
{{- $w := .w -}}
{{- if $w.own -}}
{{- $ref := printf "%s/%s:%s" $root.Values.images.repositoryPrefix .name $root.Values.images.tag -}}
{{- with $root.Values.images.registry }}{{ printf "%s/%s" . $ref }}{{ else }}{{ $ref }}{{ end }}
{{- else -}}
{{- $w.image -}}
{{- end -}}
{{- end -}}
{{/*
Env list from a map. Every value is run through `tpl`, so values.yaml can name
cluster-internal hosts ({{ .Release.Namespace }}) and the node address
({{ .Values.host }}) without the chart hard-coding either.
*/}}
{{- define "big.env" -}}
{{- $root := index . 0 -}}
{{- range $k, $v := index . 1 }}
- name: {{ $k }}
value: {{ tpl (toString $v) $root | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- end -}}
{{- define "big.labels" -}}
app.kubernetes.io/name: {{ .name }}
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .root.Release.Name }}
app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: Helm
{{- end -}}
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
{{- /*
Shared env blocks — the Kubernetes equivalent of the YAML anchors in
infra/docker-compose.yml (&oz-env, &nrc-env, &objecttypen-env, &objecten-env).
A workload picks them up with `envFrom`, so the web/celery/init variants of an
upstream image stay guaranteed-identical, and `kubectl get cm oz-env -o yaml`
shows what a pod actually got.
The *file* inputs (setup_configuration data.yaml, Keycloak realms, BPMN/DMN, the
seed scripts) are NOT here: they live in the repo and are turned into ConfigMaps
by infra/helm/seed-configmaps.sh, exactly as infra/seed-config.sh streams them
into the compose config volumes. Copying them into the chart would fork them.
*/ -}}
{{- range $group, $env := .Values.envGroups }}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: {{ $group }}-env
labels:
{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" (printf "%s-env" $group)) | nindent 4 }}
data:
{{- range $k, $v := $env }}
{{ $k }}: {{ tpl (toString $v) $ | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- /*
Portal OIDC config. The images bake config.json with the compose authority
(keycloak:8080), which a browser outside the cluster cannot resolve; these
ConfigMaps mount over it with the node address Keycloak's issuer is pinned to
(KC_HOSTNAME below), so the token the browser gets and the issuer the BFF
discovers are the same string. Same mechanism as infra/host-browser.yml.
*/ -}}
{{- range $realm := list "digid" "medewerker" }}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: portal-config-{{ $realm }}
labels:
{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" (printf "portal-config-%s" $realm)) | nindent 4 }}
data:
config.json: |
{ "authority": "{{ printf "http://%s:%v" $.Values.host (index $.Values.nodePorts "keycloak") }}/realms/{{ $realm }}" }
{{- end }}
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
{{- range $name, $w := .Values.workloads }}
{{- if and (ne $w.enabled false) (not $w.job) }}
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: {{ $name }}
labels:
{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" $name) | nindent 4 }}
spec:
replicas: 1
# Recreate, not RollingUpdate: single node, ReadWriteOnce volumes, and nothing
# here is HA — a second pod would just fight the first for the disk.
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: {{ $name }}
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ $.Release.Name }}
template:
metadata:
{{- /*
A ConfigMap mounted with subPath never picks up updates, so a portal whose
config.json content changed has to be rolled. Hashing only the values that
render it keeps the churn off the databases — an emptyDir database that is
recreated for no reason loses its data (see the runbook §6).
*/}}
{{- range $w.files }}
{{- if hasPrefix "portal-config-" .configMap }}
annotations:
checksum/portal-config: {{ printf "%s|%v" $.Values.host (index $.Values.nodePorts "keycloak") | sha256sum }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
labels:
{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" $name) | nindent 8 }}
spec:
{{- include "big.podspec" (dict "root" $ "name" $name "w" $w) | nindent 6 }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
{{- /*
The one-shot bootstrap containers from compose (oz-init, nrc-init, flowable-init,
the *-init setup_configuration runs, the zaaktype seed and the NRC abonnement)
become Jobs. All of them are idempotent, so ordering is not enforced with hooks:
each waits for the ports it needs (waitFor) and Kubernetes retries the rest.
A wiped database is re-seeded by `make k8s-reseed`.
*/ -}}
{{- range $name, $w := .Values.workloads }}
{{- if and (ne $w.enabled false) $w.job }}
---
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: {{ $name }}
labels:
{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" $name) | nindent 4 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: init
spec:
backoffLimit: 20
template:
metadata:
labels:
{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" $name) | nindent 8 }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: init
spec:
restartPolicy: OnFailure
{{- include "big.podspec" (dict "root" $ "name" $name "w" $w) | nindent 6 }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
{{- if .Values.persistence.storageClass }}
{{- range $name, $w := .Values.workloads }}
{{- if and (ne $w.enabled false) $w.data }}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: {{ $name }}-data
labels:
{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" $name) | nindent 4 }}
# Keep the databases when the release is uninstalled; `make k8s-purge` drops them.
annotations:
helm.sh/resource-policy: keep
spec:
accessModes: [ReadWriteOnce]
storageClassName: {{ $.Values.persistence.storageClass }}
resources:
requests:
storage: {{ $w.data.size | default "2Gi" }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
{{- /*
Service names are the compose service names, verbatim: the portals' Caddy
proxies to http://bff:8080 and the upstream setup_configuration files name
http://openzaak:8000 / http://nrc-web:8000, so in-cluster DNS has to answer to
exactly those names. Do not rename a workload without checking both.
.Values.nodePorts is the single place a port is published outside the cluster;
a workload listed there gets a NodePort on its first (only) port.
*/ -}}
{{- range $name, $w := .Values.workloads }}
{{- if and (ne $w.enabled false) $w.ports }}
{{- $nodePort := index $.Values.nodePorts $name }}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: {{ $name }}
labels:
{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" $name) | nindent 4 }}
spec:
type: {{ if $nodePort }}NodePort{{ else }}ClusterIP{{ end }}
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: {{ $name }}
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ $.Release.Name }}
ports:
{{- range $i, $p := $w.ports }}
- name: {{ $p.name }}
port: {{ $p.port }}
targetPort: {{ $p.targetPort | default $p.port }}
{{- if and $nodePort (eq $i 0) }}
nodePort: {{ $nodePort }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
-608
View File
@@ -1,608 +0,0 @@
# Values for the BIG reference stack on Kubernetes.
#
# `workloads` is a near-literal transcription of infra/docker-compose.yml — same
# service names, same images, same env, same one-shots — so the two stacks can be
# diffed by eye. Read that file's comments for the *why* behind each setting; only
# the deviations forced by Kubernetes are re-explained here.
#
# Every env value is rendered with Helm's `tpl`, so it may use:
# {{ .Release.Namespace }} — for a cluster-internal FQDN
# {{ .Values.host }} — the node address a browser reaches the cluster on
#
# Deviations from compose, all of them consequences of the platform:
# * The compose stack hands the ACL and the seeds OpenZaak's *container IP*,
# because OpenZaak and NRC validate URLs with Django's URLValidator and a
# single-label host ("openzaak") is rejected. In Kubernetes the service FQDN
# (openzaak.<ns>.svc.cluster.local) is already multi-label, so the IP dance and
# the `objecten.local` network alias both disappear.
# * `depends_on: service_healthy` becomes a `waitFor` init container (TCP wait)
# plus readiness probes. Ordering is otherwise not enforced: every bootstrap
# job is idempotent and Kubernetes retries.
# * The published ports are NodePorts (see `nodePorts`), not host ports.
# The address a browser outside the cluster uses to reach the node: your Talos
# VM's IP. It pins Keycloak's issuer and the portals' OIDC authority to one
# string, so browser tokens and the BFF's discovered issuer agree.
host: 192.168.122.100
# Set when pulling from a private registry (e.g. the Gitea Container Registry).
imagePullSecrets: []
images:
# Where the images built from THIS repo live. Empty = the bare
# `register-referentie/<svc>:dev` names, which only works if the node already
# has them. On Talos it never does — point this at a registry the node can
# reach (see docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md).
registry: ""
repositoryPrefix: register-referentie
tag: dev
# Applies to this repo's images only (see _helpers.tpl). Always, because `dev`
# is a mutable tag: with IfNotPresent the node keeps the first image it pulled
# and `make k8s-images` would appear to do nothing. The registry is in-cluster,
# so a re-pull is local and cheap — but the pods do depend on it being up.
pullPolicy: Always
busybox: docker.io/library/busybox:stable
persistence:
# Empty = every database is an emptyDir, so the stack comes up on a bare
# cluster with no CSI driver. Set to a StorageClass (e.g. `local-path`) to keep
# the data across pod restarts.
storageClass: ""
# The only place a port is published outside the cluster. A workload listed here
# gets a NodePort on its single port; everything else stays ClusterIP.
nodePorts:
openzaak: 30000
nrc-web: 30001
objecttypen: 30020
objecten: 30021
bff: 30080
flowable-rest: 30090
self-service: 30140
openbaar: 30141
behandel: 30142
beheer: 30143
keycloak: 30180
grafana: 30300
# ── Shared env blocks (the compose YAML anchors) ────────────────────────────────
envGroups:
oz:
UWSGI_PROCESSES: "1"
UWSGI_THREADS: "2"
DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE: openzaak.conf.docker
SECRET_KEY: dev-only-not-for-production
DB_HOST: oz-db
DB_NAME: openzaak
DB_USER: openzaak
DB_PASSWORD: openzaak
IS_HTTPS: "no"
ALLOWED_HOSTS: "*"
CACHE_DEFAULT: oz-redis:6379/0
CACHE_AXES: oz-redis:6379/0
CELERY_BROKER_URL: redis://oz-redis:6379/1
CELERY_RESULT_BACKEND: redis://oz-redis:6379/1
DISABLE_2FA: "true"
NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: "false"
OPENZAAK_SUPERUSER_USERNAME: admin
DJANGO_SUPERUSER_PASSWORD: admin
OPENZAAK_SUPERUSER_EMAIL: admin@localhost
RUN_SETUP_CONFIG: "true"
nrc:
UWSGI_PROCESSES: "1"
UWSGI_THREADS: "2"
DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE: nrc.conf.docker
SECRET_KEY: dev-only-not-for-production
DB_HOST: nrc-db
DB_NAME: opennotificaties
DB_USER: opennotificaties
DB_PASSWORD: opennotificaties
IS_HTTPS: "no"
ALLOWED_HOSTS: "*"
CACHE_DEFAULT: nrc-redis:6379/0
CACHE_AXES: nrc-redis:6379/0
CELERY_BROKER_URL: redis://nrc-redis:6379/1
CELERY_RESULT_BACKEND: redis://nrc-redis:6379/1
DISABLE_2FA: "true"
OPENNOTIFICATIES_SUPERUSER_USERNAME: admin
DJANGO_SUPERUSER_PASSWORD: admin
OPENNOTIFICATIES_SUPERUSER_EMAIL: admin@localhost
RUN_SETUP_CONFIG: "true"
NOTIFICATION_SEC_INTERVAL: "5"
objecttypen:
UWSGI_PROCESSES: "1"
UWSGI_THREADS: "2"
DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE: objecttypes.conf.docker
SECRET_KEY: dev-only-not-for-production
DB_HOST: objecttypen-db
DB_NAME: objecttypes
DB_USER: objecttypes
DB_PASSWORD: objecttypes
ALLOWED_HOSTS: "*"
CACHE_DEFAULT: objecttypen-redis:6379/0
CACHE_AXES: objecttypen-redis:6379/0
DISABLE_2FA: "true"
OTEL_SDK_DISABLED: "true"
RUN_SETUP_CONFIG: "true"
objecten:
UWSGI_PROCESSES: "1"
UWSGI_THREADS: "2"
DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE: objects.conf.docker
SECRET_KEY: dev-only-not-for-production
DB_HOST: objecten-db
DB_NAME: objects
DB_USER: objects
DB_PASSWORD: objects
ALLOWED_HOSTS: "*"
CACHE_DEFAULT: objecten-redis:6379/0
CACHE_AXES: objecten-redis:6379/0
DISABLE_2FA: "true"
OTEL_SDK_DISABLED: "true"
CELERY_BROKER_URL: redis://objecten-redis:6379/1
CELERY_RESULT_BACKEND: redis://objecten-redis:6379/1
NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: "false"
RUN_SETUP_CONFIG: "true"
# Traces for the .NET services. Always set, like compose: the exporter fails
# harmlessly when Tempo is absent (services/*/Program.cs).
otel:
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: http://tempo:4317
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL: grpc
# ── Workloads ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Per entry: image | own (built here) · args · envFrom (env groups) · env
# ports · probe (a literal readinessProbe) · files (ConfigMap mounts) · data
# (a database volume) · waitFor (host:port to wait for) · job · enabled
#
# `args` (never `command`) is the compose `command:` equivalent: compose replaces
# the image's CMD, and so does Kubernetes' `args` — Kubernetes' `command` would
# replace the ENTRYPOINT instead. The chart fails to render if you use `command`.
workloads:
# ── OpenZaak (S-01) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
oz-db:
image: docker.io/postgis/postgis:17-3.5
args: [postgres, -c, max_connections=300]
env:
POSTGRES_USER: openzaak
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: openzaak
POSTGRES_DB: openzaak
ports: [{ name: postgres, port: 5432 }]
data: { mountPath: /var/lib/postgresql/data, size: 4Gi }
probe:
exec:
command: [sh, -c, "pg_isready -U openzaak -d openzaak && psql -U openzaak -d openzaak -c 'SELECT PostGIS_Version();' -q"]
periodSeconds: 5
oz-redis:
image: docker.io/library/redis:7
ports: [{ name: redis, port: 6379 }]
probe: { tcpSocket: { port: 6379 } }
openzaak:
image: docker.io/openzaak/open-zaak:1.28.2
# setup_configuration first, then the server — in ONE container, on purpose.
# Both /setup_configuration.sh and /start.sh run `manage.py migrate`, so a
# separate init Job (as compose has, ordered by depends_on) races this pod for
# the same database and Django fails with "relation already exists".
args: [sh, -c, "/setup_configuration.sh && exec /start.sh"]
envFrom: [oz]
ports: [{ name: http, port: 8000 }]
# /admin/ answers 302 when Django is up — a redirect counts as ready.
probe:
httpGet: { path: /admin/, port: 8000 }
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 10
failureThreshold: 30
files: [{ configMap: rr-oz-config, mountPath: /app/setup_configuration }]
waitFor: [oz-db:5432, oz-redis:6379]
oz-celery:
image: docker.io/openzaak/open-zaak:1.28.2
args: [/celery_worker.sh]
envFrom: [oz]
waitFor: [oz-db:5432, oz-redis:6379]
# ── Open Notificaties / NRC (S-01-c) ────────────────────────────────────────
nrc-db:
image: docker.io/postgis/postgis:17-3.5
args: [postgres, -c, max_connections=300]
env:
POSTGRES_USER: opennotificaties
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: opennotificaties
POSTGRES_DB: opennotificaties
ports: [{ name: postgres, port: 5432 }]
data: { mountPath: /var/lib/postgresql/data, size: 2Gi }
probe:
exec: { command: [pg_isready, -U, opennotificaties, -d, opennotificaties] }
periodSeconds: 5
nrc-redis:
image: docker.io/library/redis:7
ports: [{ name: redis, port: 6379 }]
probe: { tcpSocket: { port: 6379 } }
nrc-web:
