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register-referentie/services/event-subscriber/EventSubscriber.Tests/NotificationProjectorTests.cs
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feat: read projection sourced from the register in Objecten (closes #153) (#155)
## What & why

S-19b-2, closing out ADR-0028's stated direction: **the read projection is now derived from the
`RegisterRecord` in Objecten, not from ZGW zaak events.**

Until now the subscriber listened on `zaken` and *inferred* register state from case events — a
`zaak/create` meant INGEDIEND, and any `status/create` was assumed to be the approval (it may not
read OpenZaak, so it could not tell statustypen apart). The reference wasn't in the notification
at all, so every projection made a second hop to the ACL. The register — a fact about a person —
was being reconstructed by guessing at the lifecycle of the case that produced it.

- The subscriber's abonnement moves to the `objecten` kanaal (S-19b-1 made it publish).
- An Objecten notification carries **no record data**, only the object URL, so the record is read
  back through the ACL (`POST /register-records/read`) — §8.1 applies to Objecten exactly as
  ADR-0028 established.
- The record carries `id`, `status` and `reference`, so the row *is* the record: `IsZaakCreated`,
  `IsZaakStatusSet`, `ZaakUrl`, `ZaakId` and `ToEntry`'s `Resource == "status"` inference are all
  gone, and so is the ACL enrichment hop.
- **The ACL now writes an INGEDIEND record on submit.** Without it, re-sourcing would silently
  drop every submitted registration from the public register, since only approval wrote a record.
- `processed_notifications` holds the projected row (`register_id`, `status`, `reference`) instead
  of the ZGW event, so a rebuild is a replay with no mapping rules and no upstream reads at all.

**ADR-0030** records it. ADR-0028's open caveat — record written but not yet read, "the two must
agree" — is closed: there is one source now.

Closes #153

## Definition of Done

- [x] Linked Gitea issue (above).
- [x] Failing tests committed before the implementation — two red/green pairs, ACL side
      (06c0444566ef7d) and subscriber side (142ed458af09b2).
- [x] Refactor commit follows (b496ac9).
- [x] Conventional Commits referencing the issue (`refs #153`).
- [x] CI green — all six jobs on b30fa66, `verify-stack` end to end including the e2e.
- [x] `docker compose up` from a fresh clone reaches green health checks within 3 minutes
      (`verify-stack`'s bring-up step — see the wait-healthy fix below).
- [x] Docs updated — ADR-0030 added, ADR-0028's consequence + caveat annotated, BACKLOG.md,
      e2e header comment.
- [x] ADR added in `docs/architecture/`.
- [x] Demo note in `docs/demo-script.md` — n/a: no user-visible change. The openbaar register
      shows the same two statuses for the same registrations; only where they come from changed.

## Notes for reviewers

**The decision I'd most like a second opinion on** is the one the issue didn't settle: what
happens to INGEDIEND. Objecten held only INGESCHREVEN records, so re-sourcing forced a choice
between (a) the ACL also writing on submit, (b) a public register that lists only actual
registrations, or (c) a hybrid keeping both kanalen. I took (a): visible behaviour is unchanged
and the register holds the whole lifecycle. (b) is arguably the better *semantics* for a public
register but narrows what the portal shows and reads against PRD §68 ("~50 register entries with
diverse statuses"); (c) leaves the projection half-derived from ZGW, which is the coupling
ADR-0028 set out to remove. All three are laid out in ADR-0030.

**The dedup key is the projected row**, `objecten:object:{url}:{status}:{reference}` — not the
object URL (the ACL upserts *one object per registration*, so submit and approval notify about
the same URL and the approval would be swallowed as a duplicate) and not URL+actie (a retried
approval is a second `update`). Redeliveries collapse, genuine state changes don't. §8.6.

**The migration drops columns rather than renaming them.** EF scaffolded renames — `resource` →
`register_id`, `zaak_id` → `status` — which would have carried ZGW values into columns meaning
something else, and a rebuild would then have projected that garbage. It also empties both
tables: a pre-slice row describes a zaak event the new projector can't reproject, and those
registrations have no RegisterRecord in Objecten either, so they're not re-derivable from the new
source. Stated as a ceiling in the ADR — fine while stacks are ephemeral, backfill from Objecten
if a long-lived environment ever needs it.

