Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
ehoandClaude Opus 5 6ffd3643b1 fix(audit): stop writing a BSN into the authz audit Resource (RB-02)
Program.cs built the BIG-nummer reveal's audit resource ref as
"brief/" + ctx.Zorgverlener().Bsn. AuditAuthz persists that to the
AuthzAudit.Resource column in SQLite and /admin/audit renders it, so a BSN
reached durable storage and a UI on the one trail four documents describe as
data-minimised and PII-free — on the endpoint whose own comment promises the
audit carries no PII.

The ref is now "brief". Nothing is lost: BriefStore keys one brief per owner,
so the id named what the row's acting principal already implies.

The existing guard, The_audit_schema_carries_no_pii, asserts on column names,
so a BSN inside a column called Resource could never fail it. Added
No_audit_row_carries_a_subjects_bsn, which drives a denied reveal as a
non-default subject and scans every string field of every row for that BSN
and for DemoOwner — asserting on the two BSNs actually in play rather than a
\d{9} shape, since a hex correlation id can hold nine digits by chance.
Verified it goes red when only the Program.cs line is reverted.

AuditEntry.Actor on document audit rows holds a raw BSN too; that is a
different store and stays with RB-04.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 10:49:57 +02:00
ehoandClaude Opus 5 a2e935d1d8 fix(uploads): authorize the document-content and status endpoints (RB-01)
GET /uploads/{documentId}/content took only (string documentId) — no
HttpContext, so no authorization was possible. It streams diploma and
identity scans, protected by GUID unguessability alone, while DELETE on the
same resource has always been owner-scoped. GET /uploads/status had the same
shape and confirmed whether any client-chosen localId exists, plus its
documentId.

Both now take HttpContext. Content is readable by the owning
ZorgverlenerCaller or a caller passing Authz.CanBeoordelen — matched on the
caller kind rather than branched on a boolean, because ctx.Zorgverlener()
throws for a MedewerkerCaller and the behandelportal's beoordeling screen is
a legitimate reader. Status is scoped to ctx.Zorgverlener().Bsn via a new
owner parameter on DocumentStore.ByLocalIds (one call site).

404, not 403, on both: a foreign document id must not be distinguishable
from one that never existed, and a foreign localId reads back as "unknown".

Residual, recorded in the implementation note: both callers reach the URL as
a plain browser navigation (<a href> / previewUrl), which carries no identity
header and no interceptor, so StubIdentityProvider resolves it to the seeded
citizen. That is BIO-002 and belongs to RB-09; the links keep working today
only because one citizen owns every document in the POC.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 10:48:04 +02:00
ehoandClaude Opus 5 664a43bf2d docs: refactoring-backlog workspace — baseline + 3 Phase 1 agents
Runs the multi-agent refactoring-backlog pipeline in docs/project/
refactor-backlog-setup/ up to and including three of the seven Phase 1
agents.

00-baseline.md establishes the metrics every later agent must cite, using
only tooling already in the repo (vitest lcov, coverlet cobertura, ESLint's
core `complexity` rule at threshold 0 for a full distribution, depcruise
--metrics). Duplication and C# complexity had no tooling, so
tools/baseline-scan.mjs adds a deterministic ~200-line text scan rather
than a new dependency; the approximations are labelled as such.

Headline: FE 75.1% line coverage but only over the 98 of 220 source files a
spec loads; BE 97.6% line / 79.6% branch; 0 layering violations; 7.1%
duplication; 25 of 2085 TS functions over CC 10.

Then 02-testability, 04-cqrs-light and 06-adr-conformance (27 findings).
01/03/05 were skipped deliberately — the baseline shows little for them to
find; 07 (BIO2) and 08 (consolidation) are still open.

Each agent corrected a baseline observation of mine, and in every case the
error was in something derived rather than measured:

- BL-007 counted ~13 adapter "mutations" from the `runSubmit` helper name;
  5 of those call sites are reads. It also missed 3 real mutations that
  reach the raw ApiClient and never return a Result.
- BL-002 diagnosed the 100%-duplicated auth folders as ADR-0002's
  divergence prediction failing. It never had a chance to fail: §3's
  `Principal` union was never built.
- BL-004 named libs/shared/domain and libs/beheer/contracts as coverage
  gaps; both are pure type declarations where 0% is unimprovable.

All three corrections are recorded inline in 00-baseline.md §10, so agent
08 does not inherit the bad numbers.

.prettierignore excludes the agent prompt directories — reflowing their
markdown would edit the prompt text itself.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 16:44:32 +02:00