image: docker.io/openzaak/open-notificaties:1.16.1
# setup_configuration first, then the server — in ONE container, on purpose.
# Both /setup_configuration.sh and /start.sh run `manage.py migrate`, so a
# separate init Job (as compose has, ordered by depends_on) races this pod for
# the same database and Django fails with "relation already exists".
args: [sh, -c, "/setup_configuration.sh && exec /start.sh"]
envFrom: [nrc]
ports: [{ name: http, port: 8000 }]
probe:
httpGet: { path: /admin/, port: 8000 }
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 10
failureThreshold: 30
files: [{ configMap: rr-nrc-config, mountPath: /app/setup_configuration }]
waitFor: [nrc-db:5432, nrc-redis:6379, openzaak:8000]
nrc-celery:
image: docker.io/openzaak/open-notificaties:1.16.1
args: [/celery_worker.sh]
envFrom: [nrc]
waitFor: [nrc-db:5432, nrc-redis:6379]
# Without beat, notifications are accepted but never delivered (ADR-0007).
nrc-beat:
image: docker.io/openzaak/open-notificaties:1.16.1
args: [/celery_beat.sh]
envFrom: [nrc]
waitFor: [nrc-db:5432, nrc-redis:6379]
# ── Keycloak (S-02) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
keycloak:
image: quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:26.1
args: [start-dev, --import-realm]
env:
KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME: admin
KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD: admin
KEYCLOAK_ADMIN: admin
KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD: admin
KC_HEALTH_ENABLED: "true"
KC_HTTP_ENABLED: "true"
# Pin the issuer to the address the browser uses, and let backchannel calls
# keep using keycloak:8080 — the BFF discovers metadata in-cluster and gets
# this issuer back, which is what browser tokens carry (infra/host-browser.yml).
KC_HOSTNAME: "http://{{ .Values.host }}:{{ index .Values.nodePorts \"keycloak\" }}"
KC_HOSTNAME_BACKCHANNEL_DYNAMIC: "true"
ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
# TCP, not /health/ready on the management port: nothing here gates on realm
# import, and a wrong health path would leave the Service with no endpoints.
probe: { tcpSocket: { port: 8080 }, initialDelaySeconds: 15 }
files: [{ configMap: rr-kc-realms, mountPath: /opt/keycloak/data/import }]
# ── Flowable (S-03) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
flowable-db:
image: docker.io/library/postgres:16
env:
POSTGRES_USER: flowable
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: flowable
POSTGRES_DB: flowable
ports: [{ name: postgres, port: 5432 }]
data: { mountPath: /var/lib/postgresql/data, size: 2Gi }
probe:
exec: { command: [pg_isready, -U, flowable, -d, flowable] }
periodSeconds: 5
flowable-rest:
image: docker.io/flowable/flowable-rest:latest
env:
SPRING_DATASOURCE_DRIVER-CLASS-NAME: org.postgresql.Driver
SPRING_DATASOURCE_URL: jdbc:postgresql://flowable-db:5432/flowable
SPRING_DATASOURCE_USERNAME: flowable
SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD: flowable
ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
# Every REST path needs basic auth, so an httpGet probe would read 401 as
# not-ready. TCP is the honest signal here.
probe: { tcpSocket: { port: 8080 }, initialDelaySeconds: 20 }
waitFor: [flowable-db:5432]
# Deploys the BPMN to the process engine and the DMN to the DMN engine as two
# separate deployments — flowable-rest does not cascade one into the other
# (S-13, ADR-0016). Idempotent.
flowable-init:
job: true
image: docker.io/curlimages/curl:latest
args:
- sh
- -c
- |
svc=http://flowable-rest:8080/flowable-rest/service/repository/deployments
dmn=http://flowable-rest:8080/flowable-rest/dmn-api/dmn-repository/deployments
until curl -sf -u rest-admin:test "$svc" >/dev/null 2>&1; do echo "waiting for flowable-rest..."; sleep 3; done
if curl -s -u rest-admin:test "$dmn" | grep -q '"name":"diploma-eligibility.dmn"'; then
echo "diploma-eligibility DMN already deployed; skip"
else
curl -sf -u rest-admin:test -F 'file=@/work/diploma-eligibility.dmn;filename=diploma-eligibility.dmn' "$dmn" >/dev/null && echo "deployed diploma-eligibility DMN"
fi
if curl -s -u rest-admin:test "$svc?name=registratie" | grep -q '"name":"registratie"'; then
echo "registratie BPMN already deployed; skip"
else
curl -sf -u rest-admin:test -F 'file=@/work/registratie.bpmn;filename=registratie.bpmn' "$svc" >/dev/null && echo "deployed registratie BPMN"
fi
files: [{ configMap: rr-fl-bpmn, mountPath: /work }]
waitFor: [flowable-rest:8080]
# ── ACL ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
acl:
own: true
envFrom: [otel]
env:
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: acl
# The FQDN, not `openzaak`: OpenZaak rejects a single-label host on
# zaak-create. It must be the same host the zaaktype was seeded through
# (see the seed-zaaktype job) so the URLs stay host-consistent (ADR-0009).
Acl__OpenZaak__BaseUrl: "http://openzaak.{{ .Release.Namespace }}.svc.cluster.local:8000/"
Acl__OpenZaak__ClientId: big-reference-seed
Acl__OpenZaak__Secret: insecure-dev-secret-change-me
Acl__Defaults__Bronorganisatie: "517439943"
Acl__Defaults__VerantwoordelijkeOrganisatie: "517439943"
Acl__Defaults__Vertrouwelijkheidaanduiding: openbaar
Acl__Defaults__ZaaktypeIdentificatie: BIG-REGISTRATIE
Acl__Defaults__InformatieobjecttypeOmschrijving: Diploma
# Objecten reflects the request Host into the object url it returns, and
# publishes that url to NRC — which rejects a single-label host. The FQDN
# replaces compose's `objecten.local` alias (ADR-0029).
Acl__Objecten__BaseUrl: "http://objecten.{{ .Release.Namespace }}.svc.cluster.local:8000/"
Acl__Objecten__Token: 1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678
# Short name on purpose: Objecten only accepts an objecttype URL that
# matches the one it was configured with (infra/objecten/setup_configuration
# /data.yaml → http://objecttypen:8000/api/v2/).
Acl__Objecten__ObjecttypenBaseUrl: http://objecttypen:8000/
Acl__Objecten__ObjecttypenToken: 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
Acl__Objecten__ObjecttypeName: RegisterRecord
ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
probe: { httpGet: { path: /health, port: 8080 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
# ── BIG Domain Service (S-05) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
domain:
own: true
envFrom: [otel]
env:
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: domain
Flowable__BaseUrl: http://flowable-rest:8080/flowable-rest/
Flowable__Username: rest-admin
Flowable__Password: test
Acl__BaseUrl: http://acl:8080/
ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
probe: { httpGet: { path: /health, port: 8080 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
# ── BFF ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
bff:
own: true
envFrom: [otel]
env:
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: bff
# In-cluster authority: Keycloak's discovery document returns the pinned
# KC_HOSTNAME issuer, which is what browser tokens carry (ADR-0010).
Keycloak__Authority: http://keycloak:8080/realms/digid
Keycloak__MedewerkerAuthority: http://keycloak:8080/realms/medewerker
Downstream__Domain__BaseUrl: http://domain:8080/
Downstream__Projection__BaseUrl: http://projection-api:8080/
Downstream__Acl__BaseUrl: http://acl:8080/
ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
probe: { httpGet: { path: /health, port: 8080 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
# ── Read projection (S-06) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
projection-db:
image: docker.io/library/postgres:16
env:
POSTGRES_USER: projection
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: projection
POSTGRES_DB: projection
ports: [{ name: postgres, port: 5432 }]
data: { mountPath: /var/lib/postgresql/data, size: 2Gi }
probe:
exec: { command: [pg_isready, -U, projection, -d, projection] }
periodSeconds: 5
event-subscriber:
own: true
envFrom: [otel]
env:
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: event-subscriber
ConnectionStrings__Projection: Host=projection-db;Database=projection;Username=projection;Password=projection
Acl__BaseUrl: http://acl:8080/
EventSubscriber__Webhook__AuthToken: Bearer big-reference-notifications
ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
probe: { httpGet: { path: /health, port: 8080 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
# It migrates the projection schema on start and throws if the DB is absent.
waitFor: [projection-db:5432]
projection-api:
own: true
envFrom: [otel]
env:
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: projection-api
ConnectionStrings__Projection: Host=projection-db;Database=projection;Username=projection;Password=projection
ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
probe: { httpGet: { path: /health, port: 8080 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
waitFor: [projection-db:5432]
# ── Portals (S-08/S-09/S-12/S-15) ───────────────────────────────────────────
# Caddy serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies its endpoint group to
# http://bff:8080 — hence the Service must stay named `bff`. Caddy resolves that
# name through the system resolver, so the DNS search domains apply and no
# upstream rewriting is needed here (ADR-0034).
self-service:
own: true
ports: [{ name: http, port: 80 }]
probe: { httpGet: { path: /, port: 80 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
files:
- configMap: portal-config-digid
mountPath: /usr/share/caddy/config.json
subPath: config.json
openbaar:
own: true
ports: [{ name: http, port: 80 }]
probe: { httpGet: { path: /, port: 80 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
behandel:
own: true
ports: [{ name: http, port: 80 }]
probe: { httpGet: { path: /, port: 80 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
files:
- configMap: portal-config-medewerker
mountPath: /usr/share/caddy/config.json
subPath: config.json
beheer:
own: true
ports: [{ name: http, port: 80 }]
probe: { httpGet: { path: /, port: 80 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
files:
- configMap: portal-config-medewerker
mountPath: /usr/share/caddy/config.json
subPath: config.json
# ── Objecttypen API (S-18a) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
objecttypen-db:
image: docker.io/library/postgres:17-alpine
env:
POSTGRES_USER: objecttypes
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: objecttypes
POSTGRES_DB: objecttypes
ports: [{ name: postgres, port: 5432 }]
data: { mountPath: /var/lib/postgresql/data, size: 2Gi }
probe:
exec: { command: [pg_isready, -U, objecttypes] }
periodSeconds: 5
objecttypen-redis:
image: docker.io/library/redis:7
ports: [{ name: redis, port: 6379 }]
probe: { tcpSocket: { port: 6379 } }
objecttypen:
image: docker.io/maykinmedia/objecttypes-api:3.4.2
# setup_configuration first, then the server — in ONE container, on purpose.
# Both /setup_configuration.sh and /start.sh run `manage.py migrate`, so a
# separate init Job (as compose has, ordered by depends_on) races this pod for
# the same database and Django fails with "relation already exists".
args: [sh, -c, "/setup_configuration.sh && exec /start.sh"]
envFrom: [objecttypen]
ports: [{ name: http, port: 8000 }]
probe:
httpGet: { path: /admin/, port: 8000 }
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 10
failureThreshold: 30
files: [{ configMap: rr-objecttypen-config, mountPath: /app/setup_configuration }]
waitFor: [objecttypen-db:5432, objecttypen-redis:6379]
# The RegisterRecord objecttype + published version, over the API (S-18c,
# ADR-0020/ADR-0027). The uuid is pinned — Objecten identifies it by uuid.
registerrecord-init:
job: true
image: docker.io/library/python:3-slim
args: [python, /config/register.py]
env:
OBJECTTYPEN: http://objecttypen:8000
OBJECTTYPEN_TOKEN: 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
SCHEMA: /config/registerrecord.schema.json
files: [{ configMap: rr-registerrecord-config, mountPath: /config }]
waitFor: [objecttypen:8000]
# ── Objecten API (S-18b) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
objecten-db:
image: docker.io/postgis/postgis:17-3.5
env:
POSTGRES_USER: objects
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: objects
POSTGRES_DB: objects
ports: [{ name: postgres, port: 5432 }]
data: { mountPath: /var/lib/postgresql/data, size: 2Gi }
probe:
exec: { command: [pg_isready, -U, objects] }
periodSeconds: 5
objecten-redis:
image: docker.io/library/redis:7
ports: [{ name: redis, port: 6379 }]
probe: { tcpSocket: { port: 6379 } }
objecten:
image: docker.io/maykinmedia/objects-api:3.4.0
# setup_configuration first, then the server — in ONE container, on purpose.
# Both /setup_configuration.sh and /start.sh run `manage.py migrate`, so a
# separate init Job (as compose has, ordered by depends_on) races this pod for
# the same database and Django fails with "relation already exists".
args: [sh, -c, "/setup_configuration.sh && exec /start.sh"]
envFrom: [objecten]
ports: [{ name: http, port: 8000 }]
probe:
httpGet: { path: /admin/, port: 8000 }
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 10
failureThreshold: 30
files: [{ configMap: rr-objecten-config, mountPath: /app/setup_configuration }]
waitFor: [objecten-db:5432, objecten-redis:6379, objecttypen:8000]
# Delivers Objecten's notifications to NRC; without it every register write is
# silently undelivered (ADR-0029).
objecten-celery:
image: docker.io/maykinmedia/objects-api:3.4.0
args: [/celery_worker.sh]
envFrom: [objecten]
waitFor: [objecten-db:5432, objecten-redis:6379]
# ── Bootstrap the flow, like the local compose stack does (S-B04, ADR-0020) ──
# Seeds + publishes the BIG zaaktype through the same FQDN the ACL uses, so the
# server-assigned URLs are host-consistent. The ACL then resolves them by
# identificatie (S-27, ADR-0021) — nothing is injected back.
# Publishing validates the resultaattype against the external Selectielijst
# API, so the node needs outbound internet for this one job (ADR-0006).
seed-zaaktype:
job: true
image: docker.io/library/python:3-slim
args: [python, /seed/seed_catalogus.py]
env:
OZ_BASE: "http://openzaak.{{ .Release.Namespace }}.svc.cluster.local:8000"
OZ_PUBLISH: "1"
files: [{ configMap: rr-seed-scripts, mountPath: /seed }]
waitFor: [openzaak:8000]
# Registers the NRC abonnement on the `objecten` kanaal pointing at the
# event-subscriber, so register writes reach the projection (ADR-0030).
# Without it the openbaar register stays empty. Restart-safe and idempotent.
nrc-subscribe:
job: true
image: docker.io/library/python:3-slim
args: [python, /seed/register-abonnement.py]
env:
NRC_BASE: http://nrc-web:8000
# The script resolves this to an address for the callback URL; the FQDN
# resolves to the Service's (stable) ClusterIP, which NRC's URLValidator
# accepts — the compose stack uses the container IP for the same reason.
SINK_HOST: "event-subscriber.{{ .Release.Namespace }}.svc.cluster.local"
SINK_PORT: "8080"
SINK_AUTH: Bearer big-reference-notifications
files: [{ configMap: rr-seed-scripts, mountPath: /seed }]
waitFor: [nrc-web:8000, event-subscriber:8080]
# ── Observability backplane (S-16a, ADR-0023) ───────────────────────────────
# Off by default: these are built images too (config baked in), so switching
# them on also means pushing three more images. Enable all three together.
tempo:
enabled: false
own: true
args: ["-config.file=/etc/tempo.yaml"]
ports: [{ name: otlp, port: 4317 }, { name: http, port: 3200 }]
prometheus:
enabled: false
own: true
ports: [{ name: http, port: 9090 }]
grafana:
enabled: false
own: true
env:
GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_USER: admin
GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD: admin
GF_AUTH_ANONYMOUS_ENABLED: "true"
ports: [{ name: http, port: 3000 }]
-60
View File
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
# Throwaway in-cluster OCI registry, published on NodePort 30500.
#
# Talos has no Docker daemon and no way to side-load an image, so the images built
# from this repo must come from a registry. This one lives *inside* the cluster on
# purpose: a registry on the laptop needs an inbound port opened on firewalld's
# libvirt zone (root), while pushing from the laptop to the node is outbound and
# always allowed. The node then pulls from its own NodePort.
#
# Talos must be told it speaks plain HTTP — see the machine.registries.mirrors
# patch in docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md. Storage is emptyDir: if this pod is
# replaced, re-run `make k8s-images`.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: registry
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: registry
namespace: registry
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy: { type: Recreate }
selector:
matchLabels: { app: registry }
template:
metadata:
labels: { app: registry }
spec:
containers:
- name: registry
image: docker.io/library/registry:2
env:
- name: REGISTRY_STORAGE_DELETE_ENABLED
value: "true"
ports:
- containerPort: 5000
readinessProbe:
httpGet: { path: /v2/, port: 5000 }
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /var/lib/registry
volumes:
- name: data
emptyDir: {}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: registry
namespace: registry
spec:
type: NodePort
selector: { app: registry }
ports:
- name: http
port: 5000
targetPort: 5000
nodePort: 30500
-46
View File
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# Turn the repo's config inputs into the ConfigMaps the Helm chart mounts.
