IIdentityProvider.Resolve returned a non-nullable CallerIdentity, so
the interface could not express "no identity" - StubIdentityProvider
was forced to invent one for any request carrying no credential at
all. Consequence: a production behandelportal build sends no
X-Medewerker header (medewerkerInterceptor is dev-only), so it used
to authenticate as the seeded citizen, role drafter - failing closed
on backoffice capabilities but open on every citizen-scoped endpoint,
including CanRevealBigNummer.
Resolve now returns CallerIdentity?. StubIdentityProvider keeps a
non-nullable return type (a valid narrower override) since it never
itself has "no identity" to report - it is registered only under
IsDevelopment() now. Production registers nothing and throws an
InvalidOperationException immediately during startup instead: there
is no real DigiD/employee-SSO provider in this POC yet, so a
misconfigured Production deploy must fail before serving a single
request, not resolve one per request. The identity-resolution
middleware turns a null resolution into a 401 rather than passing it
downstream.
Added StubIdentityProviderTests.Never_returns_null_even_with_no_headers_at_all
and ProductionIdentityProviderTests, which builds its own
WebApplicationFactory<Program> with UseEnvironment("Production") and
asserts startup throws. Verified both new tests fail red against the
pre-fix code.
RB-01's residual (GET /uploads/{id}/content reached via plain browser
navigation, no identity header) is confirmed unchanged in Development
and its Production consequence is written up in
implementation/rb-09.md for whoever lands the real identity provider -
no signed-URL/cookie scheme was designed here, per scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DELETE /admin/uploads/{documentId} was gated by a standalone
`X-Admin: true` header check (`IsAdmin`), outside the `Authz` module
entirely and outside the `CasesAdmin`/`StamdataAdmin`/`OrgAdmin`/
`FlagsAdmin` wrappers the four sibling admin surfaces use. It wrote no
AuthzAuditStore row, so a destructive cross-owner document delete never
appeared on /beheer/audit. A repo-wide grep confirmed the only sender of
X-Admin was the backend test itself — no frontend or e2e path depends on
it — so the gate was safe to delete outright.
Routed the endpoint through CasesAdmin (Authz.CanManageCases), the same
wrapper the other admin-cases endpoints use. RB-07 already moved
AuditAuthz onto every *Admin wrapper's allow path, so this gets the
missing audit row for free with no second AuditAuthz call. Deleted the
now-unused IsAdmin function and updated the two comments that referenced
the old X-Admin seam.
Updated EndpointTests.cs's Admin_delete_requires_admin_role to send
X-Role: admin instead of X-Admin: true, and added
AuthzAuditTests.An_admin_upload_delete_is_recorded, which asserts the
cases:manage/allow row count increases by exactly one (a plain
Contains would already be satisfied by this test class's other
cases:manage calls). Verified both tests fail red against the
pre-fix gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
All five authorization gates audited only their deny branch, so /beheer/audit
could answer "who was turned away" but never "who changed this" — for a
register whose integrity is the product, the wrong half. Nothing recorded the
flag toggle, either org-template write, the admin case or upload delete, the
three brief transitions, or the besluit; the comment claiming endpoints log
their own effect held for two of the eight.
Each gate now computes the decision once, audits it, and then acts. The row
is written by the gate rather than the endpoint, so a new admin endpoint
cannot be added that forgets to audit itself. Same reasoning for the brief:
every transition already funnelled through LogBrief for its log line, so the
audit row goes there too — submit/approve/reject/send in one place, with the
transition's own outcome as the decision, so a 403 or 409 is as visible as a
success.
FlagsAdmin gained a per-call resource, the one deviation from BIO-007's
minimal remediation: the toggle endpoint writes no log line of its own, so a
constant "feature-flags" row would say a flag changed without saying which.
It now records feature-flags/<key>=<value>. OrgAdmin and CasesAdmin keep
coarse refs because those endpoints do log the specific object.
The besluit gets a second row: the gate records that a behandelaar was
allowed to act, aanvraag:besluit records what they decided.
