6 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
notandClaude Opus 4.8	39923e0e68	fix(e2e): treat the http portal origin as secure so DigiD PKCE login works (refs #68) ... The walking-skeleton e2e timed out waiting for the Keycloak login form (`#username`). Root cause: in the compose network the portal is served over plain HTTP on a non-localhost origin (http://self-service), which is not a secure context, so Web Crypto (`crypto.subtle`) is undefined. angular-auth- oidc-client needs SubtleCrypto to build the PKCE code challenge, so `authorize()` threw ("Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'digest')") and the login redirect never fired. Production serves the portal over HTTPS, where this works. Instead of terminating TLS in the throwaway e2e stack, tell Chromium to treat the origin as secure via --unsafely-treat-insecure-origin-as-secure. The flag is only honoured by the full Chromium build (new headless), not Playwright's default headless-shell, so pin channel: 'chromium'. Verified against a minimal in-network stack (keycloak + self-service): login redirect now reaches the Keycloak form, and the full login → token exchange → authenticated portal renders with no console errors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-13 13:37:31 +02:00
notandClaude Opus 4.8	490e7347b0	test(e2e): walking-skeleton Playwright happy path + verify-e2e lane (refs #68) ... tests/e2e Playwright spec drives DigiD login (jan-burger/test123) → submit → confirmation against the compose-served portal. run-e2e-check.sh runs it inside the compose network (node container, browser installed at runtime) so the token issuer (keycloak:8080) matches the BFF authority (ADR-0010). Wired as verify-e2e (Makefile + verify chain + a verify-stack CI step). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-01 14:08:10 +02:00
notandClaude Opus 4.8	5d32d4f15e	test(bff): acceptance scenario for BFF access (valid/invalid tokens) (refs #8) ... Use-case-level BDD (Reqnroll) driving the real BFF over HTTP with fake downstreams and locally-minted tokens: a valid DigiD token is accepted and the bsn forwarded to the domain; a tokenless submit is 401; the openbaar register is anonymous and never exposes the bsn (ADR-0010). Real Keycloak validation is the verify-bff check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-01 11:03:37 +02:00
notandClaude Opus 4.8	79dcd8f14b	test(domain): acceptance scenario for submitting a registration (refs #6) ... Use-case-level BDD (Reqnroll) for S-05: a zorgprofessional submits a registration; the Domain Service starts the registratie process and the OpenZaakAanmaken external task opens a zaak via the ACL, recorded on the aggregate (ADR-0009). Driven against in-memory Workflow Client and ACL stand-ins; real Flowable+ACL+OpenZaak delivery is the live-stack verify-domain check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-30 17:15:23 +02:00
notandClaude Opus 4.8	c70840e5b7	test(event-subscriber): project zaak-created notifications into the read projection (refs #7) ... Failing unit + acceptance tests for the Event Subscriber's NotificationProjector: a zaken/zaak/create notification yields one INGEDIEND projection row, duplicate deliveries collapse to one row, non-zaak/non-create notifications are ignored, and a rebuild repopulates the projection from the durable notification log (PRD §8.4). The projector is a no-op stub so the tests compile and fail on the assertions; the implementation follows in the green commit. The notification log doubles as the idempotency guard and rebuild source so a rebuild needs no OpenZaak access (§8.1). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-30 14:47:16 +02:00
eho	28041228bd	test(acl): BDD acceptance scenario for opening a zaak (closes #5) (#49)	2026-06-08 11:25:26 +00:00