#
# This is the Kubernetes sibling of infra/seed-config.sh: the upstream Common
# Ground images are used verbatim and read their config from a mounted directory,
# so the config has to be handed to the platform out-of-band. Compose gets it via
# `docker cp` into external volumes; Kubernetes gets it as ConfigMaps created from
# the files that already live in this repo. Copying those files into the chart
# would fork them from the compose stack, so we don't.
#
# Idempotent: re-run after editing any data.yaml, then `make k8s-reseed`.
#
# Usage: seed-configmaps.sh [namespace] (default: big)
set -euo pipefail
ns="${1:-big}"
here="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
repo="$(cd "$here/../.." && pwd)"
kubectl get namespace "$ns" >/dev/null 2>&1 || kubectl create namespace "$ns"
seed() { # name <kubectl --from-file args...>
local name="$1"; shift
kubectl create configmap "$name" -n "$ns" "$@" \
--dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - >/dev/null
echo " seeded configmap/$name"
}
seed rr-oz-config --from-file="$repo/infra/openzaak/setup_configuration/"
seed rr-nrc-config --from-file="$repo/infra/opennotificaties/setup_configuration/"
seed rr-kc-realms --from-file="$repo/infra/keycloak/realms/"
seed rr-objecttypen-config --from-file="$repo/infra/objecttypen/setup_configuration/"
seed rr-objecten-config --from-file="$repo/infra/objecten/setup_configuration/"
# register.py + the RegisterRecord JSON schema (the __pycache__ dir is skipped:
# kubectl only takes regular files from a --from-file directory).
seed rr-registerrecord-config --from-file="$repo/infra/objecttypen-registerrecord/"
# The BPMN and the DMN are two separate Flowable deployments (S-13, ADR-0016).
seed rr-fl-bpmn \
--from-file="$repo/workflows/registratie.bpmn" \
--from-file="$repo/workflows/diploma-eligibility.dmn"
# The two bootstrap scripts the compose local stack runs as init containers
# (S-B04, ADR-0020). Stdlib-only, so a plain python image can run them.
seed rr-seed-scripts \
--from-file="$repo/infra/openzaak/seed_catalogus.py" \
--from-file="$repo/infra/local/register-abonnement.py"
+12 -46
View File
@@ -1,25 +1,19 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Smoke-check the Keycloak realms: each realm's OIDC login works (password grant)
and returns its expected identifying claim. The medewerker realm additionally enforces
MFA (S-15c), so its login must be refused without a TOTP code. Stdlib only.
Exits non-zero on failure.
and returns its expected identifying claim. Stdlib only. Exits non-zero on failure.
"""
import base64, hashlib, hmac, json, struct, sys, time, urllib.error, urllib.parse, urllib.request
import base64, json, sys, urllib.error, urllib.parse, urllib.request
BASE = "http://localhost:8180"
CLIENT = "big-portal"
PWD = "test123"
# Fixture TOTP secret seeded into every medewerker in infra/keycloak/realms/medewerker-realm.json.
# Keycloak HMACs the raw secret bytes, so no base32 decoding is involved.
OTP_SECRET = b"BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED"
# realm, user, claim ("__roles__" => check realm_access.roles), expected-contains, mfa-enforced
# realm, user, claim ("__roles__" => check realm_access.roles), expected-contains
CHECKS = [
("digid", "jan-burger", "bsn", "123456782", False),
("eherkenning", "acme-ondernemer", "kvk", "12345678", False),
("eidas", "pierre-dupont", "eidas_id", "FR/NL", False),
("medewerker", "merel-behandelaar", "__roles__", "behandelaar", True),
("digid", "jan-burger", "bsn", "123456782"),
("eherkenning", "acme-ondernemer", "kvk", "12345678"),
("eidas", "pierre-dupont", "eidas_id", "FR/NL"),
("medewerker", "merel-behandelaar", "__roles__", "behandelaar"),
]
@@ -29,17 +23,10 @@ def decode(jwt):
return json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(p))
def totp(secret=OTP_SECRET, period=30, digits=6):
"""RFC 6238 code: HMAC-SHA1 over the 30-second counter, dynamically truncated."""
mac = hmac.new(secret, struct.pack(">Q", int(time.time()) // period), hashlib.sha1).digest()
o = mac[-1] & 0x0F
return str((struct.unpack(">I", mac[o:o + 4])[0] & 0x7FFFFFFF) % 10 ** digits).zfill(digits)
def grant(realm, user, **extra):
def grant(realm, user):
data = urllib.parse.urlencode({
"grant_type": "password", "client_id": CLIENT,
"username": user, "password": PWD, "scope": "openid", **extra,
"username": user, "password": PWD, "scope": "openid",
}).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"{BASE}/realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/token", data=data,
@@ -48,27 +35,11 @@ def grant(realm, user, **extra):
return json.loads(r.read())
def second_factor_refused(realm, user):
"""The password alone must not yield a token on an MFA-enforced realm."""
try:
grant(realm, user)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
return e.code in (400, 401)
return False
def main():
ok = True
for realm, user, claim, expect, mfa in CHECKS:
extra = {}
if mfa:
refused = second_factor_refused(realm, user)
ok = ok and refused
print(f"{realm:12} {user:18} password-only login refused "
f"[{'OK' if refused else 'MFA NOT ENFORCED'}]")
extra = {"totp": totp()}
for realm, user, claim, expect in CHECKS:
try:
at = decode(grant(realm, user, **extra)["access_token"])
at = decode(grant(realm, user)["access_token"])
if claim == "__roles__":
val = at.get("realm_access", {}).get("roles", [])
good = expect in val
@@ -86,9 +57,4 @@ def main():
if __name__ == "__main__":
# `check_realms.py otp` prints a current code for the fixture secret — what a human demoing
# the medewerker portals types at Keycloak's OTP prompt (docs/runbooks/keycloak.md).
if len(sys.argv) > 1 and sys.argv[1] == "otp":
print(totp())
else:
main()
main()
+3 -37
View File
@@ -2,16 +2,6 @@
"realm": "medewerker",
"enabled": true,
"displayName": "Medewerkers",
"requiredActions": [
{
"alias": "CONFIGURE_TOTP",
"name": "Configure OTP",
"providerId": "CONFIGURE_TOTP",
"enabled": true,
"defaultAction": true,
"priority": 10
}
],
"roles": {
"realm": [
{ "name": "behandelaar", "description": "Behandelt registratieaanvragen" },
@@ -53,15 +43,7 @@
"lastName": "Behandelaar",
"email": "merel@big.example.nl",
"emailVerified": true,
"credentials": [
{ "type": "password", "value": "test123", "temporary": false },
{
"type": "otp",
"userLabel": "seeded TOTP (fixture)",
"secretData": "{\"value\":\"BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED\"}",
"credentialData": "{\"subType\":\"totp\",\"digits\":6,\"counter\":0,\"period\":30,\"algorithm\":\"HmacSHA1\"}"
}
],
"credentials": [{ "type": "password", "value": "test123", "temporary": false }],
"realmRoles": ["behandelaar"]
},
{
@@ -71,15 +53,7 @@
"lastName": "Teamlead",
"email": "tom@big.example.nl",
"emailVerified": true,
"credentials": [
{ "type": "password", "value": "test123", "temporary": false },
{
"type": "otp",
"userLabel": "seeded TOTP (fixture)",
"secretData": "{\"value\":\"BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED\"}",
"credentialData": "{\"subType\":\"totp\",\"digits\":6,\"counter\":0,\"period\":30,\"algorithm\":\"HmacSHA1\"}"
}
],
"credentials": [{ "type": "password", "value": "test123", "temporary": false }],
"realmRoles": ["behandelaar", "teamlead"]
},
{
@@ -89,15 +63,7 @@
"lastName": "Beheerder",
"email": "bram@big.example.nl",
"emailVerified": true,
"credentials": [
{ "type": "password", "value": "test123", "temporary": false },
{
"type": "otp",
"userLabel": "seeded TOTP (fixture)",
"secretData": "{\"value\":\"BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED\"}",
"credentialData": "{\"subType\":\"totp\",\"digits\":6,\"counter\":0,\"period\":30,\"algorithm\":\"HmacSHA1\"}"
}
],
"credentials": [{ "type": "password", "value": "test123", "temporary": false }],
"realmRoles": ["beheerder"]
}
]
+6 -11
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
"""Local-stack bootstrap (S-B04, #110, ADR-0020) — register the NRC abonnement.
Runs as the `nrc-subscribe` init container of infra/docker-compose.local.yml. Registers an
abonnement on the `objecten` kanaal pointing at the event-subscriber's /notifications callback, so
the register writes the ACL makes (INGEDIEND on submit, INGESCHREVEN on approval) reach the
projection without this the openbaar (public) register stays empty. Since S-19b-2 the projection
is sourced from the register in Objecten, not from ZGW zaak events (ADR-0030).
abonnement on the `zaken` kanaal pointing at the event-subscriber's /notifications callback, so
OpenZaak's notifications (zaak create + status set) reach the projection — without this the openbaar
(public) register stays empty. This is what infra/verify-notification-driver.py does for CI (minus
the test zaak it also creates).
The callback host is the event-subscriber's resolved **container IP**, not `event-subscriber`, because
NRC validates callbackUrl with Django's URLValidator (a single-label host is rejected — same reason the
@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ SINK_PORT = os.environ.get("SINK_PORT", "8080")
SINK_AUTH = os.environ.get("SINK_AUTH", "Bearer big-reference-notifications")
CID = os.environ.get("OZ_CLIENT_ID", "big-reference-seed")
SECRET = os.environ.get("OZ_SECRET", "insecure-dev-secret-change-me")
# The projection is sourced from the register in Objecten, not from ZGW zaak events (S-19b-2).
KANAAL = "objecten"
def token():
@@ -62,10 +60,7 @@ def main():
status, body = call("GET", f"{NRC}/api/v1/abonnement")
for ab in (body or []) if status == 200 else []:
if str(ab.get("callbackUrl", "")).endswith("/notifications"):
# The kanaal is part of "current": an abonnement left over from before S-19b-2 points at
# the right callback but listens on `zaken`, and would never be replaced on IP alone.
kanalen = [k.get("naam") for k in ab.get("kanalen", [])]
if ab.get("callbackUrl") == callback and kanalen == [KANAAL]:
if ab.get("callbackUrl") == callback:
print(f"abonnement already current: {ab['url']}")
return
call("DELETE", ab["url"])
@@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ def main():
status, ab = call("POST", f"{NRC}/api/v1/abonnement", {
"callbackUrl": callback, "auth": SINK_AUTH,
"kanalen": [{"naam": KANAAL, "filters": {}}]})
"kanalen": [{"naam": "zaken", "filters": {}}]})
if status != 201:
sys.exit(f"create abonnement -> {status}: {json.dumps(ab)}")
print(f"abonnement registered: {ab['url']} -> {callback}")
-121
View File
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""S-19b-1 (#152): driver for the Objecten → NRC notification check.
Registers an abonnement on the `objecten` kanaal pointing at the webhook sink, then writes a
RegisterRecord object exactly as the ACL's ObjectenGateway does (S-19a). The caller
(run-objecten-notifications-check.sh) watches the sink for the delivery this only sets it up,
and prints `OBJECT_URL <url>` for the caller to grep on.
Delivery exercises the whole chain: Objecten its celery worker NRC nrc-beat the callback.
Anything missing (broker, worker, kanaal, notifications config) shows up as a non-delivery.
Stdlib only so it runs in a bare python:3-slim container on the compose network.
"""
import base64
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import os
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
OBJECTEN = os.environ["OBJECTEN"] # http://objecten:8000
OBJECTEN_TOKEN = os.environ["OBJECTEN_TOKEN"]
OBJECTTYPEN = os.environ["OBJECTTYPEN"] # http://objecttypen:8000
OBJECTTYPEN_TOKEN = os.environ["OBJECTTYPEN_TOKEN"]
NRC_BASE = os.environ["NRC_BASE"] # http://<nrc-ip>:8000
SINK_CALLBACK = os.environ["SINK_CALLBACK"] # http://<sink-ip>:9000/
SINK_AUTH = os.environ["SINK_AUTH"]
CLIENT_ID = os.environ.get("NRC_CLIENT_ID", "big-reference-seed")
SECRET = os.environ.get("NRC_SECRET", "insecure-dev-secret-change-me")
KANAAL = "objecten"
def mint():
"""The HS256 JWT NRC expects (same shape as infra/local/register-abonnement.py)."""
def seg(d):
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps(d).encode()).rstrip(b"=")
payload = seg({
"iss": CLIENT_ID, "iat": int(time.time()), "client_id": CLIENT_ID,
"user_id": CLIENT_ID, "user_representation": CLIENT_ID,
})
signing_input = seg({"typ": "JWT", "alg": "HS256"}) + b"." + payload
signature = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
hmac.new(SECRET.encode(), signing_input, hashlib.sha256).digest()).rstrip(b"=")
return (signing_input + b"." + signature).decode()
def nrc(method, url, body=None):
"""Call NRC. `url` may be a path or an absolute URL (the list returns absolute ones)."""
data = json.dumps(body).encode() if body is not None else None
req = urllib.request.Request(
url if url.startswith("http") else f"{NRC_BASE}{url}", data=data, method=method,
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {mint()}", "Content-Type": "application/json"})
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as r:
return json.load(r) if r.length != 0 else {}
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
# The body carries the reason (e.g. an unregistered kanaal); the status alone does not.
raise SystemExit(f"FAIL — NRC {method} {url}{e.code}: {e.read().decode(errors='replace')[:400]}")
def token_api(base, token, method, path, body=None, crs=False):
data = json.dumps(body).encode() if body is not None else None
headers = {"Authorization": f"Token {token}"}
if body is not None:
headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
if crs:
headers["Accept-Crs"] = "EPSG:4326"
if body is not None:
headers["Content-Crs"] = "EPSG:4326"
req = urllib.request.Request(f"{base}{path}", data=data, method=method, headers=headers)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as r:
return json.load(r) if r.length != 0 else {}
def subscribe():
"""Register an abonnement on the objecten kanaal, replacing a stale one for the same callback."""