**`run-projection-check.sh` now opens its zaak through the ACL** instead of straight against
OpenZaak, because the ACL is what writes the record. A zaak created behind the ACL's back
produces no projection row — that's the re-source working, not a gap.

## Three fixes CI found, none of them in the projection logic

1. **`wait-healthy.sh` matched the wrong container** (744f91a). Bring-up timed out with
   `TIMEOUT: 'objecten' not healthy (status=none)` while the `docker ps` it dumps showed
   objecten `Up 9 minutes (healthy)`. `--filter name=` is a substring match, so `objecten` also
   matches `objecten-db`/`objecten-redis`/`objecten-celery`, and `head -1` took whichever docker
   listed first — the celery worker has no healthcheck, hence `status=none`. Latent since those
   services landed and decided purely by listing order; `objecttypen` matches `objecttypen-db`
   the same way. Anchored on the compose replica suffix, which the verify scripts already do.
2. **The ACL had to be repointed at OpenZaak's IP** (7e0897a). Opening the zaak through the ACL
   put this check in the same bind run-domain-check.sh already handles:
   `400 {"name":"zaaktype","code":"bad-url","reason":"Voer een geldige URL in."}`. OpenZaak
   reflects the request Host into the zaaktype URL and then rejects it on zaak-create when
   single-label — the mechanism compose already documents on `ACL_OPENZAAK_BASEURL`.
3. **Approval arrives as `partial_update`, not `update`** (0dd26a7b30fa66) — the one real bug
   in the slice. The ACL upserts with PATCH; DRF routes it through the notifying `update()` but
   names the action `partial_update`, so the projector dropped every approval. Only the e2e could
   catch it: `verify-projection` drives a submit, and per ADR-0028 the e2e is the only check that
   drives a *real* approval.

`verify-tracing` also failed once (run 722) on a path this PR doesn't touch, and passed on a
plain re-run of the same commit. Tempo logged `pusher failed to consume trace data` /
`distributor_pool failing healthcheck` — it dropped spans under runner load rather than the trace
chain being broken. Filed as **#156** rather than absorbed here.

**Correction to the #152 PR notes:** I wrote there that celery concurrency was "the next knob" if
verify-stack got tight. It isn't — `CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY` already defaults to 1 in the Maykin
image, so `objecten-celery` is already a single-process worker. Noted in #156.

**Possible follow-up, deliberately not done here:** an `openzaak.local` network alias mirroring
`objecten.local` would remove the ACL-repoint dance from both run-domain-check.sh and
run-projection-check.sh. It changes the host in every zaak URL the system produces, which is too
broad a ripple to land inside an unrelated slice — worth its own issue.

**Known costs, all in the ADR:** submission is now two writes across two modules and eventually
consistent (same posture ADR-0028 accepted for approval); projecting now depends on the ACL being
reachable on the main path, not just for enrichment (NRC retries, so it converges); and OpenZaak
still publishes to `zaken` with nothing in the product listening — kept because `verify-nrc`
asserts that path.Reviewed-on: #155
2026-09-01 07:26:33 +00:00