Row volume goes up — StamdataAdmin gates read endpoints, so admin page loads
now write rows. That is what auditing the allow path means; it is also what
would make retention on AuthzAuditStore necessary later.
Closes CQ-004's outstanding half and unblocks signing ADR-C-009.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /registrations passed its Documents list straight to Submit, which calls
DocumentStore.Link on every digital documentId in it — and linking a document
blocks its owner from ever deleting it (DeleteOwned returns 409 Linked). That
path had no ForeignIds ownership check, so any authenticated citizen could
post another citizen's document id and permanently block them from deleting
their own diploma scan. POST /applications/{id}/submit, the endpoint actually
in use, has had that guard since it was written.
Deleted rather than guarded: the endpoint is dead. No frontend caller, and
the whole registratie flow goes through /applications/{id}/submit.
RegistratieRequest went with it, and so did SubmissionRules.RejectRegistratie
— reachable only from here, and contradicted by the live path, which treats a
handmatig diploma as "does not auto-approve" rather than a 422 rejection. Its
own message said as much while being returned as a rejection. That last part
is a judgement call beyond the ticket's wording; reverting the two
SubmissionRules hunks restores it in isolation.
Coverage moved rather than vanished: the problem+json shape assertion is now
on /change-requests (the other endpoint on the same Submit helper), and the
linked-delete 409 test goes through the real submit path.
swagger.json, the generated client and the behaviour spec regenerated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ZgwHttpClient interpolated the full request uri and up to 500 characters of
the response body into its failure message. That message is persisted as
Aanvraag.ZgwError in SQLite and written to the log, and both halves can carry
a BSN: ZGW filters travel as query parameters (the citizen-scoped zaken list
filters on rol__betrokkeneIdentificatie__natuurlijkPersoon__inpBsn), and
OpenZaak echoes the offending request in its error bodies, so a rejected POST
/rollen comes back holding the owner BSN it was sent.
All three interpolation sites now use Redact(url) — the path without its
query — and the body snippet is replaced by the reason phrase. Status plus
path still routes a failure to the right endpoint; the lost detail already
has a deliberate home in ZGW_DEBUG_HTTP=1 (ZgwDiagnosticHandler), which is
opt-in, dev-only and not persisted.
The new test fails the one call in the fixture whose url carries a query
string and asserts the persisted ZgwError has neither the body snippet nor a
"?", while keeping the path and the 503. Verified red without the fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DocumentStore wrote one audit row per upload and per user delete carrying the
acting citizen's raw BSN as AuditEntry.Actor, persisted to SQLite — on a
store whose own doc comment says it holds metadata only, never file content
"or other PII". Same shape as RB-02, in a second store.
Masked at the two citizen call sites rather than inside Audit, because the
third actor is the literal "admin" and MaskTail("admin", 3) is "**min";
masking centrally would mean guessing which actors are BSNs and which are
role names. Audit's doc comment now states that actors arrive redacted.
StoredDocument.Owner is untouched: it is the authorization key that
DeleteOwned, ForeignIds and RB-01's content check all compare against, so the
BSN stays where it is load-bearing and leaves the trail where it was only
decoration. No endpoint exposes AuditLog, so no response shape changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mappers.ToAdminSummaryDto set Owner to the raw BSN. Both consumers are
cross-owner lists read by someone who is not the subject — GET /admin/cases
and GET /werkvoorraad — while GET /beoordeling/{id}, the detail view of the
same data, already masked it. The detail screen showed ******782 and the list
one click earlier showed the whole thing.
Masked in the mapper rather than at each endpoint, so a third cross-owner
list cannot be added that forgets to.
MaskTail moves out of Program.cs into Domain/People/Pii.cs: it now has
callers in Contracts, Program.cs and (once RB-04 lands) Data, and a second
hand-rolled copy is how one of them drifts into leaking. Documented as
idempotent, which is what lets /beoordeling/{id} keep its own call —
IZaakSource has a second implementation whose Owner is mapped from the
OpenZaak zaak identificatie, so that endpoint should not depend on which
source answered.