# NRC returns a bare list here, not a paginated envelope.
for existing in nrc("GET", "/api/v1/abonnement") or []:
if existing.get("callbackUrl") == SINK_CALLBACK:
nrc("DELETE", existing["url"])
nrc("POST", "/api/v1/abonnement", {
"callbackUrl": SINK_CALLBACK,
"auth": SINK_AUTH,
"kanalen": [{"naam": KANAAL, "filters": {}}],
})
print(f">> abonnement on '{KANAAL}' -> {SINK_CALLBACK}")
def objecttype_url():
results = token_api(OBJECTTYPEN, OBJECTTYPEN_TOKEN, "GET", "/api/v2/objecttypes").get("results", [])
match = next((o for o in results if o.get("name") == "RegisterRecord"), None)
if not match:
print("FAIL — no RegisterRecord objecttype in Objecttypen", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
return match["url"]
def main():
subscribe()
reference = f"NOTIF-{int(time.time())}"
created = token_api(OBJECTEN, OBJECTEN_TOKEN, "POST", "/api/v2/objects", {
"type": objecttype_url(),
"record": {
"typeVersion": 1,
"data": {"id": f"zaak-{reference}", "status": "INGESCHREVEN", "reference": reference},
"startAt": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%d"),
},
}, crs=True)
print(f">> wrote RegisterRecord {created['url']}")
# An NRC notification carries no record data — only hoofdObject/resourceUrl — so the object
# URL, not the reference in its data, is what the caller can correlate the delivery on.
print(f"OBJECT_URL {created['url']}")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
@@ -18,16 +18,6 @@ zgw_consumers:
auth_type: api_key
header_key: Authorization
header_value: Token 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
# (1b) The NRC Objecten publishes register-record events to (S-19b-1, ADR-0029). Same shape and
# same big-reference-seed credential OpenZaak publishes with — NRC verifies the JWT and
# authorizes it via OpenZaak's AC, which grants that client heeft_alle_autorisaties.
- identifier: nrc
label: Open Notificaties
api_type: nrc
api_root: http://nrc-web:8000/api/v1/
auth_type: zgw
client_id: big-reference-seed
secret: insecure-dev-secret-change-me
# (2) Permit the RegisterRecord objecttype (S-19a). Objecten refuses to store an object whose
# objecttype it has not been configured with ("ObjectType with url=… is not configured"), and it
@@ -50,10 +40,3 @@ tokenauth:
email: admin@localhost
organization: Respellion
is_superuser: true
# (4) Point Objecten's notifications at that NRC service (S-19b-1, ADR-0029). Requires
# NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED=false plus a celery broker + worker — without the worker the message is
# queued and never sent, which is exactly the half-wired state S-19a refused to ship (ADR-0028).
notifications_config_enable: true
notifications_config:
notifications_api_service_identifier: nrc
-12
View File
@@ -25,15 +25,3 @@ storage:
path: /var/tempo/blocks
wal:
path: /var/tempo/wal
# #156: don't let the distributor evict its own ingester. Tempo runs single-binary here, so the
# distributor and the ingester are the same process and the "pool" holds exactly one, in-process,
# member. dskit still health-checks it over loopback gRPC with a 1s deadline (checkinterval 15s);
# on the shared CI runner a transient stall blows that deadline, the only ingester is dropped from
# the pool ("removing distributor_pool failing healthcheck"), and every push then fails ("pusher
# failed to consume trace data", err="context canceled") until the next check — silently losing
# spans, which is how verify-tracing flaked. With one in-process ingester the check can never route
# around a failure, so it can only ever discard data. Turn it off.
ingester_client:
pool_config:
healthcheckenabled: false
@@ -29,9 +29,7 @@ autorisaties_api_config_enable: true
autorisaties_api:
authorizations_api_service_identifier: openzaak-ac
# 4. The kanalen publishers announce on: `zaken` (OpenZaak) and `objecten` (Objecten, S-19b-1).
# Both authenticate with the big-reference-seed credential above, which OpenZaak's AC grants
# heeft_alle_autorisaties — so no separate publisher authorization is needed for Objecten.
# 4. The kanaal OpenZaak publishes zaak events on.
notifications_kanalen_config_enable: true
notifications_kanalen_config:
items:
@@ -41,11 +39,3 @@ notifications_kanalen_config:
- bronorganisatie
- zaaktype
- vertrouwelijkheidaanduiding
# 5. The kanaal Objecten publishes register-record events on (S-19b-1, ADR-0029). Its name is
# fixed by the Objects API itself (NOTIFICATIONS_KANAAL = "objecten"), not chosen here. The
# filter set matches what the Objects API sends as kenmerken, so an abonnement can narrow by
# objecttype rather than receiving every object write in the register.
- naam: objecten
documentatie_link: https://objects-and-objecttypes-api.readthedocs.io/
filters:
- object_type
-83
View File
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# S-19b-1 (#152): verify the Objecten → NRC notification path against an ALREADY-RUNNING full
# stack. Registers an abonnement on the `objecten` kanaal pointing at a throwaway webhook sink,
# writes a RegisterRecord object (exactly as the ACL does on approval, S-19a), and asserts the sink
# receives the notification.
#
# This is the whole publish chain in one assertion: Objecten → its celery worker → NRC → nrc-beat →
# the subscriber callback. S-19a deliberately left it disconnected (ADR-0028); this proves it is
# connected for real, rather than merely configured.
#
# All in-network, reaching services by container IP (a single-label host isn't URL-valid for NRC's
# callbackUrl validator; the runner can't reach published ports — gitea-actions-gotchas.md §5/§6).
# EXCEPT Objecttypen, which must be reached by SERVICE NAME: it echoes the request Host into the
# objecttype `url` and Objecten only accepts the one matching its configured api_root (ADR-0028);
# and Objecten, reached by its `objecten.local` alias because it reflects the request Host into the
# notification's hoofdObject/resourceUrl, which NRC validates as a URL (ADR-0029).
#
# Does NOT manage the stack lifecycle, but cleans up the sink/driver it creates.
set -euo pipefail
here="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
SINK_AUTH="Bearer objecten-notification-sink-token"
cleanup() { docker rm -f rr-osink rr-overify >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; }
trap cleanup EXIT
ip() { docker inspect -f '{{range .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{.IPAddress}}{{end}}' "$1"; }
# Anchored on the compose replica suffix so they don't also match objecten-db / objecten-redis.
obj="$(docker ps -q --filter 'name=objecten[-_][0-9]+$' | head -1)"
nrc="$(docker ps -q --filter 'name=nrc-web' | head -1)"
[ -n "$obj" ] || { echo "ERROR: no running objecten container — bring the stack up first" >&2; exit 1; }
[ -n "$nrc" ] || { echo "ERROR: no running nrc-web container — bring the stack up first" >&2; exit 1; }
net="$(docker inspect -f '{{range $k,$_ := .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{$k}}{{"\n"}}{{end}}' "$obj" | head -1)"
nrc_ip="$(ip "$nrc")"
echo ">> network=$net nrc=$nrc_ip"
echo ">> starting the webhook sink"
docker rm -f rr-osink >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
sink="$(docker create --network "$net" --name rr-osink -e "EXPECTED_AUTH=$SINK_AUTH" \
python:3-slim python /sink.py)"
docker cp "$here/notification-sink.py" "$sink:/sink.py" >/dev/null
docker start "$sink" >/dev/null
sleep 1
sink_ip="$(ip rr-osink)"
echo ">> sink at $sink_ip:9000"
echo ">> registering the abonnement + writing a RegisterRecord"
docker rm -f rr-overify >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
drv="$(docker create --network "$net" --name rr-overify \
-e "OBJECTEN=http://objecten.local:8000" \
-e "OBJECTEN_TOKEN=${OBJECTEN_TOKEN:-1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678}" \
-e "OBJECTTYPEN=http://objecttypen:8000" \
-e "OBJECTTYPEN_TOKEN=${OBJECTTYPEN_TOKEN:-0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567}" \
-e "NRC_BASE=http://$nrc_ip:8000" \
-e "SINK_CALLBACK=http://$sink_ip:9000/" -e "SINK_AUTH=$SINK_AUTH" \
python:3-slim python /driver.py)"
docker cp "$here/objecten-notifications-check.py" "$drv:/driver.py" >/dev/null
docker start -a "$drv"
object_url="$(docker logs rr-overify 2>/dev/null | sed -n 's/^OBJECT_URL //p' | head -1)"
docker rm -f rr-overify >/dev/null
[ -n "$object_url" ] || { echo "FAIL — the driver did not write a RegisterRecord" >&2; exit 1; }
echo ">> wrote $object_url"
# Correlate on the object URL: a notification carries hoofdObject/resourceUrl, never the record
# data, so the reference inside the record is not in the delivered message.
echo ">> waiting for the notification to reach the sink"
for _ in $(seq 1 "${NOTIFICATION_TRIES:-40}"); do
if docker logs rr-osink 2>&1 | grep -qF "$object_url"; then
echo "OK — Objecten published to NRC and the abonnement delivered it:"
docker logs rr-osink 2>&1 | grep -F "$object_url" | tail -1 | cut -c1-500
exit 0
fi
sleep 2
done
echo "FAIL — no 'objecten' notification for $object_url reached the sink." >&2
echo " Objecten accepted the write, so the gap is downstream: the celery broker/worker," >&2
echo " the kanaal registration, or Objecten's notifications_config." >&2
echo "--- sink log ---" >&2; docker logs rr-osink 2>&1 | tail -8 >&2
echo "--- objecten log ---" >&2; docker logs "$obj" 2>&1 | tail -15 >&2
exit 1
+18 -50
View File
@@ -1,26 +1,18 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# Verify the end-to-end read-projection path (S-06, re-sourced by S-19b-2) against an ALREADY-RUNNING
# full stack: ACL → Objecten → NRC → Event Subscriber → projection → projection-api. Seeds a
# published BIG zaaktype (idempotent), registers an abonnement on the `objecten` kanaal pointing at
# the real Event Subscriber's /notifications callback (with the bearer it enforces), opens a zaak
# *through the ACL*, and asserts projection-api serves a row for it with status INGEDIEND.
#
# The zaak is opened through the ACL, not straight against OpenZaak: since ADR-0030 the projection is
# derived from the RegisterRecord in Objecten, and the ACL is what writes that record (INGEDIEND on
# submit). A zaak created behind the ACL's back produces no register write and so no projection row —
# which is the point of the re-source.
# Verify the end-to-end read-projection path (S-06) against an ALREADY-RUNNING full stack:
# OpenZaak → NRC → Event Subscriber → projection → projection-api. Seeds a published BIG
# zaaktype (idempotent), registers an abonnement on the `zaken` kanaal pointing at the real
# Event Subscriber's /notifications callback (with the bearer it enforces), creates a zaak,
# and asserts projection-api serves a row for that zaak with status INGEDIEND.
#
# All in-network, reaching services by container IP — single-label hosts aren't URL-valid and
# the runner can't reach published ports (gitea-actions-gotchas.md §5/§6). Does not own the stack
# lifecycle (the caller brings it up and tears it down), but does recreate the `acl` service to
# repoint it — see below, and run-domain-check.sh, which does the same. Plain docker primitives only.
# See ADR-0007/0008/0030.
# the runner can't reach published ports (gitea-actions-gotchas.md §5/§6). Reuses the
# notification driver to register the abonnement + create the zaak. Does NOT manage the stack
# lifecycle (the caller owns bring-up + teardown). Plain docker primitives only. See ADR-0007/0008.
set -euo pipefail
here="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
root="$(cd "$here/.." && pwd)"
compose="$root/infra/docker-compose.yml"
WEBHOOK_AUTH="${NOTIFICATION_WEBHOOK_TOKEN:-Bearer big-reference-notifications}"
cleanup() { docker rm -f rr-pverify rr-pquery >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; }
@@ -32,13 +24,11 @@ oz="$(docker ps -q --filter 'name=[-_]openzaak[-_]' | head -1)"
nrc="$(docker ps -q --filter 'name=nrc-web' | head -1)"
es="$(docker ps -q --filter 'name=event-subscriber' | head -1)"
proj="$(docker ps -q --filter 'name=projection-api' | head -1)"
acl="$(docker ps -q --filter 'name=[-_]acl[-_]' | head -1)"
[ -n "$oz" ] && [ -n "$nrc" ] || { echo "ERROR: OpenZaak and/or NRC not running — bring the stack up first" >&2; exit 1; }
[ -n "$es" ] && [ -n "$proj" ] || { echo "ERROR: event-subscriber and/or projection-api not running — bring the stack up first" >&2; exit 1; }
[ -n "$acl" ] || { echo "ERROR: acl not running — bring the stack up first" >&2; exit 1; }
net="$(docker inspect -f '{{range $k,$_ := .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{$k}}{{"\n"}}{{end}}' "$oz" | head -1)"
oz_ip="$(ip "$oz")"; nrc_ip="$(ip "$nrc")"; es_ip="$(ip "$es")"; proj_ip="$(ip "$proj")"; acl_ip="$(ip "$acl")"
echo ">> network=$net openzaak=$oz_ip nrc=$nrc_ip event-subscriber=$es_ip projection-api=$proj_ip acl=$acl_ip"
oz_ip="$(ip "$oz")"; nrc_ip="$(ip "$nrc")"; es_ip="$(ip "$es")"; proj_ip="$(ip "$proj")"
echo ">> network=$net openzaak=$oz_ip nrc=$nrc_ip event-subscriber=$es_ip projection-api=$proj_ip"
echo ">> seeding a published BIG zaaktype (idempotent)"
sid="$(docker create --network "$net" -e "OZ_BASE=http://$oz_ip:8000" -e OZ_PUBLISH=1 \
@@ -47,39 +37,19 @@ docker cp "$here/openzaak/seed_catalogus.py" "$sid:/seed.py" >/dev/null
docker start -a "$sid"
docker rm -f "$sid" >/dev/null
echo ">> registering the event-subscriber abonnement on the objecten kanaal"
echo ">> registering abonnement at the Event Subscriber + creating a zaak"
docker rm -f rr-pverify >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
# The same script the local stack uses (ADR-0020), so both paths register the identical abonnement.
drv="$(docker create --network "$net" --name rr-pverify \
-e "NRC_BASE=http://$nrc_ip:8000" \
-e "SINK_HOST=$es_ip" -e "SINK_PORT=8080" -e "SINK_AUTH=$WEBHOOK_AUTH" \
python:3-slim python /subscribe.py)"
docker cp "$here/local/register-abonnement.py" "$drv:/subscribe.py" >/dev/null
-e "OZ_BASE=http://$oz_ip:8000" -e "NRC_BASE=http://$nrc_ip:8000" \
-e "SINK_CALLBACK=http://$es_ip:8080/notifications" -e "SINK_AUTH=$WEBHOOK_AUTH" \
python:3-slim python /driver.py)"
docker cp "$here/verify-notification-driver.py" "$drv:/driver.py" >/dev/null
docker start -a "$drv"
zaak_url="$(docker logs rr-pverify 2>/dev/null | sed -n 's/^ZAAK_CREATED //p' | head -1)"
docker rm -f rr-pverify >/dev/null
# OpenZaak reflects the request Host into the zaaktype `url` it returns, and then rejects that same
# URL on zaak-create when the host is single-label ("Voer een geldige URL in."). The stack's ACL is
# configured with `http://openzaak:8000/`, so it must be repointed at OpenZaak's container IP before
# it can open a zaak — exactly what run-domain-check.sh does, and the same class of constraint as the
# `objecten.local` alias (ADR-0029). The ACL resolves the zaaktype itself (S-27, ADR-0021), so the
# base URL is the only thing to inject.
echo ">> recreating the acl service pointed at OpenZaak's IP"
ACL_OPENZAAK_BASEURL="http://$oz_ip:8000/" docker compose -f "$compose" up -d acl
WAIT_TIMEOUT="${WAIT_TIMEOUT:-120}" bash "$here/wait-healthy.sh" acl
# The container is replaced, so its IP may have changed.
acl="$(docker ps -q --filter 'name=[-_]acl[-_]' | head -1)"
acl_ip="$(ip "$acl")"
echo ">> opening a zaak through the ACL (which writes the INGEDIEND register record)"
reference="PROJ-$(date +%s)"
zaak_url="$(docker run --rm --network "$net" curlimages/curl:latest \
-fsS -X POST "http://$acl_ip:8080/zaken" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"bsn\":\"123456782\",\"reference\":\"$reference\"}" \
| sed -n 's/.*"zaakUrl":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')"
[ -n "$zaak_url" ] || { echo "ERROR: the ACL did not open a zaak" >&2; exit 1; }
[ -n "$zaak_url" ] || { echo "ERROR: driver did not create a zaak" >&2; exit 1; }
zaak_uuid="${zaak_url##*/}"
echo ">> zaak created: $zaak_url (reference $reference)"
echo ">> zaak created: $zaak_url"
echo ">> polling projection-api for the projected row (status INGEDIEND)"
for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
@@ -93,8 +63,6 @@ for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
sleep 2
done
echo "FAIL — projection-api never served an INGEDIEND row for zaak $zaak_uuid" >&2
echo " The chain is ACL → Objecten → NRC → event-subscriber → projection (ADR-0030)." >&2
echo "--- event-subscriber log ---" >&2; docker logs "$es" 2>&1 | tail -10 >&2
echo "--- projection-api log ---" >&2; docker logs "$proj" 2>&1 | tail -10 >&2
echo "--- acl log ---" >&2; docker logs "$acl" 2>&1 | tail -10 >&2
exit 1
-68
View File
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Self-check for the portals' Caddyfiles — stdlib asserts, no framework.
