BL-006: the backend has zero automated architecture enforcement.
BIO-016 names the concrete consequence for authorization — nothing
asserted the *set* of gated endpoints, so BIO-003's X-Admin gate
(outside Authz) and BIO-004's two ungated endpoints were caught only
by a human reading Program.cs, not by CI.
Adds RouteInventoryTests: walks the real app's EndpointDataSource and
asserts every mapped route either carries a .Gate("XAdmin") metadata
marker (added at the 16 call sites that already call one of the five
admin wrappers — OrgAdmin/StamdataAdmin/CasesAdmin/Beoordelen/
FlagsAdmin) or appears in a written-down, reasoned allow-list. Proved
it's hard to fool by adding a throwaway unguarded route, watching the
test go red, and reverting.
The allow-list is not "public routes" as the ticket's shorthand put
it — 19 of its 31 entries are ownership-scoped inline (ctx.Zorgverlener()/
ctx.Caller()) endpoints, not public ones, and labelling them public
would misrepresent the exact property BIO-004 was about. Each entry
instead carries its own reason. Implementation note has the full
route-by-route breakdown and judgement calls.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ehoandClaude Opus 5
ee0d449510