147 lines
6.3 KiB
C#

using EventSubscriber.Application;
namespace EventSubscriber.Tests;
/// <summary>Behaviour of the projector that turns NRC notifications into projection rows. Since
/// S-19b-2 the source is the register in Objecten (ADR-0030), not ZGW zaak events: a notification
/// carries only the object URL, so the record is read back through the ACL. Duplicate and
/// out-of-order deliveries must be tolerated (CLAUDE.md §8.6).</summary>
public sealed class NotificationProjectorTests
{
private const string ObjectUrl = "http://objecten.local:8000/api/v2/objects/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
private const string ZaakId = "99999999-9999-9999-9999-999999999999";
private readonly InMemoryNotificationLog _log = new();
private readonly InMemoryProjectionStore _store = new();
private readonly FakeAclClient _acl = new();
private NotificationProjector Projector() => new(_log, _store, _acl);
/// <summary>A register write as Objecten publishes it: the object is both hoofdObject and
/// resourceUrl, and the record itself is only reachable by reading that object.</summary>
private Notification RecordWritten(string actie = "create", string url = ObjectUrl, string status = RegistrationStatus.Ingediend, string zaakId = ZaakId)
{
_acl.Records[url] = new RegisterRecord(zaakId, status, "REG-2026-0001");
return new Notification("objecten", "object", actie, new Uri(url));
}
[Fact]
public async Task a_register_record_write_is_projected_as_a_row_keyed_on_the_registration()
{
await Projector().HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
var entry = Assert.Single(await _store.AllAsync());
// Keyed on the record's own id (the zaak id), not on the Objecten object's uuid — the
// projection row and the register record are the same registration.
Assert.Equal(ZaakId, entry.Id);
Assert.Equal(RegistrationStatus.Ingediend, entry.Status);
Assert.Equal("REG-2026-0001", entry.Reference);
}
// The ACL PATCHes the same object on approval. DRF routes a PATCH through `update()` but reports
// the action as `partial_update`, which is what Objecten puts in the notification — so accepting
// only `create`/`update` silently drops every approval.
[Theory]
[InlineData("partial_update")]
[InlineData("update")]
public async Task approval_updates_the_same_row_from_ingediend_to_ingeschreven(string actie)
{
var projector = Projector();
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten(actie, status: RegistrationStatus.Ingeschreven));
var entry = Assert.Single(await _store.AllAsync());
Assert.Equal(ZaakId, entry.Id);
Assert.Equal(RegistrationStatus.Ingeschreven, entry.Status);
}
[Fact]
public async Task an_object_whose_record_is_gone_is_not_projected()
{
// Nothing seeded in the fake ACL: the object was deleted before this (redelivered)
// notification was handled. Not an error — there is simply nothing to project (§8.6).
await Projector().HandleAsync(new Notification("objecten", "object", "create", new Uri(ObjectUrl)));
Assert.Empty(await _store.AllAsync());
}
[Fact]
public async Task replaying_the_same_notification_keeps_a_single_row()
{
var projector = Projector();
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
Assert.Single(await _store.AllAsync());
}
[Fact]
public async Task a_replayed_notification_never_reaches_the_projection_store()
{
var projector = Projector();
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
// The duplicate is dropped at the log, before the (idempotent) upsert — so the store
// is written exactly once. Row count alone can't see this; the upsert count can.
Assert.Equal(1, _store.UpsertCount);
}
[Fact]
public async Task two_different_registrations_each_get_their_own_row()
{
var projector = Projector();
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten(url: ObjectUrl[..^1] + "2", zaakId: "other-zaak"));
Assert.Equal(2, (await _store.AllAsync()).Count);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("zaken", "zaak", "create")] // the ZGW source S-19b-2 replaced
[InlineData("zaken", "status", "create")] // ditto
[InlineData("objecten", "object", "destroy")] // a delete we do not project
[InlineData("documenten", "object", "create")] // wrong kanaal
public async Task an_unrelated_notification_is_not_projected(string kanaal, string resource, string actie)
{
_acl.Records[ObjectUrl] = new RegisterRecord(ZaakId, RegistrationStatus.Ingediend, "REG-2026-0001");
await Projector().HandleAsync(new Notification(kanaal, resource, actie, new Uri(ObjectUrl)));
Assert.Empty(await _store.AllAsync());
}
[Fact]
public async Task rebuild_reproduces_the_row_without_re_reading_through_the_acl()
{
var projector = Projector();
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten("partial_update", status: RegistrationStatus.Ingeschreven));
var callsAfterProjection = _acl.CallCount;
await projector.RebuildAsync();
var entry = Assert.Single(await _store.AllAsync());
Assert.Equal(RegistrationStatus.Ingeschreven, entry.Status);
Assert.Equal("REG-2026-0001", entry.Reference);
// The log holds the projected row itself, so a rebuild needs neither the ACL nor
// Objecten (§8.4, ADR-0030).
Assert.Equal(callsAfterProjection, _acl.CallCount);
}
[Fact]
public async Task rebuild_clears_stale_rows_and_repopulates_from_the_notification_log()
{
var projector = Projector();
await projector.HandleAsync(RecordWritten());
// A stale row that is not backed by any logged notification must not survive a rebuild.
await _store.UpsertAsync(new RegisterEntry("stale-9999", RegistrationStatus.Ingediend));
await projector.RebuildAsync();
var entry = Assert.Single(await _store.AllAsync());
Assert.Equal(ZaakId, entry.Id);
Assert.Equal(RegistrationStatus.Ingediend, entry.Status);
}
}