Run: python3 infra/test_portal_caddyfiles.py (also runs in `make unit`).
Each portal serves its Angular app and reverse-proxies *its own* BFF endpoint group
same-origin, so the browser never sees CORS and the DigiD token rides along (ADR-0010).
The four files are near-identical, which makes a copy-paste slip cheap to introduce and
expensive to find: proxying another portal's group hands a behandelaar's browser an
endpoint its token isn't for, and the failure shows up as a 401 three services away.
What is asserted per portal: it proxies exactly its own groups to the BFF service, and it
falls back to index.html so Angular's client-side routes survive a deep link / refresh.
"""
import os
import re
APPS = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "..", "apps")
# The self-service portal also renders the public register (S-09), so it proxies both.
EXPECTED = {
"self-service": {"/self-service/*", "/openbaar/*"},
"openbaar": {"/openbaar/*"},
"behandel": {"/behandel/*"},
"beheer": {"/beheer/*"},
}
ALL_GROUPS = {g for groups in EXPECTED.values() for g in groups}
def caddyfile(app):
with open(os.path.join(APPS, app, "Caddyfile")) as fh:
return fh.read()
def proxied_groups(text):
"""The path groups routed to the BFF: `handle <path> { reverse_proxy bff:8080 }`."""
return {
m.group(1)
for m in re.finditer(r"handle\s+(\S+)\s*\{[^}]*reverse_proxy\s+bff:8080", text)
}
def test_each_portal_proxies_exactly_its_own_endpoint_groups():
for app, expected in EXPECTED.items():
got = proxied_groups(caddyfile(app))
assert got == expected, f"{app}: proxies {got or '{}'}, expected {expected}"
def test_no_portal_proxies_another_portals_group():
for app, expected in EXPECTED.items():
strays = proxied_groups(caddyfile(app)) & (ALL_GROUPS - expected)
assert not strays, f"{app}: proxies another portal's group {strays}"
def test_every_portal_falls_back_to_index_html():
"""Angular routes client-side: an unknown path must serve the app, not a 404."""
for app in EXPECTED:
text = caddyfile(app)
assert "try_files {path} /index.html" in text, f"{app}: no SPA fallback"
assert "file_server" in text, f"{app}: nothing serves the built app"
if __name__ == "__main__":
for name, fn in sorted(globals().items()):
if name.startswith("test_") and callable(fn):
fn()
print(f" ok {name}")
print("portal Caddyfile self-check passed")
-15
View File
@@ -59,20 +59,6 @@ def services_in_trace(trace_id):
return names
def tempo_ingest_state():
"""#156: distinguish a broken trace chain from Tempo dropping spans. `ingester_clients` is 0
when the distributor has evicted its (single, in-process) ingester over a failed loopback
health check pushes fail and spans are lost, which looks identical to missing instrumentation
from here. Diagnostics only; never fails the check."""
try:
for line in _get(f"{TEMPO}/metrics").decode().splitlines():
if line.startswith("tempo_distributor_ingester_clients "):
return f"tempo {line.strip()} (0 = no ingester in the pool — evicted, so pushes\n are failing and spans are being dropped; see #156)"
except Exception as e:
return f"tempo /metrics unreadable: {e}"
return "tempo_distributor_ingester_clients not reported"
def main():
deadline = time.time() + TIMEOUT
generate_traffic()
@@ -88,7 +74,6 @@ def main():
generate_traffic()
print(f"FAIL — no single trace spanned {sorted(WANT)}; services seen: {sorted(seen)}",
file=sys.stderr)
print(f" {tempo_ingest_state()}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
+3 -7
View File
@@ -15,13 +15,9 @@ set -euo pipefail
timeout="${WAIT_TIMEOUT:-420}"
deadline=$(( $(date +%s) + timeout ))
# compose service name -> container id. `--filter name=` is a substring match, so it is anchored on
# the compose replica suffix — otherwise 'objecten' also matches objecten-db / objecten-redis /
# objecten-celery, and 'objecttypen' matches objecttypen-db. Whichever docker listed first won, so a
# service with a sibling that has no healthcheck timed out with status=none while it was in fact
# healthy. The pattern matches both docker compose ("infra-objecten-1") and podman-compose
# ("infra_objecten_1") naming; the same anchoring the verify check scripts use.
cid_for() { docker ps -aq --filter "name=$1[-_][0-9]+\$" | head -1; }
# compose service name -> container id. The name filter matches both docker
# compose ("infra-openzaak-1") and podman-compose ("infra_openzaak_1") naming.
cid_for() { docker ps -aq --filter "name=$1" | head -1; }
for svc in "$@"; do
echo "waiting for '$svc' to be healthy (timeout ${timeout}s)..."
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ export interface DigiadAuthOptions {
redirectUrl: string;
/**
* Route prefixes whose requests get the bearer token attached. The api-client calls the BFF with
* **relative** URLs (same-origin via the Caddy proxy), so these must be relative path prefixes
* **relative** URLs (same-origin via the nginx proxy), so these must be relative path prefixes
* (e.g. `/self-service/`) angular-auth-oidc-client matches `req.url.startsWith(route)`, and a
* relative `req.url` never starts with an absolute origin.
*/
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ export interface MedewerkerAuthOptions {
redirectUrl: string;
/**
* Route prefixes whose requests get the bearer token attached. The api-client calls the BFF with
* **relative** URLs (same-origin via the Caddy proxy), so these must be relative path prefixes
* **relative** URLs (same-origin via the nginx proxy), so these must be relative path prefixes
* (e.g. `/behandel/`) angular-auth-oidc-client matches `req.url.startsWith(route)`, and a
* relative `req.url` never starts with an absolute origin.
*/
+1 -16
View File
@@ -32,17 +32,6 @@ nav:
- "ADR-0008: Read projection store": architecture/adr-0008-read-projection-store.md
- "ADR-0009: External-task job worker": architecture/adr-0009-external-task-job-worker.md
- "ADR-0010: BFF OIDC validation": architecture/adr-0010-bff-oidc.md
- FDS-architectuur:
- Overzicht: architecture/fds/README.md
- Componentview (L3): architecture/fds/c4-component-view.md
- "Slice 1: walking skeleton": architecture/fds/slice-1-proposal.md
- "FDS ADR-0001: ACL op elke registergrens": architecture/fds/adr/0001-acl-at-every-register-boundary.md
- "FDS ADR-0002: FSC voor connectiviteit": architecture/fds/adr/0002-fsc-for-connectivity.md
- "FDS ADR-0003: PBAC via OPA": architecture/fds/adr/0003-pbac-via-opa.md
- "FDS ADR-0004: Begrensde cache": architecture/fds/adr/0004-bounded-cache.md
- "FDS ADR-0005: Verwerkingenlog via events": architecture/fds/adr/0005-ldv-verwerkingenlog.md
- "FDS ADR-0006: Modulegrens en hergebruik": architecture/fds/adr/0006-module-boundary-and-reuse.md
- "FDS ADR-template": architecture/fds/adr/template.md
- Working in Gitea: gitea-workflow.md
- Frontend decisions: frontend-decisions.md
- Demo script: demo-script.md
@@ -53,11 +42,7 @@ markdown_extensions:
- admonition
- toc:
permalink: true
- pymdownx.superfences:
custom_fences:
- name: mermaid
class: mermaid
format: !!python/name:pymdownx.superfences.fence_code_format
- pymdownx.superfences
# Many docs referenced by PRD.md land in later slices; don't fail the build on them.
validation:
-13
View File
@@ -90,16 +90,6 @@ app.MapPost("/zaken/reference", async (ZaakReferenceRequest body, AclService acl
return Results.Ok(new { reference });
});
// Read the register record an object in Objecten holds. The Event Subscriber projects a register
// write from the notification NRC delivers, which carries only the object URL, and may not talk to
// Objecten itself (§8.1, ADR-0028/ADR-0030). 404 when the object holds no record — the subscriber
// treats that as "nothing to project" rather than an error (§8.6).
app.MapPost("/register-records/read", async (RegisterRecordReadRequest body, AclService acl, CancellationToken ct) =>
{
var record = await acl.GetRegisterRecordAsync(new Uri(body.ObjectUrl), ct);
return record is null ? Results.NotFound() : Results.Ok(record);
});
// Store an uploaded diploma against a zaak (S-10b): the domain sends the file as base64; the ACL
// creates the ZGW enkelvoudiginformatieobject and relates it to the zaak (§8.1). Returns its URL.
app.MapPost("/documenten", async (StoreDocumentRequest body, AclService acl, CancellationToken ct) =>
@@ -141,9 +131,6 @@ public sealed record CancelZaakRequest(string ZaakUrl);
public sealed record ZaakReferenceRequest(string ZaakUrl);
/// <summary>The object whose register record the Event Subscriber wants read back (S-19b-2).</summary>
public sealed record RegisterRecordReadRequest(string ObjectUrl);
public sealed record StoreDocumentRequest(string ZaakUrl, string ContentBase64, string FileName, string ContentType);
public partial class Program;
+1 -22
View File
@@ -24,16 +24,7 @@ public sealed class AclService(
clock.Today,
registration.Reference);
var zaakUrl = await gateway.OpenZaakAsync(request, ct);
// The register — not ZGW — is what the read projection is sourced from (ADR-0028/ADR-0030),
// so the record exists from submission, not only from approval. Same two-writes-converging
// posture as ApproveZaakAsync: the upsert is keyed on the zaak id, so a retried submit
// updates the record rather than adding a second one (§8.6).
await register.UpsertAsync(
new RegisterRecord(ZaakId(zaakUrl), RegisterRecordStatus.Ingediend, registration.Reference), ct);
return zaakUrl;
return await gateway.OpenZaakAsync(request, ct);
}
/// <summary>
@@ -61,18 +52,6 @@ public sealed class AclService(
ct);
}
/// <summary>
/// The register record held by an object in Objecten, for the Event Subscriber (S-19b-2). The
/// subscriber gets only an object URL on the notification and may not read Objecten itself
/// (§8.1, ADR-0028), so the ACL reads it back.
/// </summary>
public Task<RegisterRecord?> GetRegisterRecordAsync(Uri objectUrl, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(objectUrl);
return register.GetAsync(objectUrl, ct);
}
/// <summary>The zaak's UUID — the key the register record and the read projection rows share.</summary>
private static string ZaakId(Uri zaakUrl) => zaakUrl.Segments[^1].TrimEnd('/');
@@ -13,14 +13,6 @@ public interface IRegisterRecordGateway
/// the existing object instead of creating a second one (§8.6).
/// </summary>
Task UpsertAsync(RegisterRecord record, CancellationToken ct = default);
/// <summary>
/// The register record held by the object at <paramref name="objectUrl"/>, or <c>null</c> if that
/// object holds none. The Event Subscriber projects a register write from the notification NRC
/// delivers, which carries only the object URL — so it reads the record back through the ACL
/// rather than talking to Objecten itself (§8.1, S-19b-2).
/// </summary>
Task<RegisterRecord?> GetAsync(Uri objectUrl, CancellationToken ct = default);
}
/// <summary>
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Http.Headers;
using System.Net.Http.Json;
using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
@@ -39,30 +38,6 @@ public sealed class ObjectenGateway(HttpClient http, ObjectenOptions options, IC
"Updating the register record", ct);
}
public async Task<RegisterRecord?> GetAsync(Uri objectUrl, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(objectUrl);
// Fetched by the URL the notification carried, so no objecttype resolution and no search —
// unlike a write, which has to find the object for a registration id.
using var message = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Get, objectUrl);
message.Headers.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue("Token", options.Token);
message.Headers.Add("Accept-Crs", "EPSG:4326");
using var response = await http.SendAsync(message, ct);
// The object may be gone by the time a (possibly redelivered) notification is handled —
// there is simply nothing to project, which is not a failure (§8.6).
if (response.StatusCode == HttpStatusCode.NotFound)
return null;
await EnsureSuccessAsync(response, "Reading the register record", ct);
var body = await response.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<ReadObjectDto>(ct)
?? throw new InvalidOperationException("Objecten returned an empty object response");
var data = body.Record?.Data;
return data is null ? null : new RegisterRecord(data.Id, data.Status, data.Reference);
}
private RecordDto NewRecord(int typeVersion, RecordDataDto data) =>
new(typeVersion, data, clock.Today.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd"));
@@ -166,12 +141,6 @@ public sealed class ObjectenGateway(HttpClient http, ObjectenOptions options, IC
private sealed record ObjectDto(
[property: JsonPropertyName("url")] string Url);
private sealed record ReadObjectDto(
[property: JsonPropertyName("record")] ReadRecordDto? Record);
private sealed record ReadRecordDto(
[property: JsonPropertyName("data")] RecordDataDto? Data);
private sealed record CreateObjectDto(
[property: JsonPropertyName("type")] string Type,
[property: JsonPropertyName("record")] RecordDto Record);
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ public sealed class ObjectenGatewayIntegrationTests
new HttpClient(),
new ObjectenOptions
{
BaseUrl = new(Env("OBJECTEN_BASE", "http://objecten.local:8000")),
BaseUrl = new(Env("OBJECTEN_BASE", "http://objecten:8000")),
Token = Env("OBJECTEN_TOKEN", "1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678"),
ObjecttypenBaseUrl = new(Env("OBJECTTYPEN_BASE", "http://objecttypen:8000")),
ObjecttypenToken = Env("OBJECTTYPEN_TOKEN", "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567"),
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ public sealed class ObjectenGatewayIntegrationTests
{
using var http = new HttpClient();
var objecttype = await ResolveObjecttypeUrlAsync(http);
var query = new Uri(new Uri(Env("OBJECTEN_BASE", "http://objecten.local:8000")),
var query = new Uri(new Uri(Env("OBJECTEN_BASE", "http://objecten:8000")),
"/api/v2/objects?type=" + Uri.EscapeDataString(objecttype) +
"&data_attrs=id__exact__" + Uri.EscapeDataString(id));
-56
View File
@@ -79,21 +79,11 @@ public class AclServiceTests
{
public readonly List<RegisterRecord> Upserted = [];
public RegisterRecord? Stored;
public Uri? ReadFrom;
public Task UpsertAsync(RegisterRecord record, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
Upserted.Add(record);
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
public Task<RegisterRecord?> GetAsync(Uri objectUrl, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
ReadFrom = objectUrl;
return Task.FromResult(Stored);
}
}
private static AclDefaults Defaults() => new()
@@ -140,52 +130,6 @@ public class AclServiceTests
Assert.Equal("reg-77", req.Identificatie);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Opening_a_zaak_also_writes_an_ingediend_register_record(/* S-19b-2 */)
{
var gateway = new FakeGateway();
var register = new FakeRegisterRecordGateway();
var service = ServiceWith(gateway, register, Defaults(), new DateOnly(2026, 6, 4));
await service.OpenZaakAsync(new DomainRegistration("123456782", "reg-77"));
// The register — not ZGW — is what the read projection is sourced from (ADR-0028), so a
// submitted registration has to exist there the moment the zaak is opened, not only on
// approval. Approval upserts this same record to INGESCHREVEN.
var record = Assert.Single(register.Upserted);
Assert.Equal("abc", record.Id);
Assert.Equal("INGEDIEND", record.Status);
// The reference comes from the registration itself — no ZGW read-back needed on this path.
Assert.Equal("reg-77", record.Reference);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Reading_a_register_record_goes_through_the_objecten_gateway(/* S-19b-2 */)
{
var gateway = new FakeGateway();
var register = new FakeRegisterRecordGateway { Stored = new RegisterRecord("abc", "INGESCHREVEN", "reg-77") };
var service = ServiceWith(gateway, register, Defaults(), new DateOnly(2026, 6, 4));
var objectUrl = new Uri("http://objecten.local:8000/api/v2/objects/9de4a2ca");
var record = await service.GetRegisterRecordAsync(objectUrl);
Assert.Equal(objectUrl, register.ReadFrom);
Assert.Equal("abc", record!.Id);
Assert.Equal("INGESCHREVEN", record.Status);
Assert.Equal("reg-77", record.Reference);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Reading_a_register_record_from_a_null_url_is_rejected(/* S-19b-2 */)
{
var gateway = new FakeGateway();
var register = new FakeRegisterRecordGateway();
var service = ServiceWith(gateway, register, Defaults(), new DateOnly(2026, 6, 4));
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<ArgumentNullException>(() => service.GetRegisterRecordAsync(null!));
Assert.Null(register.ReadFrom);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Opening_a_zaak_reflects_a_default_fill_update(/* S-15b */)
{
@@ -83,43 +83,6 @@ public class ObjectenGatewayTests
private static RegisterRecord Record() => new("zaak-uuid-1", RegisterRecordStatus.Ingeschreven, "REG-2026-0001");
[Fact]
public async Task Reads_a_register_record_back_from_its_object_url(/* S-19b-2 */)
{
var sent = new List<Sent>();
var objectUrl = new Uri("http://objecten:8000/api/v2/objects/obj-9");
var gateway = Gateway(sent, _ => Json(new
{
url = objectUrl.ToString(),
record = new { data = new { id = "zaak-uuid-1", status = "INGESCHREVEN", reference = "REG-2026-0001" } },
}));
var record = await gateway.GetAsync(objectUrl);
// The object is fetched directly by the URL the notification carried — no objecttype
// resolution and no search, unlike a write.
var read = Assert.Single(sent);
Assert.Equal(HttpMethod.Get, read.Method);
Assert.Equal(objectUrl, read.Uri);
// Objecten is a geo API: the CRS header is required on reads too.
Assert.Equal("EPSG:4326", read.AcceptCrs);
Assert.Equal("Token objecten-token", read.Auth);
Assert.Equal("zaak-uuid-1", record!.Id);
Assert.Equal("INGESCHREVEN", record.Status);
Assert.Equal("REG-2026-0001", record.Reference);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Reading_an_object_that_is_gone_yields_no_record(/* S-19b-2 */)
{
var sent = new List<Sent>();
var gateway = Gateway(sent, _ => new HttpResponseMessage(HttpStatusCode.NotFound));
// A record deleted between the notification and the read is not an error — there is simply
// nothing to project (§8.6: the subscriber tolerates whatever order deliveries arrive in).
Assert.Null(await gateway.GetAsync(new Uri("http://objecten:8000/api/v2/objects/gone")));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Creates_the_object_when_none_exists_for_the_registration()
{
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Http.Json;
using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
using EventSubscriber.Application;
@@ -6,28 +5,26 @@ using EventSubscriber.Application;
namespace EventSubscriber.Api;
/// <summary>
/// HTTP client to the ACL service. An Objecten notification carries only the object URL, so the
/// subscriber reads the register record back through the ACL — the only code that may talk to
/// Objecten (§8.1, ADR-0028/ADR-0030) — rather than reading Objecten itself.
/// HTTP client to the ACL service. The subscriber enriches the projection with the zaak's reference
/// (identificatie) by asking the ACL — the only code that may read ZGW (§8.1) — rather than reading
/// OpenZaak itself (adr-proposal #78).
/// </summary>
public sealed class AclHttpClient(HttpClient http) : IAclClient
{
public async Task<RegisterRecord?> GetRegisterRecordAsync(Uri objectUrl, CancellationToken ct = default)
public async Task<string> GetZaakReferenceAsync(Uri zaakUrl, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(objectUrl);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(zaakUrl);
using var response = await http.PostAsJsonAsync(
new Uri(http.BaseAddress!, "register-records/read"),
new ReadRequest(objectUrl.ToString()), ct);
// The object holds no register record (deleted, or never one) — nothing to project (§8.6).
if (response.StatusCode == HttpStatusCode.NotFound)
return null;
new Uri(http.BaseAddress!, "zaken/reference"), new ReferenceRequest(zaakUrl.ToString()), ct);
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
return await response.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<RegisterRecord>(ct)
?? throw new InvalidOperationException("The ACL returned an empty register record response.");
var body = await response.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<ReferenceResponse>(ct)
?? throw new InvalidOperationException("The ACL returned an empty reference response.");
return body.Reference;
}
private sealed record ReadRequest([property: JsonPropertyName("objectUrl")] string ObjectUrl);
private sealed record ReferenceRequest([property: JsonPropertyName("zaakUrl")] string ZaakUrl);
private sealed record ReferenceResponse([property: JsonPropertyName("reference")] string Reference);
}
@@ -84,12 +84,11 @@ app.MapPost("/admin/rebuild", async (NotificationProjector projector, Cancellati
await app.RunAsync();
/// <summary>The NRC notification body, as Open Notificaties POSTs it. Only the fields the projector
/// needs are bound; <c>aanmaakdatum</c>, <c>kenmerken</c> and <c>hoofdObject</c> are ignored for a
/// register write hoofdObject is the same object as resourceUrl (ADR-0030).</summary>
public sealed record NotificationDto(string Kanaal, string Resource, string Actie, Uri ResourceUrl)
/// <summary>The NRC notification body, as Open Notificaties POSTs it. Only the fields the
/// projection needs are bound; <c>aanmaakdatum</c>/<c>kenmerken</c> are ignored for the minimal slice.</summary>
public sealed record NotificationDto(string Kanaal, string Resource, string Actie, Uri ResourceUrl, Uri? HoofdObject = null)
{
public Notification ToNotification() => new(Kanaal, Resource, Actie, ResourceUrl);
public Notification ToNotification() => new(Kanaal, Resource, Actie, ResourceUrl, HoofdObject);
}
public partial class Program
@@ -2,39 +2,40 @@ namespace EventSubscriber.Application;
/// <summary>
/// An inbound NRC (Open Notificaties) notification, as Open Notificaties POSTs it to an
/// abonnement callback. Only the fields the projection needs are modelled.
/// abonnement callback. Only the fields the projection needs are modelled; the full ZGW
/// "Notificatie" resource also carries <c>aanmaakdatum</c> and <c>kenmerken</c> which the
/// minimal projection ignores (bsn is deferred — see ADR-0008). For a <c>zaken</c>/<c>zaak</c>/<c>create</c>
/// notification <c>hoofdObject</c> and <c>resourceUrl</c> are both the created zaak's URL.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Since S-19b-2 the subscriber listens on the <c>objecten</c> kanaal, not <c>zaken</c>: the
/// register record in Objecten is what the projection is derived from (ADR-0030), so the
/// projection is a cache of the register rather than a re-derivation of the case system. An
/// Objecten notification carries <b>no record data</b> — only the object URL (as both
/// <c>hoofdObject</c> and <c>resourceUrl</c>) and the objecttype as a kenmerk — so the record
/// itself is read back through the ACL.
/// </remarks>
public sealed record Notification(
string Kanaal,
string Resource,
string Actie,
Uri ResourceUrl)
Uri ResourceUrl,
Uri? HoofdObject = null)
{
/// <summary>
/// A register record written to Objecten — <c>create</c> on submit and <c>partial_update</c> on
/// approval, since the ACL upserts the same object for a registration (§8.6).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <c>partial_update</c> is what a PATCH actually reports: DRF routes it through the notifying
/// <c>update()</c> but names the action <c>partial_update</c>, and that is what Objecten puts in
/// the notification. <c>update</c> is accepted too, so a PUT-shaped write would project the same
/// way. <c>destroy</c> is deliberately not: removing a registration from the public register is
/// its own decision, not a side effect of this one.
/// </remarks>
public bool IsRegisterRecordWritten =>
Kanaal == "objecten" && Resource == "object"
&& Actie is "create" or "update" or "partial_update";
/// <summary>A zaak being created — projected as INGEDIEND.</summary>
public bool IsZaakCreated =>
Kanaal == "zaken" && Resource == "zaak" && Actie == "create";
/// <summary>The object holding the register record. For a <c>resource: object</c> notification
/// Objecten sends the object as both <c>hoofdObject</c> and <c>resourceUrl</c> — the object is
/// the main resource — so the notification's own <c>hoofdObject</c> is not modelled.</summary>
public Uri ObjectUrl => ResourceUrl;
/// <summary>A status being set on a zaak — the approval, projected as INGESCHREVEN (S-09b). In the
/// walking skeleton the only status ever set after creation is the approval, and the subscriber may
/// not read OpenZaak (§8.1), so any status-create is taken as the approval.</summary>
public bool IsZaakStatusSet =>
Kanaal == "zaken" && Resource == "status" && Actie == "create";
/// <summary>The zaak URL this notification concerns — <c>hoofdObject</c> (the zaak) for a status
/// notification, else the resource URL (which, for a zaak-create, is the zaak).</summary>
public Uri ZaakUrl => HoofdObject ?? ResourceUrl;
/// <summary>The zaak UUID used as the projection key — the trailing segment of <see cref="ZaakUrl"/>.</summary>
public string ZaakId => ZaakUrl.Segments[^1].Trim('/');
/// <summary>
/// A deterministic dedup key. Open Notificaties carries no notification id and may
/// redeliver, so the key is derived from the immutable notification content: two
/// deliveries of the same zaak-create collapse to one. (NRC may also deliver
/// out of order; the projector tolerates that — order does not change the outcome.)
/// </summary>
public string IdempotencyKey => $"{Kanaal}:{Resource}:{Actie}:{ResourceUrl}";
}
@@ -3,27 +3,21 @@ namespace EventSubscriber.Application;
/// <summary>
/// Projects inbound NRC notifications into the read projection. Tolerates duplicate and
/// out-of-order deliveries (CLAUDE.md §8.6): the notification log dedups, and the projection
/// upsert is idempotent on the register id. Rebuilds the projection by replaying the log.
/// upsert is idempotent on the zaak id. Rebuilds the projection by replaying the log.
/// </summary>
public sealed class NotificationProjector(INotificationLog log, IProjectionStore store, IAclClient acl)
{
/// <summary>Handle one inbound notification. Reacts to a register record being written to
/// Objecten (S-19b-2, ADR-0030) and ignores everything else. The notification carries only the
/// object URL, so the record is read back through the ACL (§8.1) and becomes the row verbatim.</summary>
/// <summary>Handle one inbound notification. Reacts to a zaak being created (INGEDIEND) and a
/// status being set (INGESCHREVEN); ignores everything else. Enriches the row with the zaak's
/// reference via the ACL (§8.1) and records it so a rebuild needs no ZGW access (#78).</summary>
public async Task HandleAsync(Notification notification, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(notification);
if (!notification.IsRegisterRecordWritten)
return;
var record = await acl.GetRegisterRecordAsync(notification.ObjectUrl, ct);
// The object is gone, or holds no register record — nothing to project (§8.6).
if (record is null)
if (!notification.IsZaakCreated && !notification.IsZaakStatusSet)
return;
var reference = await acl.GetZaakReferenceAsync(notification.ZaakUrl, ct);
var recorded = new RecordedNotification(
KeyFor(notification.ObjectUrl, record), record.Id, record.Status, record.Reference);
notification.IdempotencyKey, notification.Actie, notification.ZaakId, notification.Resource, reference);
// Atomic record-or-skip: a duplicate (or concurrent) delivery is recognised and dropped
// before it touches the projection, so the projection stays a faithful derived artefact.
@@ -33,20 +27,6 @@ public sealed class NotificationProjector(INotificationLog log, IProjectionStore
await store.UpsertAsync(ToEntry(recorded), ct);
}
/// <summary>
/// A deterministic dedup key: the object, plus the state that write puts in the projection.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Open Notificaties carries no notification id and may redeliver, so the key is derived from
/// content. It cannot be the object URL alone — the ACL upserts one object per registration, so
/// submit and approval both notify about the *same* URL and the approval would be swallowed as a
/// duplicate. Nor can it include the actie: a retried approval would be a second `update`. Keying
/// on the projected row means a redelivery collapses and a genuine state change does not, which
/// is exactly the property §8.6 asks for.
/// </remarks>
private static string KeyFor(Uri objectUrl, RegisterRecord record)
=> $"objecten:object:{objectUrl}:{record.Status}:{record.Reference}";
/// <summary>Rebuild the projection from the durable notification log (PRD §8.4).</summary>
public async Task RebuildAsync(CancellationToken ct = default)
{
@@ -55,9 +35,11 @@ public sealed class NotificationProjector(INotificationLog log, IProjectionStore
await store.UpsertAsync(ToEntry(recorded), ct);
}
/// <summary>The projection row for an accepted notification. The log already holds exactly the
/// row's fields, so a rebuild needs no mapping rules and no upstream reads. bsn/naam stay
/// deferred — the register record is public-safe by construction (ADR-0027).</summary>
/// <summary>The projection row for an accepted notification: a status-set maps to INGESCHREVEN,
/// a zaak-create to INGEDIEND. bsn/naam are deferred (ADR-0008).</summary>
private static RegisterEntry ToEntry(RecordedNotification recorded)
=> new(recorded.RegisterId, recorded.Status, recorded.Reference);
=> new(
recorded.ZaakId,
recorded.Resource == "status" ? RegistrationStatus.Ingeschreven : RegistrationStatus.Ingediend,
Reference: recorded.Reference);
}
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ namespace EventSubscriber.Application;
/// The durable log of notifications the subscriber has accepted. It is both the idempotency
/// guard (a replayed notification is recognised and dropped) and the rebuild source: the
/// projection is a derived artefact (PRD §8.4) regenerated by replaying this log, so a rebuild
/// needs no access to Objecten or ZGW (CLAUDE.md §8.1). Implemented in Infrastructure over Postgres.
/// needs no access to OpenZaak (CLAUDE.md §8.1). Implemented in Infrastructure over Postgres.
/// </summary>
public interface INotificationLog
{
@@ -19,29 +19,22 @@ public interface INotificationLog
Task<IReadOnlyList<RecordedNotification>> AllAsync(CancellationToken ct = default);
}
/// <summary>
/// An accepted notification, retaining exactly the projection row it produced — so a rebuild
/// reproduces the row by replaying the log, without re-reading Objecten (S-19b-2, ADR-0030).
/// </summary>
public sealed record RecordedNotification(string Key, string RegisterId, string Status, string? Reference);
/// <summary>A notification that has been accepted, retaining what a rebuild needs to recompute its
/// projection row — the ZGW <c>resource</c> (zaak-create → INGEDIEND vs status-set → INGESCHREVEN) and
/// the zaak <c>reference</c> (identificatie), so a rebuild reproduces the row without re-reading ZGW (#78).</summary>
public sealed record RecordedNotification(string Key, string Actie, string ZaakId, string Resource, string? Reference);
/// <summary>
/// Port to the Anti-Corruption Layer. An Objecten notification carries only the object URL, so the
/// subscriber reads the register record back through the ACL — the only code that may talk to
/// Objecten (§8.1, ADR-0028) — rather than reading Objecten itself.
/// Port to the Anti-Corruption Layer. The subscriber enriches the projection with the zaak's
/// public-safe reference (its identificatie) by asking the ACL — the only code that may read ZGW
/// (§8.1) — rather than reading OpenZaak itself (adr-proposal #78).
/// </summary>
public interface IAclClient
{
/// <summary>The register record the object at <paramref name="objectUrl"/> holds, or
/// <c>null</c> if it holds none — the object may be gone by the time a redelivered
/// notification is handled, which is not an error (§8.6).</summary>
Task<RegisterRecord?> GetRegisterRecordAsync(Uri objectUrl, CancellationToken ct = default);
/// <summary>The zaak's reference (identificatie) for the read projection.</summary>
Task<string> GetZaakReferenceAsync(Uri zaakUrl, CancellationToken ct = default);
}
/// <summary>The public-safe register record as the ACL returns it — the RegisterRecord objecttype's
/// schema (ADR-0027). No bsn, no name: the register is world-readable.</summary>
public sealed record RegisterRecord(string Id, string Status, string? Reference);
/// <summary>The read projection store. Owned by the projection bounded context (ADR-0008); the
/// subscriber writes to it and the projection-api reads it.</summary>
public interface IProjectionStore
@@ -5,42 +5,27 @@ using EventSubscriber.Api;
namespace EventSubscriber.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Unit tests for the subscriber's ACL client, which reads a register record through the ACL — the
/// only code allowed to talk to Objecten (§8.1, ADR-0028/ADR-0030). Uses a scripted message handler
/// so no real ACL is required.
/// Unit tests for the subscriber's ACL client, which reads a zaak's reference (identificatie) through
/// the ACL — the only code allowed to talk to ZGW (§8.1, #78). Uses a scripted message handler so no
/// real ACL is required.
/// </summary>
public class AclHttpClientTests
{
private const string ObjectUrl = "http://objecten.local:8000/api/v2/objects/obj-9";
private static AclHttpClient Client(StubHandler handler) =>
new(new HttpClient(handler) { BaseAddress = new Uri("http://acl/") });
[Fact]
public async Task Reads_a_register_record_by_posting_the_object_url()
public async Task Reads_a_zaak_reference_by_posting_the_zaak_url_and_returns_it()
{
var capture = new RequestCapture();
var client = Client(capture.Responds(
HttpStatusCode.OK, """{"id":"zaak-1","status":"INGESCHREVEN","reference":"REG-42"}"""));
var client = Client(capture.Responds(HttpStatusCode.OK, """{"reference":"REG-42"}"""));
var record = await client.GetRegisterRecordAsync(new Uri(ObjectUrl));
var reference = await client.GetZaakReferenceAsync(new Uri("http://openzaak/zaken/api/v1/zaken/abc"));
Assert.Equal("zaak-1", record!.Id);
Assert.Equal("INGESCHREVEN", record.Status);
Assert.Equal("REG-42", record.Reference);
Assert.Equal("REG-42", reference);
Assert.Equal(HttpMethod.Post, capture.Seen!.Method);
Assert.Equal("http://acl/register-records/read", capture.Seen.RequestUri!.ToString());
Assert.Contains($"\"objectUrl\":\"{ObjectUrl}\"", capture.Body);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Reads_a_missing_record_as_nothing_to_project()
{
var capture = new RequestCapture();
var client = Client(capture.Responds(HttpStatusCode.NotFound));
// The object may be gone by the time a redelivered notification is handled (§8.6).
Assert.Null(await client.GetRegisterRecordAsync(new Uri(ObjectUrl)));
Assert.Equal("http://acl/zaken/reference", capture.Seen.RequestUri!.ToString());
Assert.Contains("\"zaakUrl\":\"http://openzaak/zaken/api/v1/zaken/abc\"", capture.Body);
}
[Fact]
@@ -50,7 +35,7 @@ public class AclHttpClientTests
var client = Client(capture.Responds(HttpStatusCode.BadGateway));
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<HttpRequestException>(
() => client.GetRegisterRecordAsync(new Uri(ObjectUrl)));
() => client.GetZaakReferenceAsync(new Uri("http://openzaak/zaken/api/v1/zaken/abc")));
}
[Fact]
@@ -60,17 +45,17 @@ public class AclHttpClientTests
var client = Client(capture.Responds(HttpStatusCode.OK, "null"));
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidOperationException>(
() => client.GetRegisterRecordAsync(new Uri(ObjectUrl)));
() => client.GetZaakReferenceAsync(new Uri("http://openzaak/zaken/api/v1/zaken/abc")));
Assert.Contains("empty", ex.Message, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Rejects_a_null_object_url_without_sending_a_request()
public async Task Rejects_a_null_zaak_url_without_sending_a_request()
{
var capture = new RequestCapture();
var client = Client(capture.Responds(HttpStatusCode.OK, "{}"));
var client = Client(capture.Responds(HttpStatusCode.OK, """{"reference":"REG-1"}"""));
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<ArgumentNullException>(() => client.GetRegisterRecordAsync(null!));
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<ArgumentNullException>(() => client.GetZaakReferenceAsync(null!));
Assert.Null(capture.Seen);
}
}
@@ -5,18 +5,16 @@ namespace EventSubscriber.Tests;
/// <summary>In-memory stand-ins for the projection store and notification log, so the
/// projector's behaviour is exercised without Postgres (hand-written stubs, the repo's
/// convention — no mocking library).</summary>
/// <summary>A fake ACL client standing in for the register records Objecten holds: a test seeds a
/// record per object URL, and the call count proves a rebuild does not re-read through the ACL.</summary>
/// <summary>A fake ACL client that returns a fixed reference derived from the zaak, and records
/// how many times it was called (to prove a rebuild does not re-read via the ACL).</summary>
internal sealed class FakeAclClient : IAclClient
{
public Dictionary<string, RegisterRecord> Records { get; } = [];
public int CallCount { get; private set; }
public Task<RegisterRecord?> GetRegisterRecordAsync(Uri objectUrl, CancellationToken ct = default)
public Task<string> GetZaakReferenceAsync(Uri zaakUrl, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
CallCount++;
return Task.FromResult(Records.TryGetValue(objectUrl.ToString(), out var record) ? record : null);
return Task.FromResult("REG-" + zaakUrl.Segments[^1].Trim('/'));
}
}
@@ -2,14 +2,13 @@ using EventSubscriber.Application;
namespace EventSubscriber.Tests;
/// <summary>Behaviour of the projector that turns NRC notifications into projection rows. Since
/// S-19b-2 the source is the register in Objecten (ADR-0030), not ZGW zaak events: a notification
/// carries only the object URL, so the record is read back through the ACL. Duplicate and
/// out-of-order deliveries must be tolerated (CLAUDE.md §8.6).</summary>
/// <summary>Behaviour of the projector that turns NRC notifications into projection rows.
/// The walking skeleton reacts only to a zaak being created (status INGEDIEND) and must
/// tolerate duplicate and out-of-order deliveries (CLAUDE.md §8.6).</summary>
public sealed class NotificationProjectorTests
{
private const string ObjectUrl = "http://objecten.local:8000/api/v2/objects/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
private const string ZaakId = "99999999-9999-9999-9999-999999999999";
private const string ZaakUrl = "http://openzaak:8000/zaken/api/v1/zaken/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
private const string StatusUrl = "http://openzaak:8000/zaken/api/v1/statussen/22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222";
private readonly InMemoryNotificationLog _log = new();
private readonly InMemoryProjectionStore _store = new();
@@ -17,60 +16,46 @@ public sealed class NotificationProjectorTests
private NotificationProjector Projector() => new(_log, _store, _acl);
/// <summary>A register write as Objecten publishes it: the object is both hoofdObject and
/// resourceUrl, and the record itself is only reachable by reading that object.</summary>
private Notification RecordWritten(string actie = "create", string url = ObjectUrl, string status = RegistrationStatus.Ingediend, string zaakId = ZaakId)
private static Notification ZaakCreated(string url = ZaakUrl)
=> new("zaken", "zaak", "create", new Uri(url));
// A status-set notification: resourceUrl is the status resource, hoofdObject is the zaak it belongs to.
private static Notification StatusSet(string zaakUrl = ZaakUrl, string statusUrl = StatusUrl)
=> new("zaken", "status", "create", new Uri(statusUrl), new Uri(zaakUrl));
[Fact]
public async Task creating_a_zaak_writes_one_row_with_status_ingediend()
{
_acl.Records[url] = new RegisterRecord(zaakId, status, "REG-2026-0001");
return new Notification("objecten", "object", actie, new Uri(url));
await Projector().HandleAsync(ZaakCreated());
var entry = Assert.Single(await _store.AllAsync());
Assert.Equal("11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111", entry.Id);
Assert.Equal(RegistrationStatus.Ingediend, entry.Status);
// Enriched with the zaak's reference (identificatie), fetched via the ACL (#78).
Assert.Equal("REG-11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111", entry.Reference);
}
[Fact]
public async Task a_register_record_write_is_projected_as_a_row_keyed_on_the_registration()
{
await Projector().HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
var entry = Assert.Single(await _store.AllAsync());
// Keyed on the record's own id (the zaak id), not on the Objecten object's uuid — the
// projection row and the register record are the same registration.
Assert.Equal(ZaakId, entry.Id);
Assert.Equal(RegistrationStatus.Ingediend, entry.Status);
Assert.Equal("REG-2026-0001", entry.Reference);
}
// The ACL PATCHes the same object on approval. DRF routes a PATCH through `update()` but reports
// the action as `partial_update`, which is what Objecten puts in the notification — so accepting
// only `create`/`update` silently drops every approval.
[Theory]
[InlineData("partial_update")]
[InlineData("update")]
public async Task approval_updates_the_same_row_from_ingediend_to_ingeschreven(string actie)
public async Task rebuild_reproduces_the_reference_without_re_reading_via_the_acl()
{
var projector = Projector();
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten(actie, status: RegistrationStatus.Ingeschreven));
await projector.HandleAsync(ZaakCreated());
var callsAfterProjection = _acl.CallCount;
await projector.RebuildAsync();
var entry = Assert.Single(await _store.AllAsync());
Assert.Equal(ZaakId, entry.Id);
Assert.Equal(RegistrationStatus.Ingeschreven, entry.Status);
}
[Fact]
public async Task an_object_whose_record_is_gone_is_not_projected()
{
// Nothing seeded in the fake ACL: the object was deleted before this (redelivered)
// notification was handled. Not an error — there is simply nothing to project (§8.6).
await Projector().HandleAsync(new Notification("objecten", "object", "create", new Uri(ObjectUrl)));
Assert.Empty(await _store.AllAsync());
Assert.Equal("REG-11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111", entry.Reference);
// Rebuild replays the log (which stored the reference) — no extra ACL calls (#78, ADR-0008).
Assert.Equal(callsAfterProjection, _acl.CallCount);
}
[Fact]
public async Task replaying_the_same_notification_keeps_a_single_row()
{
var projector = Projector();
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
await projector.HandleAsync(ZaakCreated());
await projector.HandleAsync(ZaakCreated());
Assert.Single(await _store.AllAsync());
}
@@ -79,8 +64,8 @@ public sealed class NotificationProjectorTests
public async Task a_replayed_notification_never_reaches_the_projection_store()
{
var projector = Projector();
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
await projector.HandleAsync(ZaakCreated());
await projector.HandleAsync(ZaakCreated());
// The duplicate is dropped at the log, before the (idempotent) upsert — so the store
// is written exactly once. Row count alone can't see this; the upsert count can.
@@ -88,59 +73,77 @@ public sealed class NotificationProjectorTests
}
[Fact]
public async Task two_different_registrations_each_get_their_own_row()
public async Task two_different_zaken_each_get_their_own_row()
{
var projector = Projector();
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten(url: ObjectUrl[..^1] + "2", zaakId: "other-zaak"));
await projector.HandleAsync(ZaakCreated());
await projector.HandleAsync(ZaakCreated(ZaakUrl[..^1] + "2")); // a distinct zaak url
Assert.Equal(2, (await _store.AllAsync()).Count);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("zaken", "zaak", "create")] // the ZGW source S-19b-2 replaced
[InlineData("zaken", "status", "create")] // ditto
[InlineData("objecten", "object", "destroy")] // a delete we do not project
[InlineData("documenten", "object", "create")] // wrong kanaal
[InlineData("documenten", "enkelvoudiginformatieobject", "create")] // wrong kanaal + resource
[InlineData("documenten", "zaak", "create")] // wrong kanaal only
[InlineData("zaken", "zaak", "update")] // wrong actie
[InlineData("zaken", "zaak", "destroy")] // wrong actie
[InlineData("zaken", "status", "update")] // a status change we ignore
[InlineData("zaken", "resultaat", "create")] // not a status we project
public async Task an_unrelated_notification_is_not_projected(string kanaal, string resource, string actie)
{
_acl.Records[ObjectUrl] = new RegisterRecord(ZaakId, RegistrationStatus.Ingediend, "REG-2026-0001");
await Projector().HandleAsync(new Notification(kanaal, resource, actie, new Uri(ObjectUrl)));
await Projector().HandleAsync(new Notification(kanaal, resource, actie, new Uri(ZaakUrl)));
Assert.Empty(await _store.AllAsync());
}
[Fact]
public async Task rebuild_reproduces_the_row_without_re_reading_through_the_acl()
public async Task setting_a_status_projects_ingeschreven_keyed_on_the_zaak_not_the_status()
{
await Projector().HandleAsync(StatusSet());
var entry = Assert.Single(await _store.AllAsync());
// Keyed on the zaak (hoofdObject), not the status resource URL.
Assert.Equal("11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111", entry.Id);
Assert.Equal(RegistrationStatus.Ingeschreven, entry.Status);
}
[Fact]
public async Task approving_updates_the_existing_zaak_row_from_ingediend_to_ingeschreven()
{
var projector = Projector();
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten("partial_update", status: RegistrationStatus.Ingeschreven));
var callsAfterProjection = _acl.CallCount;
await projector.HandleAsync(ZaakCreated());
await projector.HandleAsync(StatusSet());
var entry = Assert.Single(await _store.AllAsync());
Assert.Equal("11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111", entry.Id);
Assert.Equal(RegistrationStatus.Ingeschreven, entry.Status);
}
[Fact]
public async Task rebuild_reproduces_the_approved_status()
{
var projector = Projector();
await projector.HandleAsync(ZaakCreated());
await projector.HandleAsync(StatusSet());
await projector.RebuildAsync();
var entry = Assert.Single(await _store.AllAsync());
Assert.Equal(RegistrationStatus.Ingeschreven, entry.Status);
Assert.Equal("REG-2026-0001", entry.Reference);
// The log holds the projected row itself, so a rebuild needs neither the ACL nor
// Objecten (§8.4, ADR-0030).
Assert.Equal(callsAfterProjection, _acl.CallCount);
}
[Fact]
public async Task rebuild_clears_stale_rows_and_repopulates_from_the_notification_log()
{
var projector = Projector();
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
await projector.HandleAsync(ZaakCreated());
// A stale row that is not backed by any logged notification must not survive a rebuild.
await _store.UpsertAsync(new RegisterEntry("stale-9999", RegistrationStatus.Ingediend));
await projector.RebuildAsync();
var entry = Assert.Single(await _store.AllAsync());
Assert.Equal(ZaakId, entry.Id);
Assert.Equal("11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111", entry.Id);
Assert.Equal(RegistrationStatus.Ingediend, entry.Status);
}
}
@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ public sealed class EfNotificationLog(ProjectionDbContext db) : INotificationLog
db.ProcessedNotifications.Add(new ProcessedNotificationRow
{
Key = notification.Key,
RegisterId = notification.RegisterId,
Status = notification.Status,
Actie = notification.Actie,
ZaakId = notification.ZaakId,
Resource = notification.Resource,
Reference = notification.Reference,
ReceivedAt = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow,
});
@@ -35,6 +36,6 @@ public sealed class EfNotificationLog(ProjectionDbContext db) : INotificationLog
public async Task<IReadOnlyList<RecordedNotification>> AllAsync(CancellationToken ct = default)
=> await db.ProcessedNotifications
.OrderBy(r => r.ReceivedAt)
.Select(r => new RecordedNotification(r.Key, r.RegisterId, r.Status, r.Reference))
.Select(r => new RecordedNotification(r.Key, r.Actie, r.ZaakId, r.Resource, r.Reference))
.ToListAsync(ct);
}
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
// <auto-generated />
using System;
using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore;
using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Infrastructure;
using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Migrations;
using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Storage.ValueConversion;
using Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL.Metadata;
using Projection.ReadModel;
#nullable disable
namespace Projection.ReadModel.Migrations
{
[DbContext(typeof(ProjectionDbContext))]
[Migration("20260828103132_ProjectionSourcedFromObjecten")]
partial class ProjectionSourcedFromObjecten
{
/// <inheritdoc />
protected override void BuildTargetModel(ModelBuilder modelBuilder)
{
#pragma warning disable 612, 618
modelBuilder
.HasAnnotation("ProductVersion", "10.0.0")
.HasAnnotation("Relational:MaxIdentifierLength", 63);
NpgsqlModelBuilderExtensions.UseIdentityByDefaultColumns(modelBuilder);
modelBuilder.Entity("Projection.ReadModel.ProcessedNotificationRow", b =>
{
b.Property<string>("Key")
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("key");
b.Property<DateTimeOffset>("ReceivedAt")
.HasColumnType("timestamp with time zone")
.HasColumnName("received_at");
b.Property<string>("Reference")
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("reference");
b.Property<string>("RegisterId")
.IsRequired()
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("register_id");
b.Property<string>("Status")
.IsRequired()
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("status");
b.HasKey("Key");
b.ToTable("processed_notifications", (string)null);
});
modelBuilder.Entity("Projection.ReadModel.RegisterEntryRow", b =>
{
b.Property<string>("Id")
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("id");
b.Property<string>("Bsn")
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("bsn");
b.Property<string>("NaamPlaceholder")
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("naam_placeholder");
b.Property<string>("Reference")
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("reference");
b.Property<string>("Status")
.IsRequired()
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("status");
b.HasKey("Id");
b.ToTable("register_projection", (string)null);
});
#pragma warning restore 612, 618
}
}
}
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Migrations;
#nullable disable
namespace Projection.ReadModel.Migrations
{
/// <summary>
/// S-19b-2 (ADR-0030): the notification log stops describing ZGW zaak events and starts holding
/// the projected register row itself (register id, status, reference).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The old columns are dropped and the new ones added rather than renamed. EF scaffolded renames
/// (<c>resource</c> → <c>register_id</c>, <c>zaak_id</c> → <c>status</c>), which would carry ZGW
/// values into columns that mean something else entirely — "zaak"/"status" as a register id, a
/// zaak uuid as a register status — and a rebuild would then project that garbage.
///
/// Both tables are emptied instead. A pre-existing row describes a zaak event the new projector
/// cannot reproject, and the registrations behind those rows have no RegisterRecord in Objecten
/// (only approvals wrote one before this slice), so they are not re-derivable from the new source
/// either. The projection is a derived artefact (§8.4) and repopulates as register writes arrive.
/// </remarks>
public partial class ProjectionSourcedFromObjecten : Migration
{
/// <inheritdoc />
protected override void Up(MigrationBuilder migrationBuilder)
{
// ponytail: drops the pre-slice register rather than backfilling it. Fine while stacks are
// ephemeral (a fresh `docker compose up` is the norm). If a long-lived environment ever
// needs to keep them, backfill by walking Objecten's objects instead of replaying the log.
migrationBuilder.Sql("DELETE FROM processed_notifications;");
migrationBuilder.Sql("DELETE FROM register_projection;");
migrationBuilder.DropColumn(name: "actie", table: "processed_notifications");
migrationBuilder.DropColumn(name: "zaak_id", table: "processed_notifications");
migrationBuilder.DropColumn(name: "resource", table: "processed_notifications");
migrationBuilder.AddColumn<string>(
name: "register_id",
table: "processed_notifications",
type: "text",
nullable: false,
defaultValue: "");
migrationBuilder.AddColumn<string>(
name: "status",
table: "processed_notifications",
type: "text",
nullable: false,
defaultValue: "");
}
/// <inheritdoc />
protected override void Down(MigrationBuilder migrationBuilder)
{
migrationBuilder.Sql("DELETE FROM processed_notifications;");
migrationBuilder.Sql("DELETE FROM register_projection;");
migrationBuilder.DropColumn(name: "register_id", table: "processed_notifications");
migrationBuilder.DropColumn(name: "status", table: "processed_notifications");
migrationBuilder.AddColumn<string>(
name: "actie", table: "processed_notifications", type: "text", nullable: false, defaultValue: "");
migrationBuilder.AddColumn<string>(
name: "zaak_id", table: "processed_notifications", type: "text", nullable: false, defaultValue: "");
migrationBuilder.AddColumn<string>(
name: "resource", table: "processed_notifications", type: "text", nullable: false, defaultValue: "");
}
}
}
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ namespace Projection.ReadModel.Migrations
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("key");
b.Property<string>("Actie")
.IsRequired()
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("actie");
b.Property<DateTimeOffset>("ReceivedAt")
.HasColumnType("timestamp with time zone")
.HasColumnName("received_at");
@@ -36,15 +41,15 @@ namespace Projection.ReadModel.Migrations
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("reference");
b.Property<string>("RegisterId")
b.Property<string>("Resource")
.IsRequired()
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("register_id");
.HasColumnName("resource");
b.Property<string>("Status")
b.Property<string>("ZaakId")
.IsRequired()
.HasColumnType("text")
.HasColumnName("status");
.HasColumnName("zaak_id");
b.HasKey("Key");
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ public sealed class ProjectionDbContext(DbContextOptions<ProjectionDbContext> op
e.ToTable("processed_notifications");
e.HasKey(r => r.Key);
e.Property(r => r.Key).HasColumnName("key");
e.Property(r => r.RegisterId).HasColumnName("register_id").IsRequired();
e.Property(r => r.Status).HasColumnName("status").IsRequired();
e.Property(r => r.Actie).HasColumnName("actie").IsRequired();
e.Property(r => r.ZaakId).HasColumnName("zaak_id").IsRequired();
e.Property(r => r.Resource).HasColumnName("resource").IsRequired();
e.Property(r => r.Reference).HasColumnName("reference");
e.Property(r => r.ReceivedAt).HasColumnName("received_at");
});
@@ -55,20 +56,18 @@ public sealed class RegisterEntryRow
public string? NaamPlaceholder { get; set; }
}
/// <summary>An accepted notification, retained so the projection can be rebuilt without reading
/// Objecten or ZGW (§8.1, §8.4). Since S-19b-2 it holds the projected row itself — the register
/// record's id, status and reference — so a rebuild is a replay with no mapping rules (ADR-0030).</summary>
/// <summary>An accepted notification, retained so the projection can be rebuilt without OpenZaak (§8.1).</summary>
public sealed class ProcessedNotificationRow
{
public required string Key { get; set; }
public required string Actie { get; set; }
public required string ZaakId { get; set; }
/// <summary>The registration this record is for (the zaak id) — the projection row's key.</summary>
public required string RegisterId { get; set; }
/// <summary>The ZGW resource (e.g. <c>zaak</c> or <c>status</c>) — retained so a rebuild reprojects
/// the right status without reading OpenZaak (S-09b).</summary>
public required string Resource { get; set; }
/// <summary>The register status the record carried (INGEDIEND / INGESCHREVEN).</summary>
public required string Status { get; set; }
/// <summary>The citizen-facing reference the record carried — matches the submit confirmation (#78).</summary>
/// <summary>The zaak reference (identificatie), retained so a rebuild reprojects it without the ACL (#78).</summary>
public string? Reference { get; set; }
public DateTimeOffset ReceivedAt { get; set; }
@@ -1,28 +1,19 @@
# language: en
# Drives S-19b-2 (#153), re-sourcing S-06 (#7). The read projection is derived from the
# RegisterRecord in Objecten (ADR-0030), not from ZGW zaak events: the ACL records a registration
# in the register, Objecten notifies, and the Event Subscriber projects the record that
# notification points at. This scenario exercises the use case against in-memory stand-ins for the
# register, the projection store and the notification log; real Objecten → NRC → subscriber
# delivery is verified by the live-stack check (verify-projection, ADR-0007/0030).
Feature: Register-projectie bijwerken op een registerwijziging
Als openbaar register wil ik dat een registratie in de projectie verschijnt zodra zij
in het register is vastgelegd, zodat het register haar actuele status kan tonen.
# Drives S-06 (#7). On a zaak-created notification from NRC the Event Subscriber writes a
# rebuildable read-projection row (PRD §8.4). This scenario exercises the use case against an
# in-memory stand-in for the projection store and notification log; real OpenZaak → NRC →
# subscriber delivery is verified by the live-stack check (verify-projection, ADR-0007/#58).
Feature: Register-projectie bijwerken op een zaaknotificatie
Als openbaar register wil ik dat een aangemaakte zaak in de projectie verschijnt
zodat het register de ingediende registratie kan tonen.
Scenario: Een ingediende registratie levert een rij met status INGEDIEND
Given registration "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111" is recorded in the register with status "INGEDIEND"
When the register notification is delivered to the event subscriber
Scenario: Een zaaknotificatie levert een rij met status INGEDIEND
Given a zaak is created in OpenZaak with id "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111"
When the NRC notification for that zaak is delivered to the event subscriber
Then the register projection contains a row for "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111" with status "INGEDIEND"
Scenario: Een goedgekeurde registratie werkt dezelfde rij bij
Given registration "33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333" is recorded in the register with status "INGEDIEND"
And the register notification is delivered to the event subscriber
When registration "33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333" is recorded in the register with status "INGESCHREVEN"
And the register notification is delivered to the event subscriber
Then the register projection contains a row for "33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333" with status "INGESCHREVEN"
Scenario: Dezelfde notificatie tweemaal levert geen duplicaat
Given registration "22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222" is recorded in the register with status "INGEDIEND"
When the register notification is delivered to the event subscriber
And the same register notification is delivered again
Given a zaak is created in OpenZaak with id "22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222"
When the NRC notification for that zaak is delivered to the event subscriber
And the same NRC notification is delivered again
Then the register projection contains exactly one row for "22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222"
@@ -5,39 +5,31 @@ using Xunit;
namespace Acceptance.Steps;
/// <summary>Bindings for <c>RegisterProjectieBijwerken.feature</c> (S-06, re-sourced by S-19b-2).
/// Reqnroll creates one instance per scenario, so instance fields hold scenario-scoped state.</summary>
/// <summary>Bindings for <c>RegisterProjectieBijwerken.feature</c> (S-06). Reqnroll creates
/// one instance per scenario, so instance fields hold scenario-scoped state.</summary>
[Binding]
public sealed class RegisterProjectieBijwerkenSteps
{
private const string ObjectBase = "http://objecten.local:8000/api/v2/objects/";
private const string ZaakBase = "http://openzaak:8000/zaken/api/v1/zaken/";
private readonly InMemoryNotificationLog _log = new();
private readonly InMemoryProjectionStore _store = new();
private readonly InMemoryRegisterRecordClient _register = new();
private readonly NotificationProjector _projector;
private Notification? _notification;
public RegisterProjectieBijwerkenSteps()
=> _projector = new NotificationProjector(_log, _store, _register);
=> _projector = new NotificationProjector(_log, _store, new InMemoryAclReferenceClient());
[Given("registration \"(.*)\" is recorded in the register with status \"(.*)\"")]
[When("registration \"(.*)\" is recorded in the register with status \"(.*)\"")]
public void RegistrationIsRecorded(string id, string status)
{
// The ACL upserts one object per registration, so submit and approval share an object URL.
var objectUrl = ObjectBase + id;
_register.Records[objectUrl] = new RegisterRecord(id, status, "REG-" + id);
_notification = new Notification("objecten", "object", "create", new Uri(objectUrl));
}
[Given("a zaak is created in OpenZaak with id \"(.*)\"")]
public void GivenAZaakIsCreatedInOpenZaakWithId(string id)
=> _notification = new Notification("zaken", "zaak", "create", new Uri(ZaakBase + id));
[Given("the register notification is delivered to the event subscriber")]
[When("the register notification is delivered to the event subscriber")]
public Task TheNotificationIsDelivered()
[When("the NRC notification for that zaak is delivered to the event subscriber")]
public Task WhenTheNotificationIsDelivered()
=> _projector.HandleAsync(_notification!);
[When("the same register notification is delivered again")]
public Task TheSameNotificationIsDeliveredAgain()
[When("the same NRC notification is delivered again")]
public Task WhenTheSameNotificationIsDeliveredAgain()
=> _projector.HandleAsync(_notification!);
[Then("the register projection contains a row for \"(.*)\" with status \"(.*)\"")]
@@ -39,12 +39,10 @@ public sealed class InMemoryProjectionStore : IProjectionStore
=> [.. _byId.Values.Where(e => e.Id == id)];
}
/// <summary>An in-memory stand-in for the register the ACL reads back for the projector, so the
/// scenario runs without a running ACL or Objecten (S-19b-2, ADR-0030).</summary>
public sealed class InMemoryRegisterRecordClient : IAclClient
/// <summary>A fake ACL client for the projection acceptance scenario: returns a reference derived
/// from the zaak, so the projector can enrich rows without a running ACL (#78).</summary>
public sealed class InMemoryAclReferenceClient : IAclClient
{
public Dictionary<string, RegisterRecord> Records { get; } = [];
public Task<RegisterRecord?> GetRegisterRecordAsync(Uri objectUrl, CancellationToken ct = default)
=> Task.FromResult(Records.TryGetValue(objectUrl.ToString(), out var record) ? record : null);
public Task<string> GetZaakReferenceAsync(Uri zaakUrl, CancellationToken ct = default)
=> Task.FromResult("REG-" + zaakUrl.Segments[^1].Trim('/'));
}
@@ -65,8 +65,4 @@ public sealed class InMemoryRegisterRecordGateway : IRegisterRecordGateway
Upserted.Add(record);
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
/// <summary>The most recently written record — scenarios never read one back by object URL.</summary>
public Task<RegisterRecord?> GetAsync(Uri objectUrl, CancellationToken ct = default)
=> Task.FromResult(Upserted.Count == 0 ? null : Upserted[^1]);
}
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
import { expect, test } from '@playwright/test';
import { loginMedewerker } from './medewerker-login';
// S-15a walking skeleton: a beheerder logs in to the beheer portal (medewerker realm) and sees the
// read-only ZTC catalogus. The verify stack seeds and publishes the BIG-REGISTRATIE zaaktype (the
@@ -8,9 +7,10 @@ import { loginMedewerker } from './medewerker-login';
test('a beheerder sees the published zaaktypen in the catalogus', async ({ page }) => {
await page.goto('http://beheer/');
// The beheer portal redirects to the Keycloak medewerker realm login (same realm as behandel),
// which enforces MFA: password, then a TOTP code.
await loginMedewerker(page, 'bram-beheerder');
// The beheer portal redirects to the Keycloak medewerker realm login (same realm as behandel).
await page.locator('#username').fill('bram-beheerder');
await page.locator('#password').fill('test123');
await page.locator('#kc-login').click();
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: /Catalogus/i })).toBeVisible();
+4 -3
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
import { expect, test } from '@playwright/test';
import { loginMedewerker } from './medewerker-login';
// S-15b: a beheerder edits the ACL default-fill in the beheer portal and gets a saved confirmation.
// Runs against the shared verify stack; it edits + saves (the ACL store is in-memory, ADR-0026) and
@@ -7,8 +6,10 @@ import { loginMedewerker } from './medewerker-login';
test('a beheerder edits and saves the default-fill', async ({ page }) => {
await page.goto('http://beheer/');
// Keycloak medewerker-realm login (same realm as behandel) — password + enforced TOTP.
await loginMedewerker(page, 'bram-beheerder');
// Keycloak medewerker-realm login (same realm as behandel).
await page.locator('#username').fill('bram-beheerder');
await page.locator('#password').fill('test123');
await page.locator('#kc-login').click();
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: /Catalogus/i })).toBeVisible();

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