No frontend change: all three consumers display the value, and the parse
boundaries only require a non-empty string.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Program.cs built the BIG-nummer reveal's audit resource ref as
"brief/" + ctx.Zorgverlener().Bsn. AuditAuthz persists that to the
AuthzAudit.Resource column in SQLite and /admin/audit renders it, so a BSN
reached durable storage and a UI on the one trail four documents describe as
data-minimised and PII-free — on the endpoint whose own comment promises the
audit carries no PII.
The ref is now "brief". Nothing is lost: BriefStore keys one brief per owner,
so the id named what the row's acting principal already implies.
The existing guard, The_audit_schema_carries_no_pii, asserts on column names,
so a BSN inside a column called Resource could never fail it. Added
No_audit_row_carries_a_subjects_bsn, which drives a denied reveal as a
non-default subject and scans every string field of every row for that BSN
and for DemoOwner — asserting on the two BSNs actually in play rather than a
\d{9} shape, since a hex correlation id can hold nine digits by chance.
Verified it goes red when only the Program.cs line is reverted.
AuditEntry.Actor on document audit rows holds a raw BSN too; that is a
different store and stays with RB-04.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /uploads/{documentId}/content took only (string documentId) — no
HttpContext, so no authorization was possible. It streams diploma and
identity scans, protected by GUID unguessability alone, while DELETE on the
same resource has always been owner-scoped. GET /uploads/status had the same
shape and confirmed whether any client-chosen localId exists, plus its
documentId.
Both now take HttpContext. Content is readable by the owning
ZorgverlenerCaller or a caller passing Authz.CanBeoordelen — matched on the
caller kind rather than branched on a boolean, because ctx.Zorgverlener()
throws for a MedewerkerCaller and the behandelportal's beoordeling screen is
a legitimate reader. Status is scoped to ctx.Zorgverlener().Bsn via a new
owner parameter on DocumentStore.ByLocalIds (one call site).
404, not 403, on both: a foreign document id must not be distinguishable
from one that never existed, and a foreign localId reads back as "unknown".
Residual, recorded in the implementation note: both callers reach the URL as
a plain browser navigation (<a href> / previewUrl), which carries no identity
header and no interceptor, so StubIdentityProvider resolves it to the seeded
citizen. That is BIO-002 and belongs to RB-09; the links keep working today
only because one citizen owns every document in the POC.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Runs the multi-agent refactoring-backlog pipeline in docs/project/
refactor-backlog-setup/ up to and including three of the seven Phase 1
agents.
00-baseline.md establishes the metrics every later agent must cite, using
only tooling already in the repo (vitest lcov, coverlet cobertura, ESLint's
core `complexity` rule at threshold 0 for a full distribution, depcruise
--metrics). Duplication and C# complexity had no tooling, so
tools/baseline-scan.mjs adds a deterministic ~200-line text scan rather
than a new dependency; the approximations are labelled as such.
Headline: FE 75.1% line coverage but only over the 98 of 220 source files a
spec loads; BE 97.6% line / 79.6% branch; 0 layering violations; 7.1%
duplication; 25 of 2085 TS functions over CC 10.
Then 02-testability, 04-cqrs-light and 06-adr-conformance (27 findings).
01/03/05 were skipped deliberately — the baseline shows little for them to
find; 07 (BIO2) and 08 (consolidation) are still open.
Each agent corrected a baseline observation of mine, and in every case the
error was in something derived rather than measured:
- BL-007 counted ~13 adapter "mutations" from the `runSubmit` helper name;
5 of those call sites are reads. It also missed 3 real mutations that
reach the raw ApiClient and never return a Result.
- BL-002 diagnosed the 100%-duplicated auth folders as ADR-0002's
divergence prediction failing. It never had a chance to fail: §3's
`Principal` union was never built.
- BL-004 named libs/shared/domain and libs/beheer/contracts as coverage
gaps; both are pure type declarations where 0% is unimprovable.
All three corrections are recorded inline in 00-baseline.md §10, so agent
08 does not inherit the bad numbers.
.prettierignore excludes the agent prompt directories — reflowing their
markdown would edit the prompt text itself.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ehoandClaude